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Abbreviations
MFA The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MI The Ministry of Industry
NPN Norsk Polar Navigasjon
Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard started in 1961 when the American oil 
company, Caltex, won claims on the archipelago. When conferring the 
claims, the Ministry of Industry ignored a statute pertaining to handing 
in deposit samples. Geological indications of the possibility of oil be-
ing present were deemed sufficient. Whether this decision might have 
foreign political implications, especially vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, was 
not considered. However, the lenient treatment of Caltex established a 
precedent. The Svalbard Treaty’s principle of non-discrimination created 
opportunities for other companies. Soon, both the Norwegian company, 
Norsk Polar Navigasjon, and the Russian company, Arktikugol, started 
searching for oil on Svalbard. 
To the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs it became evident that the 
government had to take a more active approach on Svalbard if Norway 
was to control the situation. This policy was initially challenged by Cal-
tex and the Ministry of Industry, but by the summer of 1963, Norwegian 
Svalbard policy had taken a new course. From then on the Norwegian 
government utilized its legislative authority to a much larger degree than 
before, resulting in several regulatory actions on the archipelago.
KEYWORDS:  Svalbard, Spitsbergen, Norwegian oil policy, Norwegian foreign 
policy, High North
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Located between 10º and 35º East and between 74º and 81º North, the 
archipelago of Svalbard is the northernmost part of Norway. Once im-
agined as the jewel of Norway’s Arctic possessions, it was recognized 
as Norwegian by the Svalbard Treaty of 1920.1 The treaty subjected 
the recognition of Norwegian sovereignty to stipulations, which have 
caused a number of disputes between Norway and other parties to the 
treaty, some of which remain unresolved. The sovereign’s sole right 
to petroleum deposits on the continental shelf surrounding the archi-
pelago and fishery regulation in the adjacent seas are the main bones of 
contention. This study analyzes the formative stages of Norwegian oil 
policy on Svalbard from 1960 to 1967. But notably, current disputes 
and the dispute analyzed in this study basically follow the same lines: 
it is a question of the real content of Norwegian sovereignty. 
During the scope of time of this study, the American oil company 
Caltex2 was a central figure. Throughout the 1960s it was keenly in-
terested in Svalbard, and although it was not the only company in-
terested, it was the first one. Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard thus 
largely resulted from the challenges created by Caltex’s activity on 
the archipelago. Moreover, the Norwegian authorities’ treatment of 
 Caltex was harshly criticized, giving rise to the phrase “the Caltex 
case”. 
This study is in six chapters. In the first chapter, the theme and re-
search questions of the study are introduced, as are theoretical perspec-
tives and research contributions. Chapter two summarizes Svalbard’s 
history from the beginning of the 1900s to the 1960s, focusing on 
1 Its official name is “Treaty between Norway, The United States of America, Den-
mark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Ireland and the British 
overseas Dominions and Sweden concerning Spitsbergen signed in Paris 9th Febru-
ary 1920”. For simplicity, “the Svalbard Treaty” or “the treaty” will be used in this 
study.  
2 California Asiatic Oil Company & Texas Overseas Petroleum Company.
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the archipelago’s position in international law and on foreign politi-
cal challenges to Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard. Chapters three 
and four deal with oil interests on Svalbard, and how the Norwegian 
authorities managed these. The way in which oil interests challenged 
Norwegian sovereignty and the reaction of the Norwegian authori-
ties to this are focused on. The concluding chapter summarizes the 
research findings and synthesizes the arguments introduced in the pre-
vious chapters. 
Research questions
The Svalbard Treaty and the Cold War both strongly influenced Norway’s 
Svalbard policy. According to MP Torstein Selvik (Norwegian Labour 
Party), “… practically all Svalbard matters have a foreign political as-
pect, and in many cases the foreign political aspect is dominant”.3 The 
Caltex case was no different. This main aim of this study is to investi-
gate how oil interests threatened to undermine Norwegian sovereignty 
over the archipelago, and how Norwegian countermeasures reversed 
this development. As a result, Norway’s exercise of sovereignty became 
strengthened from 1960 to 1967. Within this main framework, three 
more questions will be asked. 
First, the Norwegian oil policy for Svalbard was first drafted at 
the Ministry of Industry (MI) and was based on how Caltex’s modern 
oil exploration techniques could fit with old regulations designed for 
coal mining. The result was surprisingly liberal. Based on seemingly 
little preparatory work, Caltex won the sole right to search for and ex-
tract petroleum from areas comprising more than two hundred thou-
sand hectares. How did Caltex manage to obtain such good terms on 
Svalbard, and can any ulterior motives be found behind the decision? 
Second, there were unique bureaucratic conditions at the MI at the 
beginning of the 1960s. At the same time, the ministry was an im-
portant institution for Norwegian Svalbard policy. Did complications 
and disagreement within the government’s administrative machinery 
complicate the Norwegian authorities’ treatment of Caltex, and, if so, 
which consequences did this have for the administration of Svalbard? 
The questions above touch upon different dimensions of Norway’s 
Svalbard policy (foreign, oil, administrative and environmental policy). 
3 SA, Closed sitting in the Storting, 25 February 1965, p. 3 (author’s translation).
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The border lines between these have always been blurred. The third 
and final issue in this study is thus to examine the relationship be-
tween the various dimensions. 
Svalbard and the Cold War literature
This study will be informed rather than dictated by theory. But to 
help identify the place of Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard within the 
analytical framework of Norwegian Cold War history, I have found 
it useful to draw upon an article by the historian, Rolf Tamnes, in 
which he accounts for three theories concerning Norwegian foreign-
political decision-making processes during the Cold War: one-party 
politics, international frameworks, and institutional interests.4 The question 
is whether Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard between 1960 and 1967 
can be analyzed within any of these perspectives. 
The thesis concerning the perspective of one-party politics for the 
years 1945–1965 is that Norway’s foreign policy decision-making 
process was formulated and concluded within the political apparatus 
of the Labour Party.5 The government was an executive for the Labour 
Party, while the Storting was demoted to rubberstamping decisions de 
facto already carried.6 A great deal suggests that the one-party politics 
perspective is fairly precise, but that its validity decreased during the 
1950s, as intraparty disagreements over security policy took form.7 
Moreover, Labour lost its majority in the Storting in 1961.8 It there-
fore seems reasonable to assume that the one-party politics perspective is 
not valid for the temporal focus of this study, 1960–1967. 
The international framework perspective has its theoretical foun-
dation in the realist school of thought, with military strength and 
industrial and economic potential providing the foundation for un-
derstanding a country’s foreign political decisions.9 Norway was an in-
significant international figure whose foreign policy was characterized 
4 R. Tamnes, “Ettpartistat, småstat og særinteresser. Tre skoler i norsk sikkerhetspoli-
tikk” [One Party State, Small State and Special Interests. Three Schools of Thought in 
Norwegian Security Policy], Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift, no. 3 (1986): 42.
5 Within Norwegian historiography, this perspective is accredited to Prof. Jens Arup 
Seip, and is known as the “Seip School of Thought”. 
6 The Storting is the Norwegian parliament.
7 R. Tamnes, “Ettpartistat …”: 43–44, 48.
8 In Norway, unlike in the UK or the US, elections result in a multiparty system. The 
Labour Party continued to occupy the executive branch until 1965. 
9 Within Norwegian historiography, this perspective is accredited to Prof. Magne Skod-
vin, and is known as the “Skodvin School of Thought”.
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by limited manoeuvrability within an international framework. As a 
small country Norway had limited options for influencing this frame-
work. Therefore, the major theoretical difference between the interna-
tional framework perspective and the one-party politics perspective is in 
the emphasis of the external frame. 
The institutional interest perspective is very much similar to the 
political scientist Graham T. Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Paradigm,10 
but its academic origins stem from the sociologist Stein Rokkan’s the-
ory of corporative pluralism from 1964. In a study of the channels of 
influence available to Norway’s opposition parties, it was concluded 
that they increasingly promoted their interests through special inter-
est organizations and corporative amalgamations.11 As a continuation 
of Rokkan’s theory, the institutional interest perspective suggests that 
Norway’s foreign policy was also affected by national forces outside 
the Labour Party and the Government’s reach.12 The foreign-political 
decision-making process became more fragmented due to institutional 
growth and strengthened sector competence. The ministries became 
more strongly attached to interest organizations. The Storting’s com-
mittees were also closely interlinked with special interests. Politicians 
and bureaucrats identified themselves with segmental interests and in-
creasingly acted to benefit these interests.13 
However, historians generally agree that the political leadership 
could largely shape the major issues. Tamnes writes in this regard that 
“… the Cabinet as college has played an important part in central 
questions of security policy”. The same may be said of the Storting’s 
Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs, which was “… composed of 
the parliamentarian elite, [and] upheld national and coordinating per-
spectives in a different manner ...” than the other committees.14 
It seems plausible, however, to assume that the institutional inter-
est perspective can provide some insight into the Caltex case and oil 
policy on Svalbard – before this became a topic for Norway’s political 
leadership. Extensive special sector interests may have paved the way 
for a ministry which considered itself to be in a position to challenge 
10 G. T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, The American Politi-
cal Science Review, no. 3 (1969).
11 S. Rokkan, Stat, nasjon, klasse. Essays i politisk sosiologi [State, nation, class. Essays in 
political sociology] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget,1987) pp. 95–99.
12 Within Norwegian historiography, this perspective is accredited to Prof. Gudmund 
Hernes, and is known as the “Hernes School of Thought”.
13 R. Tamnes, “Ettpartistat …”: 54.
14 Ibid: 54, 58–60 (author’s translation).
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other ministries on overlapping policy issues. The Government’s and 
the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs’ assessments of the Caltex 
case are thus important, as both institutions are regarded as possible 
coordinators of and checks on ministerial and segmental interests. 
Perceptions of threats and the  
“Svalbard System”
The postulate of the international framework perspective has been large-
ly accepted by Norwegian historians and political scientists interested 
in Svalbard. Tor Bjørn Arlov and Arild Moe have for example asserted 
that foreign and security political conditions always have been deci-
sive for the Norwegian authorities’ handling of Svalbard. Norway’s 
prudence has been motivated by the proximity of the Soviet Union 
and a concern that the Cold War conflict could undermine Norwegian 
exercise of sovereignty.15
As a continuation of the above, more specific theses of Norwegian 
Svalbard policy have been proposed. Tamnes has pointed out an in-
terplay between three types of threats which the Norwegian authori-
ties have faced in matters concerning Svalbard. The primary threat was 
the Soviet Union; Norway could neither counterbalance the Soviets 
nor establish a policy of deterrence against them in the region. At 
the same time two secondary threats existed, both of which could trig-
ger the primary one: Western activities (the external secondary threat), 
and even some non-official Norwegian enterprises (the domestic second-
ary threat), could threaten Norway’s interests by provoking a negative 
reaction from Moscow. To maintain the status quo and reassure the 
Soviet  Union, the Norwegian authorities were extremely wary of any 
Western and Norwegian activities. This policy of screening secondary 
threats was most conspicuous in questions of a military potential.16
Tamnes has also asserted that a decisive factor in the archipelago’s 
“… position in the international system” has been which countries have 
had an interest in Svalbard. Regarding the scope of time of this study, 
15 T. B. Arlov, Svalbards historie [Svalbard’s History], Oslo, p. 422–26; A. Moe, 1983: 
Utenrikspolitiske rammebetingelser og norsk Svalbard-politikk [Foreign political conditions 
and Norwegian Svalbard policy], master thesis in political science (Oslo: University of 
Oslo, 1996), pp. 136–38, 141–49.
16 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og den politiske avmakt. Striden om flyplass, olje og telemetri-stasjon. 
1955–1970 [Svalbard and political impotence. The dispute over the airport, oil and 
the telemetry station, 1959–1970], Forsvarsstudier, no. 1 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute 
for Defence Studies, 1992), p. 5.
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it is important to be aware that “… the inner circle of the Svalbard 
System comprised Norway and the Soviet Union”. The Cold War and 
Norway’s integration into the Western Bloc allowed for increased 
Western interest, but because of the threat pattern, Norway limited 
the magnitude and scope of integration through policies of screening 
and regional low tension. Western interests remained modest.17
The historian Geir Lundestad has categorized Europe’s place in 
Moscow’s foreign policy in the years after World War II. Countries 
were divided into different spheres – from inner ones to outer ones 
– based on their geographical proximity to the Soviet Union and the 
Kremlin’s analysis of the significance of the nation concerned for Soviet 
security.18 Norway was in the outer sphere, indicating that Moscow 
found little reason to involve itself heavily with the country. However, 
in the Arctic an older Russian screening policy existed and continues 
to exist, which is not primarily based on military aspects and politi-
cal consolidation, but on nationalism, Arctic imperialism, scientists, 
hunters, fishermen, and adventurers: this is where a Russian desire to 
exclude other powers from the High North has its roots. But the ob-
verse of this is that after Svalbard became Norwegian, a Russian fear 
surfaced that Norway would expel Russian interests from the archipel-
ago. The desire to exclude others and the fear of being excluded have 
both increased as the Arctic region gained in strategic importance.19
Methodological approach
There is much literature on the Cold War and Norway. Research in 
the last decade has largely been based on the foundation laid by Norsk 
utenrikspolitikks historie – a six-volume work on the history of Norway’s 
foreign relations. Much of the literature also deals with Svalbard’s 
17 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og stormaktene. Fra ingenmannsland til Kald Krig, 1870–1953 [Sval-
bard and the great powers. From no man’s land to cold war 1870–1953], Forsvarss-
tudier, no. 7 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1991), p. 9. The chro-
nological scope of Tamnes’ “Svalbard System” is 1870–1953. However, based on other 
historical literature, for example Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, vol. V, by K. E. Eriksen 
and H. Pharo (1995), and vol. VI, by R. Tamnes (1997), it is reasonable to contend 
that Norway and the Soviet Union were the only countries significantly interested in 
Svalbard up until 1973. (Author’s translation.)
18 G. Lundestad, Øst-Vest-Nord-Sør [East – West – North – South] (Oslo: Universitetsfor-
laget, 2000), p. 35. 
19 R. Tamnes, Svalbard mellom Øst og Vest. Kald krig og lavspenning i nord, 1947–1953 
[Svalbard in between the East and the West. Cold War and low tension in the north, 
1947–1953], Forsvarsstudier, no. 4 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 
1987), p. 33.
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unique legal status and the various security problems arising on the 
archipelago.20 
But no publications deal specifically with the Caltex case and 
Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard.21 Accordingly, this study is 
based mainly on primary source material, such as documents from 
the Ministries of Industry, Justice, the Environment, and Local 
Government, held at Norway’s National Archive (RA). There I also 
discovered valuable information in the private archive of Norway’s 
former minister of foreign affairs, John Lyng. 
The Storting’s archive (SA) was also interesting, particularly con-
cerning the aftermath of an explosion which occurred in one of Kings 
Bay’s pits on Svalbard in November 1962: the “Kings Bay accident”. 
Twenty-one miners lost their lives, and the accident caused consider-
able political turmoil in Norway. The Labour Party Government had 
to leave office for the first time in almost thirty years, albeit for only 
twenty-eight days. The significance of the accident to this study is that 
an investigation of the MI was launched shortly afterwards, produc-
ing three reports, two of which deal specifically with the relationship 
between Caltex and the MI. The reports were debated three times be-
hind closed doors in the Storting. I have also used material from the 
Enlarged Foreign Affairs and Constitution Committee, the Industry 
Committee, Stortingstidende,22 and several propositions and reports. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has handed over written 
material about Svalbard to the National Archive for the period up un-
til 1959. I applied for access to the ministry’s material concerning the 
Caltex case, which was rejected, a sign of the matter’s sensitive nature. 
After appealing I was granted conditional access.23 The material was 
interesting, but also posed a methodological problem as the documents 
deemed relevant had been selected by others. The comprehensive ma-
20 H. Pharo, “Norway during the Cold War: A Historiographical Survey of the Recent 
Literature”, in The Cold War – and the Nordic Countries, ed. T. B. Olesen (Odense: Uni-
versity Press of Southern Denmark, 2004), pp. 134–135.
21 Closest are R. Tamnes’ study from 1992, Svalbard og den politiske avmakt. Striden om fly-
plass, olje og telemetri-stasjon, 1955–1970, and A. R. Haugan’s master thesis from 1997, 
“Et vernekupp”, in which he analysed relations between oil activity and environmental 
protection. There have also been some contributions from a jurisprudential perspec-
tive. Especially Prof. J. Andenæs’ article from 1984, “Suverenitet og eiendomsrett på 
Svalbard”, deserves mentioning. There he reproduced a legal opinion he wrote for Cal-
tex in 1962, elaborating on some points. However, though the article provides insight 
into his legal analysis, it is not historical research. 
22 The Storting’s official news gazette.
23 “Conditional access” includes a ban on listing documents’ journal numbers, quoting 
written material, or referring to persons still in active duty. 
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terial I have examined from several archives should nevertheless ensure 
that the information presented here is reasonably satisfactory.
I have interviewed three people who worked with Norwegian oil 
policy on Svalbard at the MFA.24 The interviews were useful, but rec-
ollection is an active process.25 The interviews have been used as sup-
plements and have been correlated with the written material. The MI’s 
leading civil servants from the 1960s have all died, so the body of in-
formants is unrepresentative, although both the MI’s former Secretary 
General Karl Skjerdal and Principal Officer Harry Lindstrøm have 
written books about their involvement in the Caltex case. 
Because Caltex was an American company and the US was Norway’s 
security storm sail during the Cold War, I have examined the archives 
of the US State Department at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA). However, Svalbard was not prioritized by 
the US which is reflected in NARA’s archives which contain few docu-
ments about Svalbard.  
24 The people interviewed were former executive officers at the MFA, respectively Leif 
Terje Løddesøl and Carl August Fleischer from the legal affairs department, and Wil-
lum Steen from the 4th political section.
25 K. Kjeldstadli, Fortida er ikke hva den en gang var [The past is not as it once was] (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1999), p. 196.
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Chapter 2
Historical background
Looking back on his career, John Lyng once said that when the phone 
rang at night when he was minister of foreign affairs (1965–1972), he 
thought of Svalbard. This illustrates that the archipelago was seen as 
a challenging arena for Norwegian foreign policy. Soviet interests on 
the archipelago caused the MFA to act with caution so as not to irri-
tate Moscow. At times other ministries felt that Norwegian Svalbard 
policy was too restrained. Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli warned 
against placing too much emphasis on the foreign-political aspects in 
Norwegian Svalbard policy.26  
The challenges associated with Svalbard were complicated. The 
military-strategic sensitivity of the area, combined with the implica-
tions of the Svalbard Treaty, resulted in Norway not having “... free 
right of disposal over the area”, according to Prime Minister Einar 
Gerhardsen.27 The Soviet mining communities were not regulat-
ed by the Norwegian authorities, and Moscow wanted to transform 
Norwegian sovereignty into a bilateral arrangement. Norway had 
also tended to neglect Svalbard for quite some time. In 1925 Prime 
Minister Johan Ludwig Mowinckel said that Norway should seek to 
“... avoid the many confining articles”. This was to be achieved by us-
ing “... all our efforts to make Svalbard Norwegian”. But Mowinckel’s 
statement was never translated into action. In 1973, Foreign Minister 
Dagfinn Vårvik pointed out a “… strongly rooted passivity towards 
foreign interests on Svalbard – first and foremost Soviet interests 
26 R. Tamnes, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie [The history of Norwegian foreign policy], 
vol. VI, Oljealder 1965–1995 [The age of petroleum 1965–1995] (Oslo: Universitets-
forlaget, 1995), p. 257. T. Bratteli headed Norway’s government twice: 1971–72 and 
1973–76.
27 E. Gerhardsen headed Norway’s government three times: 1945–51, 1955–63, and 
1963–65 (author’s translation).
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– which has been an unavoidable consequence of the pennywise policy 
that has been adhered to”.28 
The Svalbard Treaty
The interest in oil on Svalbard sheds light on several sensitive aspects 
of Norway’s sovereignty over the archipelago. To understand fully the 
complexity of the case, one must familiarize oneself with those parts 
of the Svalbard Treaty that had repercussions for the Caltex case and 
Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard. 
Before 1920, Svalbard was a terra nullius by the standards of inter-
national law, a no man’s land. For business ventures this meant that 
Svalbard was a terra communis, a “free-for-all land”. Not only Norwegian 
companies were active on the archipelago. Thus, before World War I, 
it was difficult for the Norwegian authorities to assert that Svalbard 
should be a part of Norway.29 
At the same time, however, the burgeoning coal-mining industry 
on Svalbard led to a realization that regulatory authority was needed. 
Conflicts between hunters and mining companies, and between em-
ployees and employers, demonstrated that any continuation of the terra 
nullius regime would lead to chaos. Moreover, the notion that Svalbard 
should rightfully become a part of the kingdom grew steadily stronger 
in Norway. But the international response to such ideas was negative. 
A Norwegian proposal from 1909, suggesting that Norway should 
assume certain administrative duties on the archipelago, was rejected 
by both Stockholm and St Petersburg. The governments in Berlin, 
London and Paris all supported the Swedish and Russian rejections.30  
But the international arena was about to change dramatically in 
the wake of World War I and the Russian Revolution. In December 
1918, just before the Versailles Conference, the Norwegian newspaper 
Haalogaland wrote: 
Russia’s interests on Svalbard are gone ... The same can be said of 
Germany’s. Norway has the lion’s share of stakes on Svalbard ... 
Norway has suffered like no other neutral country during the war. 
28 All quotations in the above paragraph can be found in R. Tamnes: Norsk utenrikspoli-
tikks ..., p. 257 (author’s translation).
29 R. Berg: “Spitsbergen-saken 1905–1925” [The Spitsbergen issue 1905–1920], Histor-
isk Tidsskrift, no. 4 (1993): 473–474.
30 Ibid.: 473. 
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There has been talk of compensation. We do not want much ... 
However, the loss could be made up in one certain way: restored 
recognition of our sovereignty over the ancient Norwegian ter-
ritory: Svalbard ...31 
In March 1919 Norway’s representative to the peace conference in 
Paris, Fredrik Wedel Jarlsberg, was instructed by his government 
to strive to gain sovereignty over Svalbard. Thus in April Wedel 
Jarlsberg announced before the conference that Norway wanted full 
sovereignty over Svalbard, but that this would be subject to certain 
provisions ensuring the rights of foreign nationals. Sweden proposed 
Norway administer the archipelago on the behalf of the international 
community.32 
Two factors worked to Norway’s advantage: first, the Norwegian 
proposition had a moral dimension to it. During the war, forty-nine 
percent of the merchant navy had been destroyed and about 2,000 
sailors had lost their lives.33 In other words, Norway’s contribution to 
the entente’s cause had come at a high price. Second, the US adopted 
a positive stance to Wedel Jarlsberg’s proposal. The Swedish proposal 
was rejected, and in February 1920 a binding international treaty was 
completed.34 
Thereby the signatories recognized “... subject to the stipulations 
of the present Treaty, the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway ...” 
over Svalbard.35 This is Article I of the treaty and may be called its 
general disposition. The other articles consist of special rules pertain-
ing to Article I. Concerning business ventures, the quintessence of the 
special rules is a ban on discrimination: Norway cannot discriminate 
– based on nationality – against companies from the signatory powers. 
Any business activity Norwegian citizens and Norwegian companies 
31 Haalogaland, 12.4.1918, paraphrased in R. Berg, “Spitsbergen-saken …”, p. 479 (au-
thor’s translation).
32 R. E. Fife, “Folkerettslige spørsmål i tilknytning til Svalbard og de omkringliggende 
havområder” [Matters of International Law regarding Svalbard and the surrounding 
seas], in Studiehefte – Studietur nord (Oslo: Utenriksdepartementet, 2007), pp. 18–19.
33 R. Berg, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie [The history of Norwegian foreign policy], vol. 
II, Norge på egen hånd 1905–1920 [Norway on its own] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 
1995), pp. 255–256.
34 R. Berg: “Spitsbergen-saken …”: 480.
35 The Svalbard Treaty, Article I.
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are allowed to carry out must also be permissible for foreign companies 
and nationals.36
Article 8 pertains especially to the mining industry and Norway’s 
economic rights. It states:
Norway undertakes to provide for the territories specified in 
Article 1 mining regulations which, especially from the point of 
view of imports, taxes or charges of any kind ... shall exclude all 
privileges, monopolies or favours for the benefit of the State or of 
the nationals of any one of the High Contracting Parties, includ-
ing Norway ... Taxes, dues and duties levied shall be devoted 
exclusively to the said territories and shall not exceed what is 
required for the object in view.  
In other words, Article 8 establishes that Norway is obliged to pro-
vide a mining ordinance, regulations for the mining industry, which 
in turn will ensure no discrimination against Norwegian or foreign 
nationals in terms of taxes and duties. Taxes levied on Svalbard by the 
Norwegian authorities may amount to no more than what is required 
to run the archipelago. Norway’s exercise of sovereignty is further lim-
ited by Article 9 which states that the archipelago shall be free of naval 
bases and fortifications, i.e. that no structures may be established to 
conduct offensive warfare.        
Such limitations on the exercise of sovereignty can be compared to 
servitudes on property ownership rights. A servitude is a device that 
limits an owner’s freedom of decision over his or her own property. 
Exercising ownership rights is thus restricted, but ownership rights 
are not desisted from. Such servitudes were introduced in the Svalbard 
Treaty because Norwegian companies were not alone on Svalbard. 
Without servitudes, non-Norwegian interests would risk being ex-
cluded from any further economic exploitation of the archipelago.37 
For a small country like Norway, the Svalbard Treaty is a fairly 
static frame for Norwegian sovereignty. Norway has under most cir-
cumstances obliged itself not to discriminate against the signatory 
powers. Thus almost all Svalbard policy has a foreign-political aspect. 
Norway’s status as a small country has exposed the treaty’s internation-
al dimension. This has often resulted in “... Norwegian sovereignty 
36 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, memo on Svalbard by J. Evensen, 
21 March 1963.
37 R. Berg, “Spitsbergen-saken …”: 474–76.
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over Svalbard being far more limited than that over the rest of the 
country”.38
That Norway’s legal position is not optimal is agreed upon by 
Norwegians. One fundamental and recurrent problem has been wheth-
er it is Norwegian sovereignty or the exceptions from it that shall 
be valid outside the explicit areas covered by the treaty’s stipulation 
articles. From the perspective of international law, the answer is rea-
sonably clear. That the stipulation articles must be interpreted restric-
tively is supported both by the preparatory work for the treaty and 
international law.39 
However, international law does not operate in an arena bereft of 
politics. Between Norway and the Soviet Union especially, there has 
been disagreement about the prerogative of Norwegian sovereignty. 
Thus the Svalbard Treaty was subject to a thorough analysis by the 
MFA in the years after World War II: the conclusion was that the trea-
ty had considerable weaknesses. Norway’s Chief of Staff, Lt General 
Ole Berg, agreed. In March 1948 he pointed out that “... it is unsatis-
factory that Norway’s sovereignty on Svalbard is so strongly stipulated 
by all the special rules which the Svalbard Treaty contains”.40 
At the same time it was clear that it would not be possible to 
change the treaty in any way that would suit Norwegian interests. The 
signatory powers could veto any proposals. Any Norwegian initiative 
was thus deemed futile. However, should the treaty be subjected to 
debate at the behest of any of the signatory powers, Norwegian desid-
erata would be made clear, the MFA maintained.41  
International power relations after World War I, the creation of 
the Svalbard Treaty, and Norway’s desire to change the treaty thirty 
years later are interesting, especially in relation to the international 
framework perspective. It seems fair to say that Russia’s fall from grace 
represented a change on the international arena which allowed for an 
active Norwegian Svalbard policy and sovereignty over the archipel-
ago. When the Norwegian authorities were investigating the possi-
bilities of changing the treaty, Russia had returned in the form of the 
38 J. Lyng, Vaktskifte. Erindringer 1953–1965 [Changing the guard. Memoirs 1953–1965] 
(Oslo: Cappelen, 1973), p. 252 (author’s translation).
39 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A152512, memo on Svalbard by Prof. C. A. 
Fleischer, 27 October 1970.
40 RA, Records of the Ministry of Defence, H-260, Note to the Minister of Defence, 20 
March 1948 (author’s translation).
41 RA, Records of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2nd Political Section memo on the 
Svalbard Treaty, 10 June1947.
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Soviet Union. Thus it seemed impossible to achieve any change that 
would strengthen Norway’s position. Power relations within the inter-
national arena were decisive in both cases.
The mining ordinance
Concerning economic activities, mining – mostly coal mining – has at-
tracted Norwegians and foreign nationals to Svalbard. Article 8 oblig-
es Norway to provide a mining ordinance, which was implemented 
by Royal Decree in 1925. Though the mining ordinance is no treaty, 
since the 1960s there has been disagreement over its legal posture. 
Whether the ordinance constitutes an internationally binding obliga-
tion, or whether it is merely an international obligation to provide a 
mining ordinance compatible with the criteria listed in article 8, has 
been at the heart of the debate. There is still no agreement on this 
matter, and this study will not seek to provide a final answer. But the 
interpretation of the mining ordinance by the Norwegian authorities 
was central to the terms of development granted to the oil companies 
on Svalbard.42
The ordinance establishes that nationals from the signatory powers 
shall have equal rights to exploit coal, mineral oils, and other minerals. 
Anyone intending to search for such deposits on private or state land 
must have a license from the mining commissioner. The Norwegian 
authorities cannot prohibit searching for deposits.43 Anyone who dis-
covers a mineral deposit gains, in preference to subsequent discoverers, 
the right to the discovery if a discovery point is created and the min-
ing commissioner is informed thereof. Notification of the discovery 
must include data about the nature of the discovery and also include 
a deposit sample. If the data are incomplete, the right to the discov-
ery is retained if the defects are remedied by a date set by the mining 
commissioner.44  
If the notification is deemed valid, the discoverer can demand a 
claim on the discovery point. After notification in the official Mining 
Gazette, the mining commissioner may conduct a survey of the claim. 
42 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, memo on Svalbard by J. Evensen, 
21 March 1963.
43 After 1971, several areas on Svalbard became nature reserves, thereby limiting the 
areas available for deposit searches. But in the 1960s, searching for minerals was basi-
cally a common right. 
44 SA, Recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 15 November 1964, p. 1.
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If all necessary requirements are met, a claim not exceeding 1,000 
hectares may be granted. The mining commissioner’s decision can be 
contested within six months after a claim has been granted. After fi-
nalization of the claim, the holder has sole rights to extract all miner-
als and oils within that claim. 
This right is lost if the claim holder, within four years after 1 
October the year after the claim has been finalized, does not commence 
mining operations on the claim to such an extent that in the course of 
each successive five year period at least 1,500 man-days work are used 
in mining operations on the claim. However, a dispensation from this 
may be granted by the mining commissioner. This duty to work the 
claim and the requirement for a mineral sample are based upon a desire 
to avoid having large areas occupied for a lengthy period of time for 
no reason.45
Section 19 of the mining ordinance was central to oil exploration 
on Svalbard. It establishes that “The proprietor of any ground on which 
a claim has been given is entitled to participation in the operations for 
not exceeding one fourth.” This means that if a company discovers a 
deposit, for example of oil, on land that belongs to someone else, then 
that someone can demand to participate in a quarter of the claim.46
The Svalbard Act
The Svalbard Act is a Norwegian statute. As a national statute – not a 
treaty – it differs from the Svalbard Treaty. By virtue of Norway’s full 
and absolute sovereignty over Svalbard, the Norwegian government 
may implement any law it wishes on Svalbard, but such cannot conflict 
with the provisions of the Svalbard Treaty. Of relevance to Norwegian 
oil policy was the section 22 of the Svalbard Act which establishes that 
“All land which is not assigned to any person as his property pursu-
ant to the Treaty relating to Svalbard shall be State land and as such 
be subject to the State’s right of ownership.”47 In other words, the 
Norwegian government has proclaimed itself to be the rightful owner 
to all land which was not in private ownership when the treaty was 
signed.
45 Royal Decree, 8.7.1925, Mining Ordinance for Spitsbergen (Svalbard).
46 Ibid.
47 The Svalbard Act of 22 June 1928.
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Svalbard and the Cold War
In addition to the legal complication stemming from the Svalbard 
Treaty, Norwegian Svalbard policy was challenged by power-political 
relations during the Cold War. Svalbard was affected by the Cold War 
in two ways: first, in connection with the Arctic ambitions and the 
race between the superpowers; second, in connection with Norway’s 
increased association with the Western Bloc.48
Soviet Svalbard policy
Soviet foreign policy was rather ambitious in the years after World 
War II, with Moscow actively seeking to exclude other powers from 
its neighbouring areas. This policy also found expression in the High 
North. In 1926, the Soviet Union had already codified the sector prin-
ciple.49 This policy was expanded after the war: Moscow would not 
allow any foreign involvement east of the sector line.50
This policy of exclusion also included an expanding military di-
mension, reflecting that the High North was transforming into an 
arena in the arms race between East and West. The Kola region was 
significant for early warning and defence. By the end of the 1950s, the 
Soviet Northern Fleet was Moscow’s biggest maritime force. By the 
end of the 1960s, it was the core element in the Soviet construction 
of a strategic submarine and oceangoing fleet.51 Svalbard’s strategic 
potential had thus increased by the early 1960s. The archipelago was 
so close to Soviet territory that any Western base there could threaten 
the Soviet Union’s ability to reach the oceans.52 This growing strategic 
sensitivity, combined with historically determined interests, created 
a clear pattern in Soviet Svalbard policy: Moscow saw it as important 
to prevent any Western power from gaining a stronger foothold on 
Svalbard, and wanted Norwegian acceptance for the notion of a privi-
leged Soviet position on the archipelago.53  
48  R. Tamnes, Svalbard og stormaktene …, pp. 6, 62. 
49 The Russians drew a line from the Finnish-Soviet border of that time, following the 
meridian, and up to the North Pole. This Sector Decree expressed that all islands 
east of the line (and west of an equivalent line on the Soviet Union’s eastside towards 
Alaska) were considered part of the Soviet Union by Moscow. 
50 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og stormaktene …, p. 6, 62.
51 R. Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Oslo: Ad Notam, 
1991), pp. 55, 106, 202.
52 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og stormaktene …, pp. 63–65.
53 O. G. Skagestad, Norsk Polarpolitikk [Norwegian Polar policy] (Oslo: Dreyer, 1975), 
pp. 67–68.
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US Svalbard policy
The US security analysis of Svalbard can in the main be considered 
the opposite of the Soviet stance. The US ascribed less importance 
to Svalbard than did the Soviets because the archipelago was, quite 
simply, further away from US territory. The main focus of US Svalbard 
policy was to prevent the Soviets from strengthening their position 
and use the archipelago as a launch pad for offensive operations. As the 
National Security Council stated in autumn 1949: “United States secu-
rity interests in the Spitzbergen archipelago lie in supporting Norway 
in maintaining her sovereignty over these islands and preventing their 
military use by a hostile power”. This did not mean, however, that the 
US was prepared to go to war over Svalbard. During February–March 
1949, possible responses in case of a Soviet thrust on the archipelago 
were discussed in Washington. Several options were considered, but 
the US authorities dismissed the idea of overtly declaring war. This 
illustrates Svalbard’s position as a vulnerable outpost.54
The point of departure for US Svalbard analysis remained much the 
same up until the 1970s. However, the arms race in general and the 
continued expansion of the Kola bases in particular did contribute to an 
increase in Svalbard’s potential for early warning and weather forecast-
ing. In this context the US thought there was a need for strengthened 
surveillance of Soviet activities on Svalbard. Thus in March 1971, in 
a conversation with the Norwegian minister of justice, the American 
ambassador to Norway, Philip Crowe, suggested establishing a mail 
office in Barentsburg. It would be “… invaluable as a means of keeping 
tabs on what the Russians are doing up there”.55 
A useful measure of both American and Soviet interest in Svalbard 
was the archipelago’s location and accessibility. By and large the po-
tential of Svalbard’s location, meaning the archipelago’s possible stra-
tegic value, was considered limited. The same can be said of Svalbard’s 
accessibility. This resulted in both the US and the Soviet Union being 
satisfied with denying the other side a stronger foothold on the archi-
pelago. Both countries therefore approached Svalbard politics from a 
perspective of denial. Moscow was, however, somewhat more inter-
54 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og stormaktene …, p. 67.
55 NARA, College Park, Maryland, USA, Record Groups 59, Records of the Department 
of State, Box 2513, POL 32-6 NOR, Minutes from conversation between Ambassador 
Crowe and Minister of Justice Endresen.
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ested than Washington because of the archipelago’s proximity to Kola 
and historical Russian attachments to the High North.56
Norwegian Svalbard policy
The Norwegian government was not very interested in Svalbard. Insofar 
as Norway had a Svalbard policy – which did not become conspicuous 
until the mid 1960s – its goal was to secure Norwegian sovereignty and 
preserve low regional tension. Realizing this was possible as long as the 
superpowers never developed any greater interest in the archipelago. 
There was, however, little room for manoeuvre on the Norwegian side. 
The Norwegian government feared that Svalbard’s strategic potential 
could cause the superpowers to increase their involvement. To counter 
such developments, Norwegian Svalbard policy was, to a larger extent 
than usual in Norwegian security policy, characterized by a reassur-
ance of peaceful intentions towards the Soviet Union and a screening 
of Western powers.57 Notably, this resulted in a most central axiom 
of Norwegian post-World War II security policy not being applied to 
Svalbard: that allied assistance had to be prepared at times of peace 
to be effective at times of war.58 The combination of Norway’s policy 
of preserving low tension, and a lack of interest in Svalbard amongst 
Norwegian politicians, resulted in a Svalbard policy which Rolf Tamnes 
has labelled a “non-policy”, meaning a state involving the Norwegian 
authorities not undertaking independent initiatives on the archipelago, 
and only reacting to developments from overseas which would have 
implications for Svalbard. This “non-policy” continued unchallenged 
until the 1960s.59
Why did Norwegian Svalbard policy take such a cautious approach? 
By the end of World War II, Norway and the Soviet Union were the 
only nations possessing active interests in Svalbard. This created a 
clear asymmetrical power pattern disadvantaging Norway, resulting in 
a potential pressure on Norway to accommodate the Soviet Union. The 
Soviets also had large coal-mining settlements on Svalbard. Thus the 
archipelago was more physically accessible to Soviet interests. During 
56 R. Tamnes, Svalbard mellom Øst og Vest, p. 31.
57 See also R. Tamnes: “Integration and Screening. The Two Faces of Norwegian Alliance 
Policy, 1945–1986”, in Forsvarsstudier, 1987. To prevent the secondary threat, the 
Western powers, from igniting the primary threat, the Soviet Union, it was deemed 
wise to limit Norwegian participation in some of NATO’s integrated military col-
laboration. This policy has been called “screening”. 
58 R. Tamnes, Svalbard mellom Øst og Vest, p. 35–36.
59 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og stormaktene …, p. 68.
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conversations with Danish and Swedish colleagues in March 1948, 
Norway’s Prime Minister Gerhardsen summed up the situation thus: 
“The Russians have a large workforce up there, and we know that there 
is no long stretch between a worker’s and a soldier’s uniform”.60
In addition, Norwegian-Soviet relations concerning Svalbard 
got off to a most troublesome start at the end of World War II. The 
Norwegian government was deeply concerned when Soviet Foreign 
Minister Vyacheslav Molotov during a night-time meeting with his 
Norwegian counterpart, Trygve Lie, boldly suggested Svalbard be sub-
ject to joint Soviet-Norwegian administration, and that Norway turn 
over sovereignty of Bear Island to the Soviet Union. Molotov empha-
sized the notion of a historically privileged Russian position on the 
archipelago, and claimed the Svalbard Treaty did not attend to these 
interests. However, it was Svalbard’s maritime strategic potential that 
received the lion’s share of attention: the Soviet Union was surrounded 
- the only way out was to the north.61
The reserved reaction by Britain and the US made Norway’s posi-
tion acute. Svalbard’s strategic value was close to nil for the Western 
powers in 1944. This disengagement contributed to narrowing 
Norway’s room for manoeuvre by accentuating the asymmetrical re-
lations between Norway and the Soviet Union. Under pressure, the 
Norwegian government opened up for a deal involving joint defen-
sive responsibilities on Svalbard. But as a sign that other security is-
sues were of greater concern to the Kremlin than the future destiny of 
Svalbard, Moscow did not follow up on the Norwegian signals.62 
Not until the autumn of 1946 did Molotov address the topic again. 
By then, however, the circumstances had changed. The Cold War had 
started to imprint itself on East-West relations. The Norwegian au-
thorities, headed by the Storting’s majority, were increasingly scared 
by ideas of military cooperation that could lead Norway into the 
Soviet camp. Norway’s freedom of action was also greater: Soviet forc-
es, which had liberated Finnmark, the northernmost county of main-
land Norway, had returned home; the Norwegian government was no 
longer in exile; and the Western powers were showing more interest 
60 Quoted in R. Tamnes, Svalbard mellom Øst og Vest, pp. 18–20 (author’s translation).
61 O. Riste, Svalbard-krisen, 1944–1945 [The Svalbard Crisis 1944–1945], FHFS-Notat, 
no. 5 (Oslo: Forsvarshistorisk forskningssenter, 1981), pp. 1–3.
62 S. G. Holtsmark, Høyt spill. Svalbardspørsmålet, 1944–1947 [High stakes. The Svalbard 
issue 1944–47], Forsvarsstudier, no. 1 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 
2004), pp. 83–85.
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in their small-state allies from World War II. Thus the Norwegian 
government dared reject military cooperation with the Soviets on 
Svalbard. However, in July 1947, to counter Soviet criticism of the 
Norwegian rejection, a Norwegian garrison that had been in place 
on the archipelago since the war was withdrawn. Following up rejec-
tions with reassuring actions would become a rather usual element in 
Norwegian Svalbard politics.63 
In Norway, this so-called “Svalbard Crisis” in part made the MFA 
shy away from engaging in any active Svalbard policy. The events had 
demonstrated the difference in power between Norway and the Soviet 
Union, and caused Norwegian Svalbard policy to take a distinctly 
cautious approach for the next two decades. Especially Article 9 in 
the Svalbard Treaty, concerning limitations on military presence, was 
interpreted sacrosanctly. During the early days of the Korean War, 
one of the MFA’s leading civil servants, Ambassador Rolv Andvord, 
summed up the situation:
The situation is now that, almost as if by a miracle, we have qui-
etly escaped an utterly embarrassing and tough situation as far as 
this archipelago is concerned, and there are very strong reasons 
to believe that any kind of action by Norway to initiate any mili-
tary enterprise on Svalbard will be used by the Soviet Union to 
readdress this exceedingly delicate issue, which could easily lead 
us into vast difficulties.64  
The Norwegian authorities thus decided that it was in the nation’s 
interest to aspire to the conditions of the 1920s on Svalbard when the 
treaty was signed: low great power interest. It became important not 
to draw Moscow’s attention. From the end of the 1940s and up until 
the beginning of the 1960s, the Norwegian government was there-
fore focused sharply on the treaty’s stipulations.65 It may be said that 
63  K. E. Eriksen, “Svalbardspørsmålet fra krig til kald krig” [The Svalbard issue from 
war to Cold War], in Historiker og veileder: Festskrift til Jakob Sverdrup [Historian 
and tutor: Festschrift for Jakob Sverdrup], eds. T. Bergh and H. Pharo, (Oslo: Tiden, 
1989), pp. 149–51.
64 K. E. Eriksen and H. Pharo, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie [The history of Norwe-
gian foreign policy] vol. IV, Kald krig og internasjonalisering 1949–1965 [Cold war 
and internationalization 1949–1965] (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1995), pp. 371–72 
(author’s translation).
65 K. E. Eriksen, “Svalbardspørsmålet …”, p. 155.
DSS-1_2009_revidert.indd   24 24.04.2009   09:38:07
 Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard 25
Norway chose to “… strongly limit its exercise of sovereignty on the 
archipelago”.66
Svalbard, the North Atlantic Treaty and SACLANT
As with the situation prior to the Svalbard Treaty of 1920, develop-
ments on the international arena led to a strengthening of Norwegian 
sovereignty over the archipelago from the late 1940s. As Norwegian 
security policy became more firmly attached to the West, the question 
of whether Svalbard should be a part of the Western bloc arose. For 
the Norwegian authorities it was important that participation in the 
North Atlantic Treaty included the entire state – thus avoiding parts 
of the country being classified as second-rate land. The guarantees of 
the Atlantic Treaty would thus also encompass Svalbard.67
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the subsequent reor-
ganization of the Atlantic Treaty cooperation into the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, and the founding of SACLANT, 68 also had reper-
cussions for Svalbard. For the Norwegian government this was once 
again a matter of principle: the reorganization had to include Svalbard, 
which would otherwise be defined as second-class territory compared 
to the Norwegian mainland. The archipelago was included under 
SACLANT’s area of responsibility in 1951. Just like with Norway’s 
the inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty, this development signalled 
a consolidation of Norwegian sovereignty.69
But objections were voiced. In autumn 1951, Moscow protested that 
Svalbard’s inclusion under SACLANT’s area of responsibility implied 
“… permission for NATO’s armed forces under American command 
to make military arrangements [on Svalbard]”. It was highlighted, as 
in 1944, that Svalbard was of strategic and economic significance to 
the Soviet Union. The Soviets were on the watch for NATO bases on 
Svalbard, and inclusion in SACLANT was contrary to Norway’s treaty 
obligations, Moscow claimed. The Norwegian government dismissed 
the objections. The Svalbard Treaty granted the legal authority to 
self-defence. In October that same year, however, Norway’s foreign 
minister, Halvard Lange, announced that “… construction of military 
66 K. E. Eriksen and H. Pharo, Norsk utenrikspolitikks ..., pp. 65, 371 (author’s transla-
tion).
67 R. Tamnes, Svalbard mellom Øst og Vest, pp. 18–19, 21–24.
68 Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic.
69 K. E. Eriksen, “Svalbardspørsmålet …”, p. 151–52.
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bases on Svalbard has never been of interest”. Lange’s reassurance was 
quietly accepted by the Russians.70
But even though the guarantee of the North Atlantic Pact and 
the organization of SACLANT were operationalized for Svalbard, this 
was not primarily of military importance to Norway. The archipelago’s 
fate in war would after all be of little importance for the defence of the 
Norwegian mainland. For the Norwegian authorities, as mentioned, it 
was mainly important that Svalbard’s security posture did not differ 
from the rest of the country’s. The most important element was that 
Moscow accepted that Norway’s government had the authority to de-
cide the archipelago’s security alliances. Other signatory powers could 
not undermine Norway’s integration into the Western bloc by claim-
ing this could not include Svalbard.
After the end of the Svalbard crisis in 1947, and up until the first 
years of the 1950s, Norwegian Svalbard politics were not under much 
pressure. Nevertheless, this period is interesting as an illustration of 
the international framework approach to Norwegian Svalbard policy: 
movements on the international arena – beyond Norwegian control 
– forced issues onto the archipelago. That Moscow’s Svalbard policy 
was wholly redirected during this period is also important. While the 
Soviet Union had demanded treaty alterations and military cooperation 
in 1944, the country was now using the stipulations of the Svalbard 
Treaty concerning military activity as the basis for its protests against 
Svalbard’s inclusion under SACLANT.71
But the Soviets were interpreting the treaty differently from the 
Norwegian Government: one might say they were using a reverse 
method. By borrowing a notion from Professor Dr Juris Carl August 
Fleischer, it may be said that the Soviet Union was applying a meth-
od of “maximal interpretation”: Regarding matters beyond the areas 
explicitly regulated by the treaty’s stipulations, the exceptions from 
Norwegian sovereignty exercise should be applied.72 This argument 
would be a typical Soviet reason for objecting to almost all Norwegian 
engagements on the archipelago. As well as being due to the power 
struggle between East and West, this perspective can also be ascribed 
to a Russian fear of being excluded from Svalbard.
70 R. Tamnes, Svalbard mellom Øst og Vest, p. 29 (author’s translation).
71 S. G. Holtsmark, Høyt spill, pp. 161–164; R. Tamnes, Svalbard mellom Øst og Vest, pp. 
79–84.
72 C. A. Fleischer, Korrupsjonskultur, kameraderi og tillitssvikt i Norge [Culture of corrup-
tion, camaraderie and failure of confidence in Norway] (Oslo: Koloritt, 2006) p. 452.
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Also, by the end of the 1950s the balance of power was still over-
whelmingly in Moscow’s favour. The objective of Norwegian Svalbard 
policy thus remained stable: a desire to avoid regional rivalry between 
the superpowers. This was to be achieved through non-engagement: 
Norwegian and Western self-restrain would make the Soviets limit 
their ambitions in the High North. In other words, it was important 
for Norwegian Svalbard policy that the Norwegian government con-
trolled the secondary threats.73
The problem of the airport
On Svalbard, one particular problem gave the Norwegian authorities 
trouble: the question of the airport, which was not solved until 1974. 
In the 1950s, the Norwegian air force had flown civilian transport 
missions to Svalbard, landing on an ice runway in Adventdal. Such 
activities did not noticeably irritate the Russian. But when there was 
talk of constructing a large, permanent airport on the archipelago, 
Moscow protested. The airport question emerged as a difficult issue 
for the Norwegian government, and oil exploration on the archipelago 
would complicate this matter additionally for the authorities.74
Whether to build an airport first arose in the summer of 1956 
when two brothers went to Svalbard to investigate the matter. They 
had solid professional qualifications: one, Einar Sverre Pedersen, was 
chief navigator for the airline SAS, and had experience of developing 
trans-arctic routes; the other, Gunnar Sverre Pedersen, was a lieutenant 
colonel and engineer, specializing in airport construction. Like many 
Norwegians before them, they were bewitched by the Arctic. Helge 
Ingstad once wrote about one of them that he had “… a longing for the 
polar regions’ pristine mountains and endless plains …”75
The brothers concluded that Svalbard had great potential. Einar 
Sverre Pedersen envisaged the archipelago as “… the earth’s aero-
geographical centre”, and that Svalbard could become “… an im-
pressive air traffic station”.76 However, neither the Norwegian state 
nor SAS was interested in financing the project, so the brothers had 
to find the necessary capital themselves. With several Norwegian 
73 R. Tamnes: Svalbard og stormaktene …, p. 70.
74 Ibid.
75 In preface of E. S. Pedersen, Polarbasillen. Tredve år rundt Arktis [Polar fever. 30 years 
in the Arctic] (Oslo: Cappelen, 1969), p. 2 (author’s translation).
76 E. S. Pedersen, “Svalbard i flyvningens tidsalder” [Svalbard in the era of airplanes], 
in Polarboken [The Polar book] (Oslo: Polarklubben, 1961–62), p. 1 (author’s transla-
tion).
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shareholders backing them, they established a company called Norsk 
Polar Navigasjon (NPN) in October 1958. Construction work was 
scheduled to start in June 1959.77 
Initially the Norwegian government was not deprecatory of the 
Pedersen brothers’ plan. Foreign Minister Lange stated in November 
1958 that an airport could strengthen business development on the 
archipelago, and that “… one must say that Norwegian interests will 
be well served by a civilian airport on Svalbard”.78 At the same time 
the government did not think that the project would be implemented 
in the nearest future.79 
The Kremlin saw it differently. In November 1958, the Russians 
had already pointed out that the size of the proposed airport would 
allow large and heavy planes to land. Thus the plan for the airport 
could not be seen as anything but a part of a NATO-led base expan-
sion, thus violating the Svalbard Treaty. The question of whether the 
treaty had been violated was put to the MFA’s expert on international 
law, Professor Frede Castberg, who concluded that there were no ob-
stacles in the treaty to building a civilian airport. However, in line 
with its policy of not challenging the Soviet Union on Svalbard is-
sues, the government did not want to push the issue. But shortly af-
ter, in January 1959, the government became aware that the airport 
plan had advanced more rapidly than anticipated. It also became clear 
that the Pedersen brothers were working in association with Colonel 
Joseph Fletcher from the US air force and were receiving financial aid 
from the Arctic Institute of North America. Acknowledging that such 
associations would provoke the Soviets, the Norwegian government 
decided that the Pedersen brothers’ airport dream would have to be 
terminated.80
Why was an airport on Svalbard perceived as so dangerous? First, 
the Norwegian government was increasingly aware that the Arctic 
now occupied a central place in the strategic race between East and 
West: it was thus problematic that the airport had military potential. 
It could cause Soviet mistrust and increase the tension around Svalbard. 
Second, in light of the asymmetrical power gap between Norway and 
the Soviet Union, it was likely that the airport would fall under Soviet 
77 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og den politiske …, pp. 15–16.
78 SA, Stortingstidende, 5. November 1958, p. 2858–59 (author’s translation).
79 RA, Government Conference, 31 December 1958.
80 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og den politiske …, pp. 17–19, 24–25.
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control should war break out. Third, it was not unthinkable that the 
Russians would demand their own airport be built on Svalbard, claim-
ing the Svalbard Treaty’s principle of non-discrimination as justifi-
cation. Therefore the Ministry of Defence and military experts were 
sceptical of the airport plans. 
It seems clear that the decision to stop construction of an airport 
was taken out of consideration for power political realities – it was 
feared that the secondary threats could cause reactions from the primary 
threat. In November 1959 the Norwegian government did, however, 
inform the Russians that it was Norway’s right to build a civilian air-
port on Svalbard, emphasizing that there were no such plans or desires 
at the time. After a while, the Norwegian authorities also made it 
clear to the Pedersen brothers that an airport on Svalbard was out of 
the question. During the beginning of the 1960s, the brothers thus 
concluded that an airport could not be constructed in the short term. 
With that NPN decided to turn its hand to another business venture: 
oil exploration.81
Business activity on Svalbard
The Norwegian “non-policy” on Svalbard resulted largely from a de-
sire to keep the archipelago away from rivalry between the superpow-
ers. In tandem with this, limiting Soviet influence by securing certain 
Norwegian and western economic activities was also an aim. This was 
based on a fear of the dire security consequences which would result if 
the Soviet Union’s engagement on Svalbard became too conspicuous.
After World War II, the Soviet Union and Norway were the only 
countries interested in maintaining business activities on Svalbard – 
mainly coal mining. Norwegian operations recommenced in 1945. The 
Russians also swiftly re-established mining activities in Barentsburg, 
Grumantbyen and Pyramiden. In the early 1950s, there were approxi-
mately 2,000 Russians on Svalbard.82
The Norwegian mining industry consisted of two companies: the 
privately owned Store Norske Spitsbergen Kullkompani and the state-
owned Kings Bay Kullkompani. The Norwegian authorities wielded 
considerable influence over Store Norske as well, for example through 
81 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og den politiske …, pp. 20, 34–35, 38.
82 Ibid, p. 34–35, 38, 68, 79.
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a judicially registered agreement from 1933, through which the State 
could appoint two members to Store Norske’s board.83 
The problem with Norwegian mining on Svalbard was that it was 
not economically feasible, due essentially to general technological de-
velopments in the world. In particular, the continuing disappearance 
of steam locomotives affected the demand for coal. In 1957, Western 
Europe imported 108 million tons of coal; by 1959 this had dropped 
to 72 million tons. Heading into the 1960s, tough competition from 
several countries and the increasing accessibility of oil and gas contrib-
uted to a steady fall in the price of coal. Of equal importance is that 
no one expected the coal market to turn around. The coal-producing 
countries had large stocks. In September 1959, the MI concluded that 
the future looked bleak as far as coal prices were concerned.84   
As a result the Norwegian State covered the coal companies’ 
deficits through various means – this may seem strange, bearing in 
mind the bleak prospects for coal, so why did the State bankroll the 
coal companies? Quite simply, coal mining was first and foremost a 
tool for maintaining a Norwegian presence on the archipelago. But 
if Norwegian coal mining was closed down, the Russians would have 
been alone in their economic activities on Svalbard. This could have 
strengthened their claim to a privileged status.85   
The mining companies’ position in Norwegian Svalbard policy 
found clear expression in connection with the closing down of Kings 
Bay’s pits in Ny-Ålesund in 1963. The matter of shutting down the 
pits was presented to the MFA. The ministry’s response was as follows: 
Based on a desire to consolidate Svalbard’s character as Norwegian 
land, it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ general opinion that 
the Government should place considerable emphasis on, at the 
very least, maintaining the current level of Norwegian economic 
activity. Especially in light of the strongly increasing foreign 
interests and activity on the archipelago in recent years, the 
Government should seek to make conditions favourable for the 
expansion of Norwegian activities on Svalbard. To the extent 
that, for various reasons, it may be necessary to shut down exist-
83 SA, Recommendation on the Ministry of Industry’s administration, 15 November 
1963, p. 123.
84 A. Hoel, “Svalbards historie, 1956–1965” [Svalbard’s history 1956–1965], in Sval-
bard, vol. III (Oslo: S. Kildahl, 1966), pp. 1242–45, 1247, 1249, 1255.
85 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og stormaktene …, p. 79.
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ing enterprises on Svalbard, such enterprises ought to be replaced 
by other types of activities.86
In Ny-Ålesund the situation seemed hopeless regarding further ac-
tivity in the pits. The estimated costs of rebuilding and improving 
security for the workers after the Kings Bay disaster were ominous: 
mining operations ceased in the area. However, in line with the view 
of the MFA, the MI emphasized that mining could be resumed later. 
In addition, Ny-Ålesund was proposed as a possible tourist destination 
and as a scientific centre for the forthcoming construction of a station 
for the European Space Research Organization (ESRO).87
But the State’s willingness to guarantee for Norwegian enterpris-
es varied. Not all initiatives were welcomed. The reason why Store 
Norske and Kings Bay were given financial support was due to these 
mining companies being a Norwegian presence on Svalbard. At the 
same time the government’s influence over the companies ensured any 
risk-taking which might provoke the Russian was avoided. Former 
executive officer at the MFA, Leif Terje Løddesøl, summed up the 
government’s view on Norwegian business activity thus: “We wanted 
positive Norwegian activity which underlined that Svalbard was a part 
of Norway.”88 The mining companies fitted into this picture. 
Though Russian coal production was somewhat greater, there 
are good reasons to doubt its profitability. In the 1950s, the Russian 
settlements on Svalbard consisted of approximately 2,000 people. In 
comparison, Kings Bay had only 224 people engaged in mining activ-
ity on a year-round basis in 1960/61. Considering that coal mining 
was the only production enterprise on Svalbard, the Russian settle-
ments probably generated much less than they cost.89
Similar assessments existed at the time. According to the US am-
bassador to Norway, the mining commissioner once told him in a con-
versation in August 1970 that Russian mining had to be in deficit:
86 SA, Proposition to the Storting no. 146 (1962–63), p. 30–31 (author’s translation).
87 A. Hoel, “Svalbards historie …”, pp. 1279–80. In 1963 the European Space Research 
Organization (ESRO) wanted to establish a station on Svalbard for the reception of 
telemetry signals from the organization’s satellites. The Soviet Union feared it was a 
concealed intelligence operation. The dispute ended with a deal between Norway and 
the Soviet Union, allowing the Russians to visit the station. It became operative in 
1967 and was shut down in 1974. For more information on the ESRO dispute, see R. 
Tamnes, Svalbard og den politiske … 
88 Interview with Leif Terje Løddesøl, 11 April 2007 (author’s translation).
89 A. Hoel: “Svalbards historie …”, pp. 1246, 1499.
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 … it was quite obvious … that the Russian coal operations 
are not a profitable enterprise from an economic standpoint. 
The Soviet mines on Svalbard produce about 400.000 tons per 
year – the same as the Norwegian mines – but they use twice as 
many men to produce it and the output per miner is about three 
tons per day as against seven for the Norwegians. Furthermore, 
the quality of the Russian coal is the poorest presently mined in 
Svalbard and production would not be considered economically 
feasible in any Western economy.
Why then were mining operations retained? According to the ambas-
sador, there was no doubt as to the reason: 
There is no question that the Soviet Union runs its mines pri-
marily, if not solely, as an excuse to keep a political pressure in 
a strategically important island, and it is also logical to assume 
that it maintains a good many more men at Barentsburg than 
are justified by the coal it manages to extract. It is also logical to 
assume that the miners have some military training and in the 
case of an emergency would be able to use it.90
Doubtless, maintaining Norwegian business activities on Svalbard was 
motivated by a need to mark sovereignty through physical presence. 
It also seems reasonable to assume that the Russians had political mo-
tives. Therefore, the two nations with the strongest interests in the 
archipelago did not create any economic surplus through their engage-
ment, but chose to retain their business activities to mark their rights 
and interests in the area.
The Cold War and Norwegian sovereignty
The development of Norway’s Svalbard regime up until the 1960s 
forms a mixed picture. On the one hand, Norwegian sovereignty was 
clearly strengthened through Norway’s incorporation in the Western 
bloc and the subsequent integration in NATO’s operative structures. 
And the Soviet Union’s calls for revising the Svalbard Treaty and joint 
defence of the archipelago were not made again.
90 NARA, College Park, Maryland, USA, Record Groups 59, Records of the Department 
of State, POL NOR-USSR 1/1.70, Svalbard, C:195-197. Aerogram from Ambassador 
Crowe to State Dep.
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But the Soviet Union was negative to most Norwegian disposi-
tions. The Svalbard Treaty granted free access to the archipelago, and 
Norwegian and Western enterprises were hidden attempts to militarize 
Svalbard, Moscow claimed. At the same time the Norwegian authori-
ties regarded Svalbard as vulnerable to power political thrusts from the 
Soviet Union. At a time of strained relations between East and West, 
it was deemed unwise to challenge the Russians over an archipelago 
that mattered little – economically and militarily – to Norway as a 
whole. The Norwegian authorities accepted the prerogative of power 
relations, and Norway’s Svalbard policy became a “non-policy”. Thus 
at the beginning of the 1960s, Norway’s sovereignty exercise was min-
imal compared to its legal authority granted by the treaty. 
Svalbard remained a common land economically and a grey area 
in the East-West struggle. Within Norway’s administration it was ac-
cepted that the Russians had a special position as a consequence of 
their historical affiliation, settlements, geographical proximity and 
military power. This Norwegian low profile was in tune with the wish-
es of the Western powers, which never developed a strong interest in 
Svalbard.91 After all, the archipelago’s strategic value was never more 
than a potential one, but it was also significant that Norway did not 
want any stronger Western engagement.92 
At the same time, it was an important prerequisite for Norway’s 
profile of low regional tension that Svalbard’s strategic and econom-
ic value to the superpowers be limited. This prerequisite would soon 
be tested. 
91 K. E. Eriksen and H. Pharo, Norsk utenrikspolitikks ..., p. 64–65.
92 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og stormaktene …, p. 62.
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Chapter 3
Oil exploration on Svalbard
Svalbard has for a number of years attracted people looking for riches 
under the earth’s crust. Optimism was especially high from the end of 
the nineteenth century and through to the interwar years. The English 
prospector, Ernest Mansfield, described a peninsula near Ny-Ålesund 
as “[n]othing less than an island of pure marble”.93 In 1917 rumour 
had it that gold could be found, and in 1919 the first attempt to drill 
for oil was carried out, with lean pickings. By the end of the 1920s 
it was clear that coal mining was the only economically feasible min-
eral on Svalbard.94 However, during the 1960s interest in oil on the 
archipelago blossomed. The subsequent influx of companies was so 
great that Norway’s minister of industry, Kjell Holler, maintained in 
October 1961 that “… a race is taking place between American and 
Russian companies looking for oil on Svalbard”.95
For the Norwegian authorities, the potential discovery of oil 
painted a contrasted picture – Norwegian coal companies were trou-
bled by low profits: oil could offer an alternative.96 But oil exploration 
also challenged Norway’s exercise of sovereignty. The oil companies 
had such large resources at their disposal that the governor of Svalbard 
could not monitor the exploration.97 In addition, the oil exploration 
revealed a sensitive aspect to Norwegian sovereignty over the archi-
pelago. The situation seemed so potentially detrimental that several of 
93 “En øy av ren marmor” [An island of pure marble], Aftenposten, 2 May 2007 (author’s 
translation).
94 A. Hoel, “Svalbards historie …”, pp. 1030, 1332.
95 RA, Government Conference, 26 October 1961 (author’s translation).
96 UD, 36.6/60, bind II, JN. 011122. Letter from MFA to the Ministry of the Environ-
ment (ME)
97 T. B. Arlov and A. H. Hoel, “Kulldrift i kald krig” [Coal mining in cold war], in 
Norsk Polarhistorie [Norwegian polar history] vol. III, ed. H. D. Jølle (Oslo: Gyldendal, 
2004), p. 406. During the first half of the 1960s the governor’s means of transport was 
a boat in the summer and a dog sledge in the winter. Caltex, however, transported its 
crew by helicopter. 
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ employees hoped that the oil compa-
nies “… would not discover any oil on Svalbard”.98
 This chapter seeks to explain how the “oil race” started on 
Svalbard. As we shall see, decisions taken right at the start were vital 
for the ensuing race, and in enabling the oil companies to establish 
themselves outside of governmental control on Svalbard. Why the MI 
treated Caltex the way it did, and how oil exploration came to threat-
en Norway’s sovereignty exercise on Svalbard is this chapter’s chief 
concern. 
Caltex – primus motor
On 18 March 1960, after receiving an inquiry from the MFA, the 
Norwegian Polar Institute reported that it knew of several foreign 
companies that had shown an interest in oil exploration on Svalbard. 
The most active was the American company, Caltex. Through its af-
filiate Amoseas99 it had acquired aerial photographs of Svalbard, and 
was now in full swing with equipping a geological expedition to the 
archipelago the next summer. In Norway the company had set up a 
subsidiary, Norsk Caltex Oil A/S, which was led by Director Arild 
Lindbom. Caltex had also sent a lawyer to Norway in the middle of 
March to make enquiries about regional mining rights.100
In addition to Caltex, Shell planned to send a geological expedition 
to Svalbard during the summer of 1960. Canadian Husky Oil Ltd had 
contacted the Norwegian embassy in Ottawa and the Norwegian Polar 
Institute about terms for licences and geological conditions. Hoard & 
Spradlin, an Oklahoma-based company, had been in touch with the 
county governor and former UN secretary general, Trygve Lie, and the 
Norwegian embassy in Washington about terms for exploration and 
other oil operations on Svalbard. A German scientist, Professor Julius 
Büdel, also planned a visit to Svalbard the next summer. His stated 
purpose was to carry out a topographical survey. However, he rented 
a boat for 4,000 kroner a day, suggesting that there were not just sci-
entific interests behind his expedition, the Polar Institute stated.101 
Norwegian interests, represented by NPN, also participated from the 
98 Interview with Willum Steen, 28 August 2007 (author’s translation).
99 American Overseas Petroleum Ltd.
100 UD, 36.6/39, bind I.
101 Ibid.
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outset. Compared to its competitors, however, it was considered a 
mere minnow.102
Why this interest in Svalbard? First, technological developments 
played a role. During the 1950s oil had been discovered in Canada, 
Alaska, and on the Yamal Peninsula in Siberia. Thus interest in the 
Arctic region grew amongst oil companies.103 One of Caltex’s geologists 
explained that the company had studied charts and aerial photographs 
from several Arctic regions. Svalbard was not the only area that looked 
promising, but because “… the tax regime applicable in Spitsbergen is 
generally favorable”, a closer examination was justified.104
Against this background, Caltex sent an expedition to Svalbard 
during the summer of 1960. It revealed several interesting areas, but 
some were problematic in that they had already been claimed or were 
owned by the mining company, Store Norske. Should oil be discov-
ered on Store Norske’s property, the company would be entitled to 
participate twenty-five percent in the operations. If oil was discovered 
on Store Norske’s claim, the company would have the sole right to ex-
tract it. However, Store Norske could desist from asserting its extrac-
tion right. Caltex thus sought to reach an agreement with the mining 
company according to which Store Norske would receive 12.5 % of 
any oil’s gross value in exchange for the mining company’s extraction 
and participation rights. Store Norske’s director, Atle Bjørkum, was 
favourably inclined to Caltex’s suggestion.105
However, such an agreement concerned parties other than just 
Caltex and Store Norske. Store Norske had in a judicially registered 
agreement from 1933 pledged not to sell, let, or mortgage any of its 
property or mining rights without the MI’s consent. Thus in October 
1960, Store Norske communicated Caltex’s suggestion to the ministry, 
where it was dealt with by Principal Officer Harry Garman Lindstrøm. 
Lindstrøm was sympathetic to the proposal, but prior to making a final 
decision he contacted the MFA. In a letter from 25 October, Lindstrøm 
wrote that Caltex had given notice of 190 discovery points to the 
mining commissioner, whereas some were on Store Norske’s land. 
Furthermore, he noted that an agreement between Caltex and Store 
Norske could be to the government’s advantage: through its influence 
102 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og den politiske …, pp. 47–48.
103 E. S. Pedersen, “Polarbasillen …”, p. 230.
104 “Search in the Arctic”,  Oil – Life Stream of Progress, no. 2 (1968). The geologist’s name 
was Douglas Klemme. 
105 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
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over Store Norske, the MI would keep better informed about work car-
ried out by Caltex. The MFA had no objections.106
So during the autumn of 1960, the MFA knew that there was 
substantial interest in oil exploration on Svalbard, and that Caltex op-
erated on a large scale. However, the ministry did not know that the 
applicability of the mining ordinance to purported oil deposits would 
cause serious problems in terms of interpretation.107 
Geological indications
As mentioned in chapter two, the mining ordinance was designed to 
regulate coal-mining activities. How should it be applied to oil explo-
ration? This question was raised for the first time in December 1960 
by Executive Officer Thorgrim Haga at the MI’s mining section. At 
that time Caltex had notified the mining commissioner of 201 discov-
ery points. The points were marked correctly, but the oil company had 
not handed in a deposit sample, required by the mining ordinance. 
Instead the company had documented located anticlines,108 with layers 
that possibly could trap oil.109
This requirement for a sample implied that a physical sample of 
oil, or soil/rocks with traces of oil, had to be handed in. Unlike with 
coal mining, oil samples could not be found without drilling. Caltex 
broached this issue, claiming it would cost between 1 and 1 ½ million 
dollars per hole, and drilling several holes would be necessary. Thus a 
deposit sample could not be secured within the ten-month limit laid 
down by the mining ordinance. The company suggested an arrange-
ment involving a time limit being set for providing a deposit sample 
while the claims were conferred. If this limit was not respected, the 
claims would lapse. The mining commissioner was perplexed as to 
how to resolve the issue and chose to consult the MI.
Thus, in an internal memo, Executive Officer Haga raised the 
question of whether providing a deposit sample was an absolute pre-
condition for obtaining claims. Referring to the mining ordinance’s 
wording, he concluded that this was indeed the case. This provision 
106 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
107 SA, Additional recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 1 October 1965.
108 n arch-shaped fold in rock in which rock layers are upwardly convex. The oldest rock 
layers form the core of the fold, and outwards from the core progressively younger 
rocks occur. Anticlines may form hydrocarbon traps, particularly in folds with reser-
voir-quality rocks at their core and impermeable seals in the outer layers of the fold. 
A syncline is the opposite type of fold, having downwardly convex layers with young 
rocks at the core.
109 SA, Recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 15 August 1964, p. 1.
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was supposed to ensure that large areas would not be occupied with-
out sufficient reason. Haga suggested this dilemma could be solved 
by granting a deferment on providing a sample for up to five years. 
Claims could be granted if deposits were found within this period. 
Otherwise, there would be no basis for a discovery notice. Haga then 
underlined that it was important that any arrangement decided upon 
had a strong legal basis in the mining ordinance, as “… there are 
strong interests associated with oil exploration on Svalbard, not least 
of a foreign-political character”. In light of the Soviet position on the 
archipelago, it was important that any decision to give American com-
panies an opportunity be legal.110 
However, the MI did not take any further action. Haga’s memo 
was not dealt with until the ministry, in January 1961, became aware 
that the mining commissioner had held a claim survey for 201 dis-
covery notifications from Caltex – but the company had not handed 
in deposit samples. Only then was the issue examined more closely. 
Principal Officer Lindstrøm, Director General Egil Hammel, and 
Secretary General Karl Olai Skjerdal all agreed with Haga’s original 
conclusion. On 27 January 1961, in a telegram from the ministry to 
the mining commissioner, the following was emphasized: 
In connection with oil exploration on Svalbard it has been asked 
whether the Mining Ordinance’s provision … on handing in a 
deposit sample must be fulfilled prior to granting claims … The 
Ministry has looked at the question and has concluded that the 
answer must be yes. If conditions are such that it cannot reason-
ably be expected that a deposit sample be handed in at the same 
time as the discovery notification, the mining commissioner 
may … grant the necessary deferment to satisfy this provision. 
The ministry assumes that the mining commissioner will use 
this interpretation as a basis when assessing notifications of oil 
discoveries.111
In a telegram dated 14 February 1961, after an inquiry from the min-
ing commissioner, the MI elaborated on its finding: granting claims on 
the condition that deposit samples be handed in within a certain time 
was not an option. At the time of a discovery notification, a deferment 
110 SA, Additional recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 1 October 1965, Enclosure I, 
p. 5 (author’s translation).
111 SA, Recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 8.15,1964, p. 2 (author’s translation).
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could be granted, and when a deposit sample was handed in claims 
could be conferred. The telegram was written by Haga, and proofread 
by Lindstrøm and Skjerdal. The mining commissioner followed the 
MI’s directives, and on 28 February, in the official Mining Gazette, the 
claim surveys were retracted.112
After the mining commissioner had retracted the claim surveys, 
Caltex decided to raise the issue directly with the MI. First the compa-
ny’s representatives had a meeting with Executive Officer Lindstrøm, 
and on 27 March 1961 a meeting was held with Minister of Industry 
Kjell Holler, and American and Norwegian representatives of Caltex, 
among others. During the meeting, Caltex’s representatives claimed 
that handing in deposit samples was a provision unheard of in modern 
oil legislation. If the provision was upheld, the company would be 
forced to cease its activities on Svalbard for economic reasons. A con-
servative interpretation would force Caltex to hand in samples from all 
its discovery points. Considering that a sample could only be obtained 
by drilling a borehole at the price of 1 to 1½ million dollars, the com-
bined costs could exceed 300 million dollars. The company was not 
willing to risk such an amount without acquiring right of security to 
its potential discoveries. At the same time, Caltex stressed that a clari-
fication of the issue was urgent in light of the company’s scheduled 
work the forthcoming summer.113 
The meetings with Caltex caused a fundamental change in 
Lindstrøm’s view on how the mining ordinance should be applied to 
oil exploration. In two internal memos from 24 and 30 March 1961, 
Lindstrøm argued that claims should be awarded even though this 
meant disregarding the ordinance’s provision pertaining to deposit 
samples. According to Lindstrøm, no one had considered oil deposits 
far beneath the earth’s crust when the mining ordinance was moulded. 
If someone had, its provisions on the matter would have been more 
precise. Because Lindstrøm thought the mining ordinance could not 
be amended by Norway alone, it was impossible to correct its old vin-
tage. He claimed the ordinance had to be interpreted in accordance 
with the spirit of the law. In his own opinion, it was the intention of 
the legislators to enable exploitation of Svalbard’s natural resources. 
112 SA, Recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 15 August 1964, p. 2.
113 RA, John Lyng’s private archive, Storting papers (1964–65); SA, Recommendation for 
claims on Svalbard, 15 August 1964, p. 2. The date of Lindstrøm’s first meeting with 
Caltex is unknown. A letter the company sent to the ministry, dated 24 March 1961, 
reveals that Caltex had already had one meeting with Lindstrøm at that time. 
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Thus he spoke in favour of an emphatically liberal interpretation of 
the ordinance.114  
He went far in expounding specific provisions of the mining or-
dinance so that claims could be conferred to Caltex in the manner 
the company desired. Section 9 of the ordinance, sub-section 1 stated 
that: “Anybody who, by lawful search, shall discover a natural deposit, 
containing or supposed to contain minerals … acquires thereby … a 
right to the discovery”. As well as the requirement for a legally valid 
notification, it is stated in the same section, sub-section 2 d that there 
shall be: “Information of the nature of the discovery under reference 
to a sample, handed over at the same time …” Lindstrøm argued that 
the words “supposed to contain” in section 9, sub-section 1 were listed 
next to the word “containing”. And if the words “supposed to con-
tain” had any meaning, the requirements in section 2 d could not be 
perceived as absolute. An interpretation that accepted geological in-
dications instead of deposit samples could therefore be justifiable. In 
addition, Lindstrøm argued Caltex’s case on a more practical basis: the 
purpose of the provision requiring a sample was to provide evidence 
that something had been found – and he was of the opinion that Caltex 
had provided such evidence:
The proof [Caltex] has generated in the form of geological exam-
ination material is more extensive and more convincing than 
many of the samples that are handed in. On the basis of the 
knowledge [Caltex’s] geologists has obtained in several countries 
over many years, [Caltex] thinks one should be able to discover 
oil on Svalbard.115 
For Lindstrøm there was no doubt. He recommended the retraction 
be reversed and the claim survey be held. Remarkably, he thought it 
unnecessary to inform the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the matter. According to Lindstrøm, the Ministry of Justice’s 
employees did not have much “ … knowledge about the regulations and 
laws regarding Svalbard … In addition, as a starting point one should 
114 SA, Additional recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 1 October 1965, Enclosure 2, p. 
3.
115 SA, Additional recommendation for claims on Svalbard,  1 October 1965, Enclosure 
4, p. 6 (author’s translation). A more reasonable interpretation of the meaning of the 
phrase “supposed to contain” is that the applicant is not obliged to scientifically verify 
the content of a discovery. This is the mining commissioner’s duty. In other words, 
the applicant is not acting unlawfully if he or she hands in a deposit sample supposing 
it is marble, and then the mining commissioner’s investigation reveals that it is only 
quartz.  
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take the view that it is the Ministry of Industry that interprets the 
statutes regarding Svalbard”. It would suffice to inform the MFA, who 
already knew of the agreement between Caltex and Store Norske, after 
the issue had been settled, Lindstrøm claimed. However, if Minister 
Holler wanted to, he could “… give an account to the government in 
a short memo”.116  
Not all the civil servants at the Ministry of Industry shared 
Lindstrøm’s view. In a memo from 6 April 1961, Director General 
Egil Hammel stood by the conclusion Executive Officer Haga had ar-
rived at in his memo of 2 December 1960. As mentioned, Haga had 
concluded that a deferment of five years could be granted for handing 
in deposit samples. During that time Caltex would have prior right 
to claims. But for a claim survey to become final, the company would 
have to hand in samples within the five-year period. Also, Hammel 
emphasized that since the MI had no experience of oil exploration, it 
would be hard to verify Caltex’s assertions. Thus the Norwegian Polar 
Institute should be consulted. If it emerged that modifying the rules 
was necessary because of difficulties involved in providing a sample 
and amending the mining ordinance, then the Polar Institute should 
be contacted in any case. It could assist in establishing what geological 
evidence should be required. If claims were awarded as a mere matter 
of opinion, the result could “… easily be that large areas gets booked 
up on a more or less shaky basis” – in other words, the opposite of the 
spirit of the mining ordinance.117 
If the claims were granted at their maximum extension, Hammel 
continued, they would compromise 2,000 km, or 1/30 of Svalbard. 
That the area was so large suggested to Hammel that Caltex’s evidence 
was too flimsy. An area of such great size could give the company all 
the potential oil deposits on Svalbard. He was also of the opinion that 
the Russians would pay close attention to the issue, and “… we can-
not disregard that we might be accused of favouring the Americans”. 
Precisely because of the matter’s foreign policy aspect, he dissuaded 
from ignoring the mining ordinance’s provision requiring a sample 
without consulting the MFA.118
Secretary General Skjerdal, however, concluded that Caltex’s 
claims had to be conferred. He stated that the company could demand 
116 Ibid (author’s translation).
117 SA, Additional recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 1 October 1965, Enclosure 5, 
p. 1 (author’s translation).
118 Ibid, p. 2 (author’s translation).
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the claim survey be honoured as the mining commissioner had already 
sanctioned its discoveries, and the MI did not have the opportunity to 
review the mining commissioner’s decision. If a third party thought 
the conditions for a claim survey had not been met, that party would 
have to commence court proceedings. On 7 April 1961, Skjerdal raised 
the issue with Minister Holler. On 15 April the question was privately 
forwarded to Secretary General Rolv Ryssdal at the Ministry of Justice, 
supposedly at Holler’s request.
On 17 April Ryssdal’s answer came, written by Director General 
Carl Stabel, chief of the Ministry of Justice’s legislation department. 
Stabel did not agree with Skjerdal’s arguments for awarding Caltex’s 
claims. It was underlined that a civil servant was in no position to 
establish legal rights for private entities in violation of statutory pro-
visions. Like Haga and Hammel, Stabel noted that the rationale be-
hind the provision requiring a sample was to avoid having large areas 
occupied for several years without proper reason. He also noted that 
handing in a deposit sample was “… an absolute condition for valid 
discovery notifications, and thus the right to claims and the sole right 
to the discovery”.119
However, Stabel was of the opinion that drilling for oil had not 
been foreseen when the mining ordinance was framed: there should 
thus be room to modify the interpretation of the provision concerning 
samples. “But to go as far as Principal Officer Lindstrøm wants to – 
that is to consider the provision as unwritten as far as oil notifications 
are concerned – must seem very dubious considering the rationale be-
hind the provision.” The prerequisite for any modification would have 
to be that the basis for exemption offered the same strength of evi-
dence as a deposit sample. Caltex asserted that geological indications 
created a basis for assuming that oil could be present. In this regard 
Stabel wrote that he for one thought that 
… deposit samples normally establish a considerably stronger 
probability for existence. Awarding claims on the basis of an 
“assumption” that there “might” be oil at the discovery point, 
seems to be in poor accordance with the rationale behind the 
provision on deposit samples.120
119 SA, Recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 15 November 1964, p. 2 (author’s trans-
lation).
120 SA, Additional recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 1 October 1965, Enclosure 7, 
p. 1–2. “Unwritten” emphasized in original document (author’s translation).  
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In addition to these judicial considerations, Stabel noted that consid-
eration must be paid to the way in which the other signatory powers 
would interpret the provision concerning samples, and their reaction if 
they thought the treaty had been violated. The obvious deviation from 
the wording of the mining ordinance which Lindstrøm was suggesting 
could be considered favouritism. Finally, Stabel advised that the MFA 
be consulted if this had not already taken place. He referred to the fact 
that the ministry, and its embassy in Moscow, were both concerned 
with another type of American-inspired activity on Svalbard at that 
time: the question of the airport.121  
So at this point both Haga and Hammel at the Ministry of Industry, 
and Stabel at the Ministry of Justice, had voiced their opinions, say-
ing that the provision for deposit samples was an absolute; a provision 
based on avoiding having large areas occupied without good reason. 
Haga also stressed that there were foreign political interests associated 
with oil exploration on Svalbard, and both Hammel and Stabel advised 
that the MFA should be consulted. Haga and Hammel also wanted to 
hear the Polar Institute’s professional opinion on Caltex’s geological 
indications. 
Minister Holler, however, took none of this into account. He chose 
to settle the issue by himself, consulting neither the MFA nor the 
Polar Institute. Just after he had received the legislation department’s 
statement, on Holler’s orders a telegram was sent to the mining com-
missioner, notifying him that the MI would waive its previous objec-
tions to holding claim surveys on the areas Caltex had notified. The 
commissioner later stated that “… the telegram was like an order, and 
I had no other option than to undertake the claim surveys”.122
The first part of Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard was thus cast. 
The geographical implications were considerable: in a strategically 
sensitive region, Caltex had won sole rights to extract oil and miner-
als on areas covering approximately 2,000 km. For Norwegian sover-
eignty, the issue was just as piquant. The opportunities the MI had to 
control Caltex’s access to Svalbard were not used. Without commit-
ting to any form of return services or obligations, Caltex was allowed 
far beyond the limitations on Norway’s exercise of sovereignty in the 
Svalbard Treaty.
121 Ibid, p. 3.
122 “Bergmester Welde var imot å foreta Caltex-konsernets utmål på Svalbard” [Mining 
Commissioner Welde opposed awarding Caltex claims on Svalbard], Verdens Gang, 26 
August 1965 (author’s translation).
DSS-1_2009_revidert.indd   44 24.04.2009   09:38:08
 Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard 45
Behind the scenes at the Ministry of Industry
“A more devastating criticism of a ministry and its leader than in 
this case is fortunately hard to find.”123 Thus did MP Kjell Bondevik 
(Norwegian Christian Democratic Party) open his comments on the 
Caltex case when in 1965 it was assessed by the Norwegian Storting. 
Amongst the MPs there was broad consensus that the Ministry of 
Industry’s mode of treatment had been despicable. 
Circumstances at the MI largely determined the concessions given 
to Caltex, and in the wake of the Kings Bay accident, these circum-
stances surfaced. On 4 July 1963, Holler resigned. Lindstrøm resigned 
in October, and found himself at the centre of a police investigation.124 
In addition, Skjerdal and Hammel were given leave of duty. Against 
the background of information the Norwegian government had re-
ceived about the circumstances surrounding Lindstrøm, an investiga-
tive committee was established in the middle of November to examine 
the MI’s administrative methods.125 
The committee harshly criticised the MI in three different reports, 
in which Lindstrøm and Skjerdal were particularly focused on. But 
there was another important factor: since World War II, the MI had 
risen to become a professional and self-confident institution possess-
ing politically important responsibilities. As we shall see, this insti-
tutional self-confidence in part led to the decision not to consult oth-
ers on the matter of the deposit sample. The first part of Norwegian 
oil policy on Svalbard was largely formed by the MI’s sympathy with 
Caltex’s dispositions and a notion that industrial activity on Svalbard 
was the ministry’s exclusive area of responsibility. This pattern is not 
unlike the emphasis of the institutional interest perspective on strong 
connections between ministries and respective sector interests, and its 
influence on foreign-policy decisions.
The ministry after the war
Industrial development was a key political goal in Norway after World 
War II. To this end, the MI was established in 1946. Up until the 1960s, 
its responsibilities steadily grew to include most matters concerning 
123 SA, Closed sitting in the Storting, 14 May 1965 (author’s translation).
124 On 21 October, four days after Lindstrøm resigned, he was arrested on suspicion of 
financial malpractice. 
125 SA, Report to the Storting no. 36. (1964–65), p. 1.
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Svalbard.126 For the ministry to fulfil its designated tasks, a number of 
new departments and sections were founded. In 1946 the Directorate 
of Industry was established. It had seven sections when it was reorgan-
ized in 1958 and merged with the Industry Department. The MI set 
up a separate section for issues of a general industrial-economic nature 
in 1955. The ministry’s management was also strengthened by the 
establishment of a deputy ministerial post from 1947–1958, and in 
1956 the post of secretary general was created.127
Linked to the MI’s growth, a fundamental problem surfaced. 
Several of its civil servants were representatives on boards of state-
owned companies, and carried out tasks for institutions belonging to 
the MI. Thus the civil servants’ impartiality was questioned, as in ad-
dition to their work at the ministry, they also worked for the compa-
nies and institutions in question. Lindstrøm, for example, was sec-
retary to the Kongsberg Silver Mines Liquidation Committee, while 
managing issues pertaining to silver mines at the MI. He was also 
secretary to the Coke Commission and was in charge of the MI’s deal-
ings with coke.128
Abuse of such positions was at the forefront of the criminal inves-
tigation of Lindstrøm, who altogether had seventeen committee du-
ties. During his trial in November 1965, he told the court that “ [m] y 
work as Executive Officer was only a fraction of everything else”.129 
Lindstrøm was not the only civil servant having professional engage-
ments elsewhere.130 This was in fact a dominant trait at the MI, and it 
indicates a development implying that several of the ministries’ civil 
servants were strongly linked to the industrial sector’s interests.131
While the MI was strengthening its professional basis for influence 
and several of its employees were forming strong bonds with the in-
dustrial segment, a development took place in the Storting’s executive 
procedure which undermined the foreign-policy aspect of Norway’s 
126 One exception: The governor of Svalbard was in 1953 transferred back to the Ministry 
of Justice after having previously been under the Ministry of Industry. 
127 SA, Recommendation on the Ministry of Industry’s administration, 15 Novem-
ber 1963, p. 11
128 Ibid, pp. 48, 138–39.
129 H. Markussen, Prosessen mot Lindstrøm. Et politisk justismord [The process against Lind-
strøm. A political miscarriage of justice] (Oslo: Dokumentarforlaget, 2000), p. 158 
(author’s translation).
130 Secretary General Skjerdal was for example a member of the Kings Bay’s board of 
directors.
131 SA, Recommendation on the Ministry of Industry’s administration, 15 November 
1963, pp. 48, 138–39.
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Svalbard policy. MP Torstein Selvik (Labour Party) summarized the 
development thus: 
Originally, all Svalbard issues were handled by the Standing 
Committee of Foreign Affairs in acknowledgement that these 
were vital national questions, and Norwegian interests vis-à-vis 
other powers were to be attended to. When I first came to the 
Storting 15–16 years ago, the senior members of this assembly, 
and especially those concerned with foreign policy, very strongly 
asserted that this should be a rule, an unbreakable rule that had 
to be enforced consistently, that everything regarding Svalbard 
should be managed by the Standing Committee of Foreign 
Affairs. However, the predominant view over time has been 
that these issues should go to the respective sub-committees. I 
deplore this development. I have repeatedly tried to reconnect 
these issues to the Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, to 
make it the main committee for Svalbard issues. However, little 
can be done when the majority is of a different opinion.132
This development was important, especially in terms of the institu-
tional interests postulate on fragmentation of the State’s power. The 
growth of the MI’s staff and organizational capacity helped elevate the 
industrial establishment to a powerful institutional force. This created 
a foundation for a tug-of-war over the professional responsibility for 
Svalbard between the MI and other ministries dealing with the archi-
pelago. At the same time, MPs’ opportunities to limit the industrial 
segment’s influence on Svalbard decreased as a result of Svalbard issues 
being managed by respective sub-committees, and not by the Standing 
Committee of Foreign Affairs.133
Extraordinary management procedures
In addition, much suggests that Lindstrøm’s position at the MI helped 
bring about the strong influence that considerations for Caltex had on 
Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard. Unorthodox management proce-
dures and, one might say, arbitrariness gave him a considerable influ-
ence over the ministry’s administration of Svalbard issues. This also 
drew the attention of the investigative committee. Ordinary minis-
terial management procedures were considered solid and adequate, 
132 SA, Closed sitting in the Storting, 5 February 1965, p. 3 (author’s translation).
133 R. Tamnes, “Ettpartistat …”, p. 56.
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according to the committee as cases within the section concerned were 
assessed by both an executive officer and a principal officer. The inten-
tion of this was to ensure a solid analysis before any decision was made. 
Hence, normal procedure was for the matter at hand to be analyzed 
further before a final decision was taken at a higher level.134
This procedure was largely adhered to when ordinary issues were 
being assessed. But this was not the case when the issues at hand were 
more complex and comprehensive, and this is indicative of the effi-
cient way in which Lindstrøm made his mark. During his trial he 
told the court that his capacity for work and education made him self-
confident. He was both a jurist and a mining engineer,135 and he en-
joyed his peers’ confidence, especially from Skjerdal. Holler also valued 
Lindstrøm and his efficiency. This was a mutual relation. Lindstrøm 
said of Holler that “I have never met a superior, and I have met quite a 
few superiors during my days, who worked as efficiently as Holler … 
By and large we had similar opinions on how different issues should be 
managed, and we spoke the same language”.136
Because of the confidence in him and his effectiveness, Lindstrøm 
was allowed to work, as it were, separate from the rest of the Ministry 
– i.e. outside of normal management procedures. The more complex 
cases went straight to him without first being assessed by an executive 
officer. Skjerdal trusted his appraisals, and for the sake of efficiency 
Holler was often the only one who looked through his work. However, 
as minister he did not have time to closely examine the results.137
This included Svalbard issues. Originally it was intended that 
Haga should be the first official responsible for dealing with such 
matters. According to Lindstrøm, Haga was “… very methodical and 
thorough”. But to Lindstrøm, efficiency was the greatest virtue. Haga 
could have “… been more productive, in the sense that he could have 
completed more work”. Accordingly, most Svalbard issues were dealt 
with by Lindstrøm alone. He saw no problem in that: on the contrary, 
in his opinion “… all Svalbard-issues should be concentrated in one 
134 SA, Recommendation on the Ministry of Industry’s administration, 15 November 
1963, p. 138.
135 In addition to his formal education, Lindstrøm spoke French, German, English, Italian 
and Russian. At the time of his arrest he was learning Chinese. 
136 H. Markussen, Prosessen mot ..., pp. 156–57 (author’s translation).
137 SA, Recommendation on the Ministry of Industry’s administration, 15 November 
1963, p. 49; Interview with Prof. C. A. Fleischer, 19 April 2007.
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section, under one specific person. I am of the opinion that the Mining 
Section should be the one”.138
Lindstrøm’s monopoly on dealing with complex and comprehen-
sive issues went so far that his subordinates at the mining section end-
ed up feeling left out. In March 1963, Lindstrøm’s superior, Director 
General Hammel, expressed that the executive officers should be used 
more. Lindstrøm did not agree: he considered his own skills unsur-
passed. Regarding Hammel’s request, he wrote that he had “… no 
need for and do not ask for and do not want any help to manage the 
Mining Section”. Lindstrøm was of the opinion that the mining sec-
tion was one of the best managed sections in the Government’s admin-
istrative machinery. Regarding his own work, there was no doubt: “… 
I complete as much work as a dozen executive officers + a few principal 
officers, and one could also add a couple of director generals”.139
Based on the above, the investigation committee concluded that 
the MI lacked the checks ordinary management procedures provided: 
thus the actual management system had not failed, but the lack of 
monitoring, especially of Lindstrøm’s work, was at fault. This would 
have consequences for the ministry’s oil policy.140
Caltex at the Ministry of Industry
As shown, institutional developments at the MI and Lindstrøm’s “sep-
arate” position influenced the managing of several of the ministry’s 
areas of responsibility, including Svalbard. Caltex was no exception. 
At the MFA in particular, several people were surprised about the MI’s 
stance on the matter. Executive officer at the legal affairs department, 
Leif Terje Løddesøl, summarized cooperation with the MI thus: “At 
that time we felt that they were working against us, and we wondered 
why.”141
One of the first questions that arose in connection with the treat-
ment of Caltex by the MI was why Lindstrøm so eagerly wanted to 
liberalize the criteria for claims without consulting any other insti-
138 H. Lindstrøm, Notatsamling med kommentarer [Collection of memos with comments], 
(no page numbers given, unknown publication date). In connection with his own 
appeal hearings and lawsuits against the investigation committee and several newspa-
pers, Lindstrøm put together a collection of different memos which had compromised 
a substantial part of the criticism directed at him. The only copy publically available 
was lost from the Sophus Bugge university library in 1987 (author’s translation).
139 SA, Recommendation on the Ministry of Industry’s administration, 15 November 
1963, pp. 49, 138 (author’s translation).
140 Ibid, p. 138.
141 Interview with Leif Terje Løddesøl, 11 March 2007 (author’s translation).
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tutions. Based on the investigating commission’s reports and several 
books that Lindstrøm wrote, it seems fair to conclude that he was mo-
tivated by practical and principle considerations. 
Concerning practical considerations, it weighed heavy that the 
mining ordinance was out-of-date in terms of technological develop-
ment within oil exploration. Lindstrøm claimed that the ordinance 
did not take the technological realities of modern oil exploration into 
account. As mentioned, Caltex stated that the cost per borehole would 
be between 1 and 1½ million dollars. All in all the costs for provid-
ing a sample deposit could amount to several hundred million dollars. 
According to Caltex, provisions requiring deposit samples were un-
heard of in modern oil legislation.142 
Lindstrøm was quite certain that geological indications did not 
prove the existence of oil. However, based on his professional experi-
ence he was also aware that a deposit sample, for example of coal, did 
not prove the existence of a profitable deposit. In other words, cur-
rent practice did not take profitability into consideration: nor would a 
modification have to.143 
Lindstrøm’s principle considerations were coloured by his view of 
Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. According to Lindstrøm, the 
Svalbard Treaty and the mining ordinance obliged Norway to make 
conditions favourable for economic activity on the archipelago.144 
This had consequences for his oil policy. In 1965, when testifying at 
Lindstrøm’s trial, Caltex’s director in Norway, Arild Lindbom, told the 
court he was under the impression that Lindstrøm wanted to achieve 
something on Svalbard. Oil industry fitted this idea.145
In addition, Lindstrøm was of the opinion that Caltex had honest 
intentions. It was possible to be conferred claims on the basis of a min-
eral sample and still only search for oil. According to section 14 of the 
mining ordinance, a claimholder acquires “… the sole right to extract 
all the minerals and rocks …within the claim … “, including oil. This 
means that if a claim is awarded on the basis of a mineral sample, the 
142 H. Lindstrøm, Svalbard og norske nutidspolitikeres behandling av norske interesser i Svalbar-
dormådet. En samtidshistorie om nasjonal galskap [Svalbard and contemporary Norwegian 
politicians’ treatment of Norwegian interests in the Svalbard area. A contemporary 
history of national insanity] (Oslo: H. Lindstrøm, 1965), pp. 15, 38–39.
143 H. Lindstrøm: Svalbard ..., p. 17.
144 Ibid, pp. 7, 14–15.
145 H. Markussen, Prosessen mot ..., p. 168
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company in question would win sole rights to oil exploitation, if there 
is oil on the claim.146
Caltex was aware of this option. Director Lindbom summarized it 
thus: “We could have got claims by handing in gravel.”147 However, the 
company did not want to exploit this loophole. Caltex’s representatives 
informed Lindstrøm, Skjerdal, and Holler about this viewpoint during 
their meeting at the MI on 27 March 1961. According to Lindstrøm, 
the company stated that it was only interested in oil. All claims that 
were shown not to contain oil would be abandoned. However, it was 
underlined that starting exploratory drilling without claim rights was 
out of the question: claim rights were a security the company needed 
before it would invest millions in drilling.
Holler, Skjerdal, and Lindstrøm sympathized with Caltex dissat-
isfaction concerning the requirement for deposit samples. Lindstrøm 
especially was influenced by the company’s decision to raise the issue 
with the MI instead of demanding claims on the basis of minerals. And 
in retrospect it was not the decision to modify the interpretation of the 
mining ordinance that was most strongly criticized. The Norwegian 
government wanted business activity on Svalbard, and oil stood out as 
a supplement to coal. The problem was that the MI did not seek any 
advice in establishing the professional criteria for what would consti-
tute acceptable geological indications. Thus it was Caltex’s geologists 
who set the standard for the theoretical production of evidence re-
quired for claims, not the Norwegian authorities. Norway’s regulatory 
authority was not activated.148
Why were the other relevant institutions excluded? To formu-
late technical criteria for acceptable geological indications of oil, the 
Norwegian Polar Institute would have been a natural partner for the 
mining section. However, to Lindstrøm such an idea was impudent. 
He disliked the Polar Institute, regarding it as challenging the min-
ing section’s professional expertise and as competing for money from 
the budget. 
146 Royal Decree, 7 August 1925, Mining Ordinance for Spitsbergen (Svalbard)
147 H. Markussen, Prosessen mot ..., p. 168 (author’s translation). Lindstrøm shared Lind-
bom’s understanding. It was, however, incorrect. With reference to mining industry 
being a business enterprise, it was established by Oslo City Court in the so-called “Be-
rabo case” in 1974, that deposit samples must demonstrate probability. So winning 
claims on the basis of “gravel”, meaning minerals impossible to trade at any conceiv-
able profit, was not an option.
148 H. Lindstrøm: Svalbard ..., pp. 38–39.
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Importantly, he was of the opinion that interpreting the mining 
ordinance was the domain of the mining commissioner and the MI. As 
the Polar Institute took claims on behalf of the State, it was in no posi-
tion to take a stand on questions of evidence. This was a principle for 
Lindstrøm, but nor did he have any confidence in the Polar Institute’s 
professional value. Throughout his career at the MI, he had never “… 
seen any instances in which the Norwegian Polar Institute could have 
provided the Mining Commissioner with any sort of advice regarding 
his work on Svalbard”.149
That he had to compete with the Polar Institute for money from 
the budget did not increase his cooperativeness. Also, he fundamen-
tally disagreed with the Polar Institute’s preferences. He “… opposed 
having this institute using a large portion of its time and energy on 
exploring the South Pole area together with other ‘great powers’. 
We should obviously focus our time and resources on more obvious 
tasks”.150 He was clearly thinking of Svalbard:
For the Mining Section, and I am sure it was true of the rest 
of the Ministry of Industry’s leadership, it was important first 
and foremost to focus on the underdeveloped state of our own 
research before spending large amounts of money on researching 
the South Pole and other remote areas. For the Mining Section, 
it was important to have a good head for business in studying 
Svalbard, and stop flying around on mountain tops, looking for 
ancient fossils … my task was to ensure that … such work came 
after we had ensured an economic basis in this country.151  
In other words, Lindstrøm had no faith in the Polar Institute’s profes-
sional qualifications or utilitarian value. That the institute played an 
important part as a Norwegian standard bearer in the polar regions 
mattered little. To Lindstrøm this was clearly of secondary importance 
compared to the work of the mining section. Against this background 
he was opposed to involving the Polar Institute in the issue of deposit 
samples. 
Because of Svalbard’s rooting in international law and its position 
between East and West, it was Lindstrøm’s insistence on not consulting 
the MFA that most surprised his contemporaries. Several factors were 
149 Ibid, pp. 19, 22 (author’s translation).
150 Ibid, pp. 19, 25 (author’s translation).
151 Ibid, p. 28 (author’s translation).
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significant. At its base lay an old grudge against Norwegian foreign af-
fairs: “I am one of those who have never been particularly impressed by 
Norwegian foreign policy. 1940 – was a rule with no exceptions.”152
That the MFA cooperated with the Polar Institute was also impor-
tant as this challenged the mining section’s professional competence. 
Lindstrøm was vexed at the MFA treating the Polar Institute as “… 
their special experts on questions of geology and mining industry in 
the Antarctic and Arctic regions”. Personally he could not remem-
ber a single instance of his section receiving similar requests from the 
MFA. It also annoyed him that the MFA often put its weight behind 
the Polar Institute in budgetary matters at the Ministry of Finance. 
This positioned the MI “… against opponents we had not taken into 
account”.153
However, the decisive factor was that Lindstrøm was of the opin-
ion that the MFA should not be involved in mining and industry issues 
on Svalbard. In 1965 he wrote: 
To avoid any discussion and any doubt, I will start by underlin-
ing that while working with Svalbard issues I have always been 
of the basic opinion that one should not present anything related 
to the Mining Ordinance for Svalbard to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.154
Once again his view of administrative procedures was driven by prin-
ciple: the mining ordinance should be interpreted by the mining 
commissioner. Only in cases of doubt should the MI be consulted. 
Whether to award Caltex claims on the basis of geological indications 
was one such case. In that respect the MI had “… the right to contact 
the Ministry of Justice, but no obligation to contact the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs”.155
This negativity to involving the MFA was also linked to Lindstrøm 
ascribing a “maximal interpretation” analysis of the Svalbard Treaty: 
it was the intention of the treaty that foreigners should have the right 
to engage in economic activity on Svalbard. It was Norway’s duty to 
make sure this happened unhindered. Lindstrøm thus claimed it was 
152 H. Lindstrøm, Svalbard ..., p. 98 (author’s translation). In April 1940 Germany in-
vaded Norway, catching the Norwegian authorities unawares. After the war, the MFA’s 
leadership was frequently blamed for not having foreseen the attack. 
153 Ibid, p. 28 (author’s translation).
154 Ibid, p. 27 (author’s translation).
155 H. Lindstrøm, Svalbard ..., p. 29 (author’s translation).
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“ … obvious to everyone that the interpretation and application of 
the Mining Ordinance cannot and should not be done by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and that one cannot give special considerations to 
Norwegian foreign policy”.156 In other words, Lindstrøm’s dealings 
with Caltex were directed by a belief in economic ventures taking legal 
preference over Norwegian exercise of sovereignty on Svalbard. Thus 
the MFA should not be contacted. 
Caltex and the government
Lindstrøm’s standpoint was clear. And he received support from 
Minister Holler, who eventually settled the matter. After the meet-
ing with Caltex’s representatives on 27 March 1961, Holler informed 
Lindstrøm and Skjerdal that he would raise the matter of the depos-
it sample at a government conference. Both Lindstrøm and Skjerdal 
later claimed that Holler said that this had been done, and that the 
Government had given its consent to the MI’s solution. Thus there was 
no longer any reason to claim that the MFA should be approached.157
However, it emerged that none of the government’s members 
could remember Holler mentioning this. And nor were there any 
minutes from the government conferences on the matter. Norwegian 
newspapers accused Holler of lying.158 To avoid a media debate about 
Holler’s credibility, the government asked the investigative commit-
tee to meet up again and examine the question. The committee’s mem-
bers agreed.
Since the issue to be investigated regarded events that had tak-
en place some years back, the committee pointed out that one could 
not put decisive weight on whether members of the government that 
might have been involved in debating the issue could not remember 
it. On the other hand, Svalbard issues were seen as especially delicate, 
thus making them easier to recollect. In this regard the committee 
drew attention to the testimony of Jens Haugland, who was minis-
ter of justice when the matter of the deposit sample was handled by 
the Ministry of Justice. Haugland remembered that he was orientated 
by his own secretary general, Rolv Ryssdal, about the MI’s unofficial 
submission of the issue. Therefore he found it inconceivable that he 
156 Ibid (author’s translation).
157 K. Skjerdal, I demokratiets navn [In the name of democracy] (Oslo: Cappelen, 1967), 
p. 203.
158 “Fra vondt til verre” [From bad to worse], Verdens Gang, 23 August 1965.
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would not be able to recollect debating the same issue at a government 
conference.159
The investigation committee found no information that could val-
idate Holler’s assertion that the issue of samples had been presented to 
the Government. Holler, however, refused to admit any wrongdoing. 
In light of this deadlock, the committee concluded that “… in any case 
he has presented the matter in such a fashion that neither the prime 
minister nor the other members of the government have been able to 
comprehend its importance”.160 
Why was this so important? At the time this was a matter of whose 
responsibility it was. However, for this study it is of importance to 
the explanatory power of the institutional interest perspective. Tamnes 
has pointed out that the Government and the Standing Committee of 
Foreign Affairs coordinated foreign-policy issues pushed to the sur-
face by sector interests. Thus the political leadership should largely 
have been able to shape Norway’s foreign policy. But the investigative 
committee’s conclusions – like MP Selvik’s reference to the absence of 
Svalbard issues in the Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs – illus-
trate that the deposit sample issue had been settled in favour of Caltex 
without being first checked by the Cabinet or the Standing Committee 
of Foreign Affairs. 
Oil exploration and the Airport Question
Although Norsk Polar Navigasjon (NPN) put its airport plans on hold 
following the negative response from the Norwegian government, its 
commitment to business ventures on Svalbard were not just superficial. 
The company sent three expeditions to Svalbard to look for oil as early 
as 1960. Unlike Caltex, it was not that concerned with securing claim 
rights in advance. The first test drilling took place in July 1961.161 But 
not after claim surveys on 15 August 1962 was the company awarded 
claims, thirty in all.162
The explanation for NPN risking drilling before its rights had 
been secured is simple. First, it did not use equipment as demanding 
of capital as Caltex – indeed, its expeditions almost seemed “volun-
tary”. While Caltex covered large areas by helicopter, the Pedersen 
159 SA, Additional recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 1 October 1965, pp. 13, 
29–30.
160 Ibid, p. 52 (author’s translation).
161 E. S. Pedersen, “Svalbard i flyvningens …”, p. 229.
162 SA, Report to the Storting no. 37 (1964–65), pp. 2–3.
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brothers picked their way through the icy wastes by boat, tractor, or by 
foot. The area explored by the company was small, but this kept costs 
low. In addition, the company had found slate with traces of oil in the 
area where its trial drilling had taken place in 1961. It would not have 
been possible to deny the company claims on the areas where deposit 
samples had been discovered. Thus claim rights had essentially been 
secured. However, the company got wind that geological indications 
were also acceptable as a basis for claims. The Pedersen brothers there-
fore extended the company’s claim application. When the claim survey 
was held in August 1962, NPN won three claims based on deposit 
samples and twenty-seven based on geological indications.163
However, the Norwegian authorities were not enthusiastic about 
NPN’s achievements. Indeed, it is important to point out that the 
authorities were suspicious of the company even prior to 1960. NPN 
had resisted for as long as possible the authorities’ attempts to stop 
the plans for an airport, much to the Government’s displeasure. The 
Norwegian authorities were also worried that Gunnar Sverre Pedersen’s 
association with the military would cause suspicions in Moscow that 
military plans loomed in the background. This uneasiness was so deep-
ly engrained that the Norwegian government wanted to exclude Lt 
Colonel Pedersen, not just from any airport plans, but from Svalbard 
in general. That the brothers thought it was wrong to be so considerate 
towards the Soviet Union’s objections did not improve matters.164   
Hence the government was sceptical to NPN’s oil exploration 
intentions. That the company had no financial strength and no ex-
perience of oil exploration in comparison with the other interested 
parties in Svalbard, strengthened the government’s mistrust. It was 
assumed that the primary objective of exploring for oil was to promote 
airport construction. During the autumn of 1960, both the governor 
and Norway’s chief of military intelligence, Vilhelm Evang, suspected 
that NPN would construct runways on its claims. The government 
shared this view. During a government conference in October 1961, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Halvard Lange noted that the company 
had not found oil, but was working on the same areas on which it had 
previously wanted to construct airfields. Minister of Industry Holler 
163 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, Memo on Svalbard by J. Evensen, 
21 March1963.
164 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og den politiske …, pp. 31–32.
DSS-1_2009_revidert.indd   56 24.04.2009   09:38:08
 Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard 57
assumed that oil exploration was “… acting as camouflage for certain 
other plans”.165
Such uneasiness was justified. NPN’s oil ventures had an inde-
pendent rationale, but at the same time the company hoped that oil 
activities would create a demand for airports. According to NPN’s 
annual report for 1960, oil exploration would “… ensure the necessary 
foundation for construction of airports and development of transport 
operations in the polar regions”.166 In line with this strategy, the com-
pany actively sought to play on a notion of an increasing demand for 
air freight. In the company’s annual rapport for 1961, it was evident 
that the board was continuing to work with issues of transportation 
in the Arctic, and that it “… sees an opportunity to establish a local 
air connection between the company’s claims as soon as in 1962”.167 
In February 1963 Einar Sverre Pedersen applied for permission to fly 
from Alaska to Svalbard. He wanted to land “… on a natural landing 
place close to Ny-Ålesund and Brøggerhalvøa”. The intention of the 
flight, he wrote, was “… to stimulate the shared interest for flying in 
these areas”. The MFA suspected that it was the Pedersen brothers’ 
intention to expand the proposed landing field.168
This plan – poorly veiled by oil exploration – was to have repercus-
sions. Soviet suspicion of Western activity in the area was based on a 
fear that it might be a smokescreen for something else. The Russians 
knew of NPN’s airport plans, and could not “… comprehend that a 
private Norwegian company was allowed to search for oil in such a 
sensitive area, especially since one of its participants was an active of-
ficer in the Norwegian military”.169
Because of this, NPN’s oil exploration drew unwanted attention 
to the area. Such attention was undesirable “... primarily because of 
the tense strategic relationship with the Soviet Union”.170 The com-
pany’s indefatigable pursuit of an airport was noted with displeasure. 
However, according to the mining ordinance, there were few oppor-
tunities to halt NPN’s oil exploration. The Norwegian government 
165 RA, SMK, Government Conference, 26 Ocotber 1961 (author’s translation).
166 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og den politiske …, p. 35 (author’s translation).
167 Ibid (author’s translation).
168 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, Memo on Svalbard by J. Evensen, 
21 March 1963 (author’s translation). The Directorate of Civil Aviation notified Mr 
Pedersen that permission for non-commercial flights was unnecessary. However, it was 
added that any kind of improvement of a “natural landing place” was forbidden. 
169  Interview with Willum Steen, 28 August 2007 (author’s translation).
170  Ibid.
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thus settled for a different approach: NPN was too weak to accomplish 
anything on its own. Through strengthened regulatory measures, it 
would be forced to accept the government’s will.171 
Claims and oil: evolving towards a terra communis
By the summer of 1962 two companies had been awarded claims in-
tended for oil exploration on Svalbard: Caltex and NPN. Compared to 
coal mining, confined to certain areas, the geographical area for eco-
nomic activity had expanded considerably, a development Caltex had 
pushed forward. NPN remained a dwarf by comparison, both techno-
logically and financially. 
Why was this development dangerous? First, it could lead to for-
eign political complications. In relation to Tamnes’ description of 
the threat pattern on Svalbard, approving Caltex’s claim application 
meant that the MI had incautiously “… paved the way for an external 
secondary threat …”, which in turn would open up for the domestic 
secondary threat in the form of NPN. This could cause the Soviets to 
accuse Norway of deliberately encouraging and favouring American 
capitalism and its Norwegian footmen on Svalbard.172
Neither were there any gains from a Norwegian sovereignty per-
spective. The right to regulate the criteria for oil claims was abandoned. 
At a time when Norwegian exercise of sovereignty was at a level of 
minimal activity, this was a serious development. And as mentioned, 
Norway’s foreign-policy leadership wanted Norwegian economic activ-
ity that underlined Norwegian supremacy without provoking Soviet 
reactions. Caltex was American, and NPN was too strongly connected 
to the airport question and the Norwegian military to fit the picture.
At the same time this generous treatment of Caltex could spell 
further problems. A precedent had been set. As non-discrimination 
was an important principle in the Svalbard Treaty, the Russians now 
also had good reasons for acquiring new claims. In other words, a legal 
basis for expanding Soviet involvement on Svalbard had been created. 
If Soviet and American interests were to compete over the archipela-
go’s resources, it could cause unpredictable consequences.  
In sum this meant that by making conditions favourable for the 
external and domestic secondary threat, the MI had opened for a reaction 
from the primary threat, the Soviet Union – which Norway could hardly 
171 Interview with Leif Terje Løddesøl, 11 April 2007.
172 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og den politiske …, p. 48 (author’s translation).
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contain either politically or legally. The archipelago could in reality 
revert back to its previous status as an unregulated terra communis – as 
it had been prior to the Svalbard Treaty which laid the foundation for 
the Norwegian takeover in 1925.173
173 Ibid.
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Chapter 4
Property rights on Svalbard
Claims awarded in conflict with the mining ordinance were not the 
only problem for Norwegian Svalbard policy. Whether the State had 
participation rights to operations on Caltex claims would also prove 
especially difficult to handle, threatening to expose sensitive sides 
of Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. Potentially, this could also 
end up being a case between Norway and the United States at the 
International Court of Justice.
In one corner was the Norwegian State: as property owner, the 
government thought itself entitled to a share in any profit and the for-
eign-policy leadership in particular stressed the importance of having 
Norway’s participation rights acknowledged. In the other corner was 
Caltex. The company – which in addition to geology was also attracted 
to Svalbard’s low taxes – did not want to share any potential yields. 
However, this pattern of conflict was complicated by the appearance 
of the Ministry of Industry, acting again as Caltex’s best man. In addi-
tion, the company was supported by legal quarters. 
The question of participation rights caused a forceful ministerial 
turf war, helping to reveal the unique working conditions and person-
alities that defined the MI at the time. Like chapter three, this part 
of the study will show how circumstances within the administration 
impeded management of the issue. A solution to the conflict did not 
emerge until after the MI’s leadership had been replaced. 
Superficially, the conflict seemed to be about the government’s fi-
nancial interests. Any oil discovered could yield large revenues. The 
financial perspective was significant, but Norwegian sovereignty con-
sideration determined the Norwegian government’s stance. This part 
of the study will show how Caltex’s dispositions challenged Norwegian 
sovereignty by claiming that this did not include property ownership 
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over Svalbard’s unclaimed land, and how the Norwegian government 
reacted to this. 
Evensen and the MFA’s Svalbard policy
The legal affairs department mainly handled Svalbard questions at the 
MFA. As with the Ministry of Justice’s legislation department, the le-
gal affairs department was traditionally strongly focused on theoretical 
legal interpretations. But this changed rapidly after July 1961, when 
Jens Evensen – new to the MFA – became the department’s director 
general. Evensen’s appointment was connected to the minister of for-
eign affairs, Lange, and his desire to have a legal affairs department 
which could operate more practically. Evensen did not disappoint. 
As director general he was pragmatic, vigorous, and enjoyed Lange’s 
confidence.174
It was Evensen’s “… manifesto that the legal affairs department 
should be a judicial-political department. It should play a part in 
guarding Norwegian interests”. International law should not immedi-
ately dictate Norwegian foreign policy, but the latter could find sup-
port in the former if this benefitted foreign-policy goals, including 
Svalbard. Prior to the conflict over participation rights, Evensen had 
pointed out that the department had to have a “… more active view 
on the Svalbard Treaty”.175 
The MFA’s attitude to activity on Svalbard was emphatically re-
strictive, and it generally discouraged from being persistent in promot-
ing national interests there. Rooted in an idea of impotence, this was 
a legacy from the Svalbard crisis. The archipelago was seen as an out-
post not worth risking one’s neck for. This attitude was supported by 
members of the ministry’s establishment, including Assistant Director 
General Egil Amlie and Principal Officer Knut Hedemann, but also 
by politicians. As late as in June 1965, the chairman of the Standing 
Committee of Foreign Affairs, Finn Moe (Labour) stated that Svalbard 
was “… if not a burden, then at least a very heavy responsibility”.176
Evensen represented the obverse to this line of thinking. With his 
encouragement, new employees at the legal affairs department took 
a more active approach to the Svalbard Treaty. Especially Leif Terje 
174 B. R. Retzer, Makten, myten og mennesket Jens Evensen [The power, myth and person of 
Jens Evensen] (Gjøvik: bbg, 1999), pp. 77–79.
175 Interview with Prof. C. A. Fleischer, 19 April 2007 (author’s translation).
176 UD, 36.6/39, bind II; SA, Closed sitting in the Storting, 18 May 1965 (author’s trans-
lation).
DSS-1_2009_revidert.indd   62 24.04.2009   09:38:08
 Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard 63
Løddesøl and Carl August Fleischer177 were given relatively free hands.178 
Willum Steen from the 4th political section was also a “… strong sup-
porter of the Norwegian State marking itself in the polar regions, not 
least on Svalbard”.179 With Evensen this group supported an “active 
interpretation” of the treaty: The legal affairs department should aim 
to create more freedom of action for Norwegian Svalbard policy. Focus 
should thus be on the treaty’s possibilities, not its limitations.180 
Significantly, Evensen’s active Svalbard policy was supported by 
Minister Lange. This was an important development with consequenc-
es beyond the Caltex Case. In real terms this meant that the legal 
affairs department – and over time the entire ministry – readjusted 
their view on Svalbard. Norway was to mark actively its presence on 
Svalbard.181    
Right to participation
The mining ordinance was again at front of stage. According to the 
ordinance, a claim holder had sole rights to extract all minerals and 
oils within the claim. But the ordinance also provides the landowner 
with a right to participate in operations on the claim not exceeding 
one quarter. And the Svalbard Act of 1925 establishes that all land on 
Svalbard is State property, except for treaty property, meaning land oc-
cupied before the Svalbard Treaty’s entry into force. Accordingly, the 
Norwegian State has a right of participation not exceeding one quarter 
in operations on claims on state land.182 
The State’s participation right was discussed by the MI in 
November 1961. Because of Caltex’s claims, the MI started to make 
preparations for participation. But a confidential MFA memo from 
1947 surfaced, raising doubts over the State’s participation right. The 
MI, a relevant professional partner in the matter, had received a copy 
of the memo. But no conclusion had been reached in 1947. Lindstrøm 
thus approached the MFA to hear a second opinion on the matter.183
177 C. A. Fleischer started working for the MFA in 1960. He worked full time for the 
MFA until January 1962, when he also started working as a lecturer at the University 
of Oslo (UiO). He completed his PhD in 1964 and became a professor in 1969. He has 
been employed by both the UiO and the MFA throughout his career. 
178 Interview with Leif Terje Løddesøl, 11 April 2007.
179 Interview with Willum Steen, 28 August 2007 (author’s translation).
180 Interview with Prof. C. A. Fleischer, 19 April 2007.
181 Ibid.
182 SA, Report to the Storting no. 37 (1964–65), p. 1.
183 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
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At the MFA, the issue was subjected to considerable analysis from 
the end of November 1961. Willum Steen noted that section 22 of the 
Svalbard Act laid down that all land which was not treaty property, 
was to be considered State property. The Svalbard Act thus clarified 
a question to which the treaty did not provide an answer. Steen pre-
sumed that the Act built on Article 1 of the treaty which establishes 
Norway’s full and absolute sovereignty over Svalbard, thus enabling 
the State to claim ownership over unoccupied land with the same 
rights as ascribed private landowners. If this was correct, the State had 
participation rights.184
But Steen was concerned that trouble with the signatory powers 
could be sparked off. It could be argued that access to participation in 
claims on all areas not subject to private ownership would constitute a 
privileged position for Norway that may not have been intended when 
the Svalbard Treaty was moulded. Article 1 of the Svalbard Treaty, grant-
ing Norway sovereignty over Svalbard, but subject to stipulations, also 
seemed to curtail section 22 of the Svalbard Act. Neither could it be 
ruled out that Norway and the signatory powers had regarded the areas 
not subject to private ownership as a sort of no-man’s land during the 
preparatory work on the treaty: that Norway should have sovereignty 
over these areas, but not ownership in the sense of private law.185  
Steen was in effect raising the fundamental question about the 
Svalbard Treaty: was it the principle of absolute sovereignty or limited 
sovereignty exercise that should be applied when analysing issues not 
covered by the treaty’s explicit stipulation articles? From the perspec-
tive of international law, one could not prescribe the stipulation arti-
cles new areas of application. Thus Norway had ownership and partici-
pation rights. However, in light of Articles 7 and 8 in the treaty one 
could assert that participation rights would constitute a non-intended 
privilege for Norway. It was a matter of interpretation. When a treaty’s 
intention was in doubt, the practice in international law was that:
The whole of the treaty must be taken into consideration, if the 
meaning of any one of its provisions is doubtful; and not only the 
wording of the treaty, but also its purpose, the motives which led 
to its conclusion, and the conditions prevailing at the time.186
184 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
185 Ibid.
186 L. Oppenheim and H. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law, 8th edition (London: 
Longmans, 1955), p. 953.
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But was there any material outside the Svalbard Treaty that could shed 
light on the issue? Steen drew attention to a record from negotiations 
between Norway and Sweden in 1920 over a draft of the mining or-
dinance. In the first draft, it said in section 19 that: “The proprietor 
of any private ground on which a claim has been given is entitled to 
participation …” This was changed by the Norwegian authorities to: 
“The proprietor of any ground on which a claim has been given is 
entitled to participation …” It was stated that the reason for remov-
ing the word “private” was only to ensure that the State, if it acquired 
private land, would have the same rights as private landowners.187 This 
standpoint could possibly imply that there was an obligation vis-à-vis 
Sweden for Norway to refrain from invoking participation rights on 
State land, according to Steen.188
The next question was whether Norway was bound by this. The 
record had been the backdrop for the MFA’s memo from 1947, written 
by Executive Officer Gustav Heiberg. Principal Officer Erik Colban 
and Professor Frede Castberg189 continued working with the matter 
of this record with Heiberg. They never came to an agreement, and 
in January 1948 three different standpoints were recorded. Heiberg 
concluded doubtfully that the record constituted a binding obligation 
towards Sweden. Colban asserted that it implied a civil judicial obliga-
tion which Norway could seek annulled. Castberg’s view was that the 
record was only preparatory work of interpretative value. However, 
this could hardly mean that the State had to limit its participation 
right without this being explicitly stipulated by the mining ordi-
nance, which was not the case.190 
Though the question went unanswered, Steen recommended that 
the State invoke participation rights for two reasons. First, such a po-
sition could be well advocated. Second, it was highly doubtful that 
objections to invoking such a right would be raised by Sweden or 
any other signatory power. But first and foremost Steen argued that 
strengthening Norway’s position on Svalbard was principally desir-
able. And in cases when there was doubt as to whether the Svalbard 
187 UD, Records from negotiations between Norway and Sweden, 26–27 March 1920.
188 UD, 36.6/39, bind II. The word “private” is not emphasized in the original. 
189 Prof. Frede Casberg was as mentioned in chapter II the MFA’s advisor in international 
law.
190 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
DSS-1_2009_revidert.indd   65 24.04.2009   09:38:09
 66 Defence and Security Studies 1-2009
Treaty limited Norway’s position, this could be achieved by establish-
ing a practice which served Norwegian interests.191  
In January 1962 the issue was passed on to Director General 
Evensen, who also maintained that the section 22 of the Svalbard Act 
gave the State the same rights over State land as a private landowner 
would have over private land. The question was whether this standpoint 
was compatible with the provisions of the Svalbard Treaty and mining 
ordinance. Whether Norway had entered into a binding obligation to 
Sweden during the negotiations in 1920 was therefore important. The 
answer would have far-reaching consequences. In accordance with the 
Treaty’s principle of non-discrimination, Norway would have the same 
obligations to the other signatory powers as to Sweden.192
Evensen concluded that since section 22 of the Svalbard Act had 
been in force since 1925 without being opposed, it would be illogical 
if the authorities now failed to invoke participation rights. And such 
action would probably not cause Stockholm to raise objections.193 At 
the same time the issue was of significance for Evensen’s objectives for 
Svalbard: that “… Norway through a wise and active Svalbard policy 
will be able to emphasize and strengthen its rights”, made for invok-
ing participation rights.194
Oil claims revisited
The MI’s approach to the MFA regarding the State’s participation right 
was a turning point for Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard. From then, 
oil-policy management was no longer the exclusive domain of the MI, 
and became instead subject to broader political analysis. The realities 
of foreign affairs and regional threat patterns had caught up with the 
MI’s lenient treatment of Caltex. 
During the winter of 1961–62, in connection with work on the 
issue of participation rights, the MFA became aware that interpreting 
the mining ordinance was problematic when dealing with oil claims. 
Evensen was shocked by how easily claims had been conferred to the 
oil companies. He pointed out that NPN’s geological indications con-
sisted only of references to a book from 1937 by the geologists Adolf 
191 Ibid.
192 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
193 Ibid.
194 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, Memo on Svalbard by J. Evensen, 
4 February 1962 (author’s translation).
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Hoel and Ander Orvin, Das festungeprofil auf Spitsbergen, and one from 
1940 by Orvin alone, Outline of the Geological History of Spitsbergen.195
Evensen was not in a position to evaluate the quality of Caltex’s 
geological data, but he found it worrying that the company had been 
conferred sole extraction rights to such large areas without any sub-
stantial commitments or economic obligations being demanded of the 
company. In addition, it was generally supposed that the company’s 
claims consisted of the areas on Svalbard where the probability of dis-
covering oil was greatest. In practical terms this implied “… an ad-
vance booking of considerable areas …”, and “… may cause foreign 
political complications”. He feared that the Soviet Union would accuse 
Norway of greatly favouring American interests.196
The legal affairs department quickly decided that stricter demands 
were necessary. Evensen’s goal was two-fold: first, he wanted Caltex 
and NPN – so far the only companies with claims awarded based on 
geological indications – to be subject to much stricter treatment in 
terms of the other provisions in the mining ordinance, , especially the 
obligation to work the claims; second, Evensen wanted to tighten the 
MI’s liberal claim criteria. In sum, he wanted to activate Norway’s 
rights and opportunities to regulate the oil companies’ terms and 
development.197
But a conflict between the MI and the MFA was now brewing, 
the core of which was to be found in Evensen championing a funda-
mentally different opinion on Norway’s position on Svalbard than his 
colleagues at the MI. Lindstrøm asserted that it was Norway’s duty to 
make conditions favourable for business ventures on the archipelago. 
It was “… illegal to take special foreign political considerations into 
account when managing Svalbard”.198 Evensen, on the other hand, as-
serted that outside of the Svalbard Treaty’s non-discrimination princi-
ple, it was up to Norway to decide how activity should be conducted. 
The crux of the matter was that Norway’s sovereignty 
 … does not represent any clearly defined areas of responsibil-
ity for Norway’s sovereignty exercise. The sovereignty’s contents 
195 Ibid.
196 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, Memo on Svalbard by J. Evensen, 
4 February 1962 (author’s translation).
197 Ibid. As mentioned in chapter 2, all claim rights are lost if the claim holder from the 
1 October, the same year as the claim is finalized, and four years on, does not carry out 
a certain amount of work. The State may grant a dispensation from this duty to work 
the claim.
198 H. Lindstrøm, Svalbard ..., p. 116 (author’s translation).
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proper can be strengthened or weakened by later custom. Thus if 
one neglects to enforce the opportunities available and the con-
trol which the Mining Ordinance provides … then Norway’s 
authority and its opportunity to control the development is 
weakened.199
The main point for Evensen was that the MI was surrendering a con-
trol mechanism by acting so liberally in the claim issue. If referring to 
pre-war literature was all one had to do to be awarded claims, then the 
authorities had no real control over the basis on which oil companies 
were given opportunities. Norway’s sovereignty exercise was thus an 
empty shell, a serious development that had to be reversed. The Caltex 
case became the first test of Evensen’s ambition to have a more active 
Svalbard policy.
Andenæs’ contention of the participation right 
Participating in Caltex’s claims could imply that the State might have 
to pay for one quarter of operational costs. Because Caltex had only 
completed preparatory investigations, it was impossible for the MI to 
calculate what such costs might amount to: the question was raised 
with Caltex at the end of March 1962. 
However, in its response of 4 May the same year, Caltex contested 
the State’s participation right. The company referred to a legal opinion 
from Professor Johs. Andenæs at the faculty of law at the University of 
Oslo who maintained that participation rights could only be invoked 
by owners of treaty land, and not by the State basing its ownership 
rights on section 22 of the Svalbard Act.200
That Andenæs was the mastermind behind Caltex’s contention is 
noteworthy. Although the State’s participation right on Svalbard was 
a matter of international and property law, Andenæs’ specialty was 
criminal and constitutional law,201 but by the same token he was a 
199 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, Memo on Svalbard by J. Evensen, 
21 March 1963 (author’s translation).
200 SA, Report to the Storting no. 37 (1964–65), p. 1.
201 C. Smith, “Tonene strømmer tilbake” [The memories are returning], in Etter over-
veielse [After reconsideration] J. Andenæs (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget,1992), p. viii. 
Andenæs dealt with many spheres during his career. However, according to Prof. Dr 
juris Carsten Smith “… criminal law was at centre stage” of Andenæs’ work. This 
description is especially precise up to 1962. At that time over eighty per cent of his 
publications regarded criminal law.   
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well-known public figure. In 1935 he had completed an excellent fi-
nal university examination. He played a prominent role in the public 
prosecutor’s team during trials against alleged Nazi collaborators after 
World War II, and, despite his young age, he became professor of law 
at the University of Oslo in 1945. In the following years, he created a 
position for himself as Norway’s leading jurist. He was, according to 
his colleague, Professor Carsten Smith, “… a leading legal researcher, a 
leading figure in our public lives … Few jurists in Norwegian history 
have had such influence over legal affairs”. He was a jurisprudential 
factotum that had the ear of the Storting, the Government and the 
courts alike.202
Andenæs’ public reputation was important. During meetings be-
tween Lindstrøm and Caltex it became evident that the MI lacked a 
complete survey of property ownership on Svalbard. Lindstrøm then 
entered into cooperation with Caltex to have such a survey produced. 
Furthermore, Andenæs was contacted by the company “… because the 
job presupposed access to the Ministry’s archives, and thus one wanted 
a person with public credibility to be responsible for the survey”.203 
Andenæs accepted the task and his assistant, lecturer Ole Lund, was 
granted permission to utilize the ministry’s archives.204 The survey was 
completed on 18 March 1962.205
However, Andenæs was also solicited by Caltex to take a stand 
regarding the State’s participation right. He was told by Lindstrøm 
that the State had no interests in the matter, and he accepted the as-
signment. This work resulted in a legal opinion of 26 April 1962.206 
Lindstrøm saw no problem in assisting in compiling a legal opinion 
to the State’s disadvantage. Nor did Caltex have any doubts as this 
202 “Johs. Andenæs’ minneord” [Memorial speech for Johs. Andenæs], Lov og Rett, no. 6 
(2003): 381–382 (author’s translation).
203 Anneus Schjødt, quoted in “Andenæs’ advokat redegjør” [Andenæs’ solicitor gives ac-
count], Morgenbladet, 16 February 1974 (author’s translation). Schjødt was Andenæs’ 
solicitor in a defamation issue regarding the Caltex Case.
204 Lund was given unhindered access by Lindstrøm. Even Lindstrøm’s closest colleagues 
did not know this until Haga once encountered Lund in the MI’s archives. Haga noted 
Lund was alone and stepped in. If there was anything that Lund needed, Haga could 
help him search for publically available material, but nothing else. Lund, who already 
knew the MI’s filing codes, replied that he would like to see the files regarding airports 
on Svalbard. Beyond this episode, the extent of Lund’s access is unknown. However, 
it was not his first day in the MI’s archive. In addition, Lindstrøm was in the habit 
of keeping documents at his own flat. When Haga notified the authorities of the cir-
cumstances after Lindstrøm’s departure, he drew attention to one of the MFA’s memos 
which had vanished. Not surprisingly, Haga’s information astonished the MFA. 
205 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15212, Survey of property rights on Sval-
bard by Prof. Andenæs.
206 The legal opinion was called: Om den norske stats rett til å delta i grubedrift på statsgrunn 
på Svalbard.
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development unfolded. That it was a highly regarded and inspirational 
legal scholar who contested the State’s participation right created le-
gitimacy. No one in the MI’s leadership gave any thought to how such 
cooperation would appear from a Soviet perspective.207
This intimate cooperation between Lindstrøm and Caltex was un-
known outside the MI, but the MFA knew that Andenæs had taken on 
work for the company. Andenæs had approached lecturer Carl August 
Fleischer as early as January 1962 and asked for his assistance. The as-
signment was to write about Norway’s rights on Svalbard and whether 
it was possible to assert that they were limited. When Fleischer be-
came aware that Caltex was the customer, he declared that he could 
take no part in the job as he also worked for the MFA’s legal affairs 
department.208
Evensen thus found out through Fleischer that Andenæs was to 
prepare a legal opinion for Caltex. At the same time it was a fact that 
Professor Castberg had written a confidential legal opinion about the 
participation right, with the background provided by Heiberg’s memo 
from 1947.209 However, Castberg had sent a copy of his legal opin-
ion to Andenæs. Because of its confidential nature Andenæs could not 
openly debate its content. As the primary study on the State’s rights 
on Svalbard during that time it could, however, influence his point of 
view. Thus there was a certain expectation at the MFA that Andenæs’ 
final product would be coloured by factors in Castberg’s legal opinion 
that were to Norway’s disadvantage.210
The translation error
However, it emerged that the MFA was unprepared for the reasoning 
in Andenæs’ legal opinion. Right of participation for the State would 
constitute a favoured position in violation of the treaty’s principle of 
equal treatment, Andenæs claimed. And based on the English transla-
tion of the mining ordinance it could be proven that the State was not 
entitled to such a right. Then, through Caltex’s correspondence with 
the MI, the MFA became aware that the English translation of section 
207 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
208 C. A. Fleischer, Korrupsjonskultur ..., pp. 448–449.
209 Castberg’s opinon can be found in: Utredninger om folkerettslige spørsmåle 1942–51. As 
mentioned, his view was that the record only had interpretative value and could hardly 
mean that the State had to limit its participation right.
210 Interview with Prof. C. A. Fleischer, 19 April 2007.
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19 of the mining ordinance did not conform to the original Norwegian 
version.211
As mentioned, section 19 of the mining ordinance lays down that 
the “proprietor of any ground on which a claim has been given is enti-
tled to participation …”212 At the same time, section 22 of the Svalbard 
Act establishes that “All land which is not assigned to any person as 
his property pursuant to the Treaty relating to Svalbard shall be State 
land and as such subject to the State’s right of ownership.”213
By comparing the two provisions above the State’s participa-
tion in operations on State land seems obvious. This was the conclu-
sion reached by Steen and Evensen. Andenæs, however, asserted that 
it was erroneous. He pointed out an English translation of section 
19 of the mining ordinance, which stated that: “The proprietor of 
any private ground on which a claim has been given is entitled to 
participation …”.214
It seemed like the English translation distinguished between land 
owned by the State and land owned by private owners. According to 
Andneæs, participation rights were thus limited to the latter.215 As a 
consequence of this, the legal affairs department’s Assistant Director 
General, Egil Amlie, started to work on uncovering what was written 
in the first translations sent to the signatory powers.216
Prior to changes being suggested, a draft of the mining ordinance 
had been translated into English and French at the request of the MFA. 
In turn, these translations had been changed in tandem with changes 
in the original Norwegian draft. However, Amlie discovered that dur-
ing these successive translations an error had occurred. The translator 
had simply forgotten to make the changes in the English translation 
that should have come after the expression “The proprietor of any pri-
vate ground” was changed to “The proprietor of any ground” in the 
211 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
212 Royal Decree, 7 August 1925, Mining Ordinance for Spitsbergen (Svalbard).
213 The Svalbard Act of 17 July 1925, section 22.
214 UD, “Mining Ordinance for Spitsbergen (Svalbard), Presented by the Norwegian 
Government (Translation)”, 1921, p. 7. The word “private” is not emphasized in the 
original document. 
215 J. Andenæs, “Suverenitet og eiendomsrett på Svalbard” [Sovereignty and property 
rights on Svalbard], in Etter overveielse [After reconsideration], J. Andenæs (Oslo: Uni-
versitetsforlaget, 1992), p. 28. Andenæs did not intend to publish the legal opinion he 
wrote for Caltex. In the article “Problemer om folkerett og sikkerhet i Nordområdene 
(DNAK, 84/1983) it was criticized by Prof. C. A. Fleischer. To reply, Andenæs found 
it necessary to publish the legal opinion in the article “Suverenitet og eiendomsrett på 
Svalbard “, Institutt for offentlig retts skriftserie, no. 1 (1984), and reprinted in his book 
Etter overveielse from 1992.  
216 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
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Norwegian text. Thus the modification the Norwegian authorities 
gave to their Swedish counterparts during the negotiations in 1920 
was never given to recipients of the English translation, for exam-
ple the United States. “The proprietor of any private ground”, from 
the first Norwegian draft, was left unaltered. However, in the French 
translation the proper change had been made.217
Similar to the status of the Norwegian-Swedish negotiations in 
1920, the question was now whether the Norwegian government 
could be held responsible for the translation error. Could it be ar-
gued that the English document was just a translation, and since the 
Norwegian text was the original, it was thus the only authentic ver-
sion? Amlie concluded that such an argument was of no use as it 
was Norway that had introduced the official translations, and thus 
the country was responsible for the translations’ validity. They were 
binding.218
In spite of the translation error, Amlie thought a great deal of 
prestige was linked to asserting participation rights. He warned that 
the Storting and media would question why the government would 
not stand up to Caltex, despite the clear wording of the Svalbard Act 
and mining ordinance. At the same time, he was of the opinion that 
asserting participation rights would lead to a dispute with Caltex, and 
perhaps the American government, who might invoke the English 
translation. If the State did not lose for any other reason, it was, ac-
cording to Amlie, highly probable that it would lose on that basis. 
The issue had become so delicate, both politically and tactically, that 
it should be forwarded to the Cabinet.219 
A legal challenge to Norway’s Svalbard regime
Amlie considered Andenæs’ conclusion solid. Evensen thought it was 
“… very well-founded”.220 Unlike Heiberg and Castberg’s work with 
the record from the Norwegian-Swedish negotiations in 1920, the ref-
erence to the translation error was new. But what consequences would 
217 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
220 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, Memo on Svalbard by J. Evensen, 
21 March 1963 (author’s translation). As mentioned, Andenæs’ legal opinion was later 
questioned, e.g. in Studier i folkerett from 1997 by Prof. C. A. Fleischer. However, that 
Caltex had a strong case was the predominant view in the period in question. 
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accepting Andenæs’ legal opinion or a court ruling in his favour have 
for the State?221 
First, the State would be cut off from any revenue from oil dis-
covered on Caltex’s claims, and the State’s opportunity to collect taxes 
was already limited by the article 8 of the Svalbard Treaty. An accept-
ance of Andenæs’ legal opinion would also deny the State income from 
all mining industry on State land, meaning almost all of Svalbard. 
Thus Svalbard’s economic potential could easily become second-rate 
compared to the rest of Norway. This was a worrying development, 
but the economic aspect was nevertheless not the most alarming part 
of Andenæs’ legal opinion. His analysis of the mining ordinance – a 
Norwegian Royal Decree - was more concerning. However, Andenæs 
asserted unequivocally that it was “… clear that the Mining Ordinance 
has been created as part of a binding international treaty which must 
be seen as a supplement to the Svalbard Treaty”.222
To support his reasoning, he called on the final sub-section of 
Article 8 of the treaty, which states:
Three months before the date fixed for their coming into force, 
the draft mining regulations shall be communicated by the 
Norwegian Government to the other Contracting Powers. If 
during this period one or more of the said Powers propose to 
modify these regulations before they are applied, such proposals 
shall be communicated by the Norwegian Government to the 
other contracting Powers in order that they may be submitted to 
examination and the decision of a Commission composed of one 
representative of each of the said Powers. This Commission shall 
meet at the invitation of the Norwegian Government and shall 
come to a decision within a period of three months from the date 
of its first meeting. Its decisions shall be taken by a majority.223
However, this procedure was never carried out. Through unofficial ne-
gotiations with the other parties, agreement was reached. Nevertheless, 
Andenæs asserted that Article 8 gave the signatory powers “… a co-
determination right …”, and thus the State was “… bound by the 
texts which were hereby built on”, including the English translation 
of the mining ordinance. That neither Norway nor any of the other 
221 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
222 J. Andenæs, “Suverenitet og …”, p. 21 (author’s translation).
223 The Svalbard Treaty, Article 8. 
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signatory powers viewed the ordinance as a treaty mattered not. There 
was no doubt about the translation’s status: “That it is an internation-
ally binding contract is certain.”224 
Why was this conclusion dangerous for the Norwegian authori-
ties? First, the State would be bound by the translation error. Second, 
it affected the government’s authority over the mining ordinance. As 
an internationally binding contract, the interpretation of the mining 
ordinance would concern the signatory powers in the same way as it 
did Norway. The mining ordinance would thus become a guarantor of 
legal rights for the signatory powers’ citizens rather than a regulation 
tool for the Norwegian State. Mining could become a right of the sig-
natory powers’ citizens. Strengthening Norway’s sovereignty exercise 
– through tightening the requirements for acquiring and maintaining 
claims – would be hard.225
At the same time, it was clear that changing the ordinance’s pro-
visions was out of the question. The reason was judicial and political. 
The legal aspect was connected to Article 8 being analysed in a way 
that made it impossible for Norway to amend the ordinance without 
following the same procedure the article prescribed. The political as-
pect reflected the international framework’s postulate of Norway’s lim-
ited influence on the international arena: During the Cold War’s bloc 
structure, it would probably be impossible to achieve any change that 
could strengthen Norway’s position.226 
In other words, Andenæs’ legal analysis and conclusion threatened 
to weaken the Norwegian government’s authority on Svalbard in sev-
eral ways: economically, by cutting the State off from income from all 
mining industry; politically, by giving foreign companies extended 
rights on the archipelago; and judicially, in the sense that if the State 
did not have the same rights over Svalbard’s unclaimed land as over 
the rest of the country, then Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard was 
of a poorer quality.
How did the MFA react to this development? That the State did not 
have ownership rights over Svalbard’s unclaimed land was not explic-
itly expressed in the Svalbard Treaty. It was a matter of interpretation. 
224 J. Andenæs, “Suverenitet og …”, pp. 21, 36 (author’s translation).
225 Interview with Prof. C. A. Fleischer, 19 April 2007.
226 F. Castberg, Utredninger om folkerettslige spørsmål, 1922–1941 [Opinions on matters 
of International Law, 1922–1941] (Oslo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1950), p. 380. 
Castberg’s opinion was later questioned, including in Petroleumsrett from 1983 by Prof. 
C. A. Fleischer. However, as with Andenæs’ legal opinion, it was the contemporary 
view that Castberg’s arguments were solid. 
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The issue of participation rights thus touched upon a core issue of 
the treaty: could the treaty’s stipulations be given an enlarged area of 
application? Is it the principle of Norwegian sovereignty or the excep-
tions which shall be valid outside that which the treaty explicitly lays 
down? 
For the legal affairs department, the answer was unequivocal: 
“… Norway is not obligated to tolerate any confinements of its sov-
ereignty exercise on the archipelago beyond those that are mentioned 
explicitly in the Treaty”. This was a very important principle, espe-
cially because of the pressure powerlessness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 
placed on Norway’s sovereignty. “Sovereignty is not a clearly defined 
term”, Evensen stated. Its meaning depended on “… the extent of 
Norway’s enforcement of its rights” By practising the authority of reg-
ulation, exercising sovereignty would be strengthened. By practising 
the right of participation, the country’s sovereign position would be 
underlined.227 
So at this point it was no longer a question of maintaining the 
status quo in Norwegian Svalbard policy. Abstaining from participa-
tion in Caltex’s claims could have serious repercussions for Norwegian 
sovereignty. Recognizing Norway’s participation rights, on the other 
hand, would strengthen the principle of absolute sovereignty. So even 
though the judicial options seemed limited, the legal affairs depart-
ment decided that the State should demand participation, and that 
Caltex should be notified thereof. The MI followed the recommenda-
tion notifying Caltex of its claim to participation on 22 June 1962. 
Thus Andenæs’ legal opinion was put aside. This was, in light of 
Andenæs’ professional reputation and prestige, a bold decision by 
Evensen. Whether Caltex would accept it remained to be seen.228
Soviet suspicions
The oil-prospecting activities had not gone unnoticed. Since the end of 
World War II, Moscow had followed Norwegian and Western actions 
on Svalbard with Argus eyes. In September 1960 The Red Star, a news 
organ for the Soviet army, dissected geological expeditions by NATO 
countries on Svalbard that year with strong scepticism. According to 
the paper it was highly probable that “… the American ‘prospectors’ 
227 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, Memo on Svalbard by J. Evensen, 
21 March 1963 (author’s translation).
228 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
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and their partners in the aggressive block are attracted by the Svalbard 
archipelago’s strategic position … These undertakings cannot be de-
scribed as anything but hostile actions towards the Soviet Union”.229 
On 23 June, one day after the MI had informed Caltex that the 
State would demand participation rights, the MFA received a new en-
quiry about oil exploration on Svalbard. This time it was from the 
governor of Svalbard. He informed the ministry that the Soviet consul 
and deputy consul in Barentsburg, the director of Arktikugol, a geolo-
gist and an interpreter had been to see him. In addition to a list of all 
foreign and Norwegian expeditions to Svalbard that year, they wanted 
information on all of Caltex’s and NPN’s claims. Furthermore, they 
were interested in knowing what rights a claimholder possessed, and 
to what extent a claimholder could refuse to have other activities on 
his claims.230  
The Soviet interest was not surprising, but because of Caltex’s con-
testing of Norway’s participation rights, the issue became even more 
sensitive. If the government accepted Andenæs’ legal opinion it would, 
as mentioned, be a step towards Norway’s Svalbard regime being noth-
ing but a caretaker mission over an international terra communis. In this 
regard, the link between Arktikugol and the Kremlin leadership was 
significant. Arktikugol’s coal mining, in all likelihood unprofitable, 
was probably motivated by a desire to maintain a political presence 
in a strategically sensitive area. And during the Cold War it was the 
predominant view that Arktikugol operated as Moscow’s lieutenant on 
the archipelago.231 
At first the MFA feared a negative Soviet reaction since American 
interests had won such good terms on Svalbard. But if the Norwegian 
authorities accepted Andenæs’ legal opinion – which would award 
Caltex new rights – the same concessions would have to be awarded to 
Arktikugol, because of the Svalbard Treaty’s non-discrimination prin-
ciple, resulting in a more favourable position for the Soviet company 
to expand its activities on the archipelago.
At the same time, matters could deteriorate further if the State 
did not manage to assert its right to regulate business ventures. The 
legal affairs department “… feared that political problems could arise 
229 The Red Star, quoted in Aftenposten, 7 September1960 (author’s translation).
230 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
231 NARA, College Park, Maryland, USA, Record Groups 59, Records of the Depart-
ment of State, POL NOR-USSR 1/1.70, Svalbard, C:195-197; R. Tamnes, Svalbard og 
stormaktene …, p. 71.
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if the petroleum activities were not regulated and controlled”.232 
Unregulated, Russian and American companies would have room to 
operate unchecked on Svalbard. The state prior to Norwegian sover-
eignty being awarded in 1920 threatened to return. Also, the regional 
low tension could increase if conflicts between Caltex and Arktikugol 
arose over the archipelago’s resources.
The repercussions of Soviet interest could be significant. Caltex 
was an insignificant figure compared to the pressure Moscow could 
apply on Norwegian authorities. Evensen noted that it was first and 
foremost the Soviet Union that had objected to Norway’s Svalbard re-
gime in the past. For the sake of peaceful relations it was desirable this 
did not reoccur. Evensen therefore asserted that it was “… tactically 
sound to engage in a dispute over participation rights, and thus indi-
rectly over our sovereignty’s extent, with [Caltex] first … Then in the 
next round Norway will be in a stronger position to assert the same 
rights towards the Russians”. In other words, the Soviet interest pro-
vided foreign political arguments for Evensen’s dispositions towards 
the American company.233
Lindstrøm and Holler versus Evensen and Lange
In the summer of 1962 the MFA and the MI pulled in opposite direc-
tions. At the MFA, the analysis of the Caltex’s involvement in Svalbard 
was guided by a desire to strengthen Norway’s position on the archi-
pelago. Participation rights would “… help underline our sovereignty 
over the area”, Evensen maintained. Thus the MFA would not let go of 
its demand as long as there was reasonable hope of winning any future 
trial.234
Then there was the MI. It is noteworthy that key actors at this 
ministry adopted a fundamentally different stance on participation 
rights than the officials at the MFA. The MFA’s dispositions were, ac-
cording to Lindstrøm, “… in total opposition to the spirit and idea 
behind the Svalbard Treaty …” Norway could not put such “… ob-
232 Interview with Leif Terje Løddesøl, 11 April 2007 (author’s translation).
233 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, Memo on Svalbard by J. Evensen, 
21 March 1963 (author’s translation).
234 Ibid.
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stacles in the way of [Caltex] when it comes to exploiting Svalbard’s 
natural wealth”.235 
The MI’s reaction to the MFA’s approach came in a letter on 16 
July 1962. In it Lindstrøm presented an extensive argument why the 
State should not demand participation rights. Caltex had unofficially 
informed him that if the State persisted, no further exploration would 
be carried out that summer. Lindstrøm feared that Caltex would leave 
Svalbard and warned that companies from other countries would re-
place Caltex.236
Also, Lindstrøm was of the opinion that the State’s right to par-
ticipation was highly uncertain. If it proved to be a legitimate right, 
then both he and Caltex considered that such would include expenses 
for trial drilling, and not just claim operations. And if the State initi-
ated participation, it would have to activate its right to all claims on 
Svalbard, regardless of company and nationality, which would prove 
expensive and complex. Nor did Lindstrøm regard recognizing par-
ticipation rights as desirable, unlike the MFA. He thought that the 
State should not assert this right until it had been definitely decided 
whether the State wanted to participate. As a solution he suggested 
that the State should assert its participation right in principle, but not 
activate it vis-à-vis Caltex’s claims.237
Lindstrøm’s arguments and proposals met with little sympathy at 
the MFA. In a letter of reply to the MI on 27 July 1962, the MFA’s 
points of view were presented by Willum Steen. He agreed that doubts 
could be raised over the State’s participation rights on two counts: it 
could not be proven that anyone had such a right in mind at the time of 
the preparation of the mining ordinance and Svalbard Treaty; and the 
translation error weakened the State’s procedural capacity. However, 
Steen pointed out that the political analysis of the issue compromised 
a most central dimension. He underlined that Norway had several ob-
ligations on Svalbard; thus it was only reasonable that the State to 
the largest extent possible should take part in utilization of the archi-
pelago’s natural resources.238
Lindstrøm’s argument that the State, if its participation right were 
recognized, would have to participate in all claims on Svalbard and 
235 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15212, Note on participation rights by H. 
Lindstrøm 9 August 1962  (author’s translation).
236 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
237 Ibid.
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bear one quarter of exploratory costs, somewhat irritated the MFA. It 
was far from an obvious conclusion. Steen asserted that, as a princi-
ple, the State was free to consider claim participation on a commercial 
basis. Whether the State wanted to participate in Caltex’s claims or 
not was a question that, apart from the desire to strengthen Norway’s 
position, had to be decided by assessing the chances of discovering 
commercially viable findings.239
However, the MFA’s irritation was primarily due to the fact that 
assessing the chances of discovering commercial findings had been 
made difficult, as Caltex had been awarded claims without handing 
in deposit samples. Thus no one knew if there was any oil at all on 
Svalbard, much less commercially viable deposits. If the State had to 
contribute to exploration costs, the MI’s liberal claim practice could 
prove costly for Norway. Evensen summarized the paradox thus: 
Having done Caltex a favour by not demanding deposit samples 
by the letter of the law before awarding these extensive claims, 
one has made it possible for Caltex to contend that Norway, if 
participation rights are asserted, also has to share the expenses for 
test drilling to find out whether there is even any oil at all!240
Steen pointed this out to Lindstrøm. He wrote that from people claim-
ing to have discovered petroleum, the State should demand a substan-
tial degree of documentation to have a more solid basis for assessing 
claim participation.241 
In conclusion, Steen summarized the MFA’s point of view. The 
issue of participation rights concerned Norway’s sovereignty exer-
cise on Svalbard to a considerable degree. A positive result would 
strengthen Norway’s position on the archipelago. It was pointed out 
that the authorities could grant an exemption from the duty to work 
the claims, and this could be of tactical value for Norway vis-à-vis 
Caltex. Cooperation with Caltex did not necessarily have to consist of 
participation in claim operations. Norway could also accept a part of 
the operations’ profit. However, the idea of the State asserting its par-
ticipation right in principle, but choosing not to activate it regarding 
Caltex’s claims, was out of the question. This would create a precedent 
239 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
240 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, Memo on Svalbard by J. Evensen, 
21 March 1963 (author’s translation).
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which Norway would find it difficult to wriggle out of later. Because 
the issue had so many important aspects, the MFA concluded that it 
had to be discussed in Cabinet. In the meantime the MI was advised 
not to take any final decisions. That the issue should be coordinated 
with other institutions and ministries would be the MFA’s policy from 
then on.242
The MI’s leadership was not content with the MFA’s conclusions. 
Lindstrøm in particular was becoming impatient – but there was lit-
tle he could do. The problem’s source was a Cabinet Directive from 
1909. It was normal procedure that when two ministries disagreed, 
the matter was referred to a government conference. The MI could not 
settle the problem on its own, as it had with the deposit sample issue. 
However, consideration in Cabinet would take time and Lindstrøm es-
pecially was keen to provide Caltex with a swift answer. This resulted 
in him, and later Minister Holler, trying to make the MFA alter its 
conclusion about the MI’s suggestion. Accordingly, asserting partici-
pation rights, but not activating them vis-à-vis Caltex’s claims seemed 
the path to take.243
Lindstrøm’s ultimatum
On 8 August 1962, after receiving Steen’s letter from 27 July, 
Lindstrøm phoned Steen to inform him personally that Caltex would 
withdraw from oil exploration on Svalbard if the State invoked partici-
pation rights. He claimed the Russians would take over Caltex’s claims 
if the company withdrew. Furthermore, Lindstrøm informed Steen 
that Professor Andenæs again had notified the MI unofficially that the 
State would lose a trial over participation rights. Steen excused himself 
by saying the MFA was planning to have an internal meeting about the 
matter within the next few days.244
That Caltex wanted to withdraw, even though the company had 
strong chances of winning in court, was not the case. For reasons that 
are hard to comprehend, Lindstrøm had at this time become obsessed 
with getting his opinion accepted as policy. He was highly indignant 
that the MFA had become involved in interpreting the mining or-
dinance and desperate to have the matter settled in Caltex’s favour. 
The State could levy some taxes on oil production on Svalbard, which 
242 Ibid.
243 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
244 Ibid.
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according to Lindstrøm, should be satisfactory. In an internal memo he 
justified his opinion: It was not Norway’s privilege to “…sit at high 
table”.245 
However, the MFA had no plans to contact Lindstrøm prior to a 
government conference. On 1 September, Lindstrøm sent a letter, call-
ing for an answer. As it led nowhere, Lindstrøm phoned Steen a second 
time. Lindstrøm was angry. He was going to meet representatives from 
Caltex at two o’clock the same day. If he did not hear anything from 
the MFA by that time, he would inform the company that the State 
would not invoke its participation right.246
Steen was bewildered. Being given such an ultimatum by a princi-
pal officer at another ministry was not just part of the course for a new-
ly hired junior executive officer. Time was scarce. Lindstrøm had called 
just before lunch. By his own superior Steen was told that this was the 
legal affairs department’s business. Steen decided to go straight to the 
top – to Jens Evensen. He gave Evensen a short briefing and underlined 
that Lindstrøm’s deadline was fast approaching. “And what would you 
like me to do, Mr Steen?” Evensen asked. “You are a director general 
and can call on anyone, even Minister Holler himself,” Steen replied. 
Evensen concurred. He phoned Holler and said it regarded the Caltex 
issue. Steen overheard Holler “… bark on the phone: ‘Yes. Get yourself 
over here right away!’”. Evensen looked smiling at Steen and said: “I 
better go then.” Later that day he phoned Steen, ensuring him that 
everything was under control.247 
Evensen thus explained his motives to Holler. Participation rights 
would increase Norwegian control and revenues, and underline sover-
eignty. Beyond that, it is unknown what was said at the meeting. No 
one took minutes. However, some information can be deduced. Holler 
found no reason to change his opinion. Cooperation between the two 
ministries was at rock bottom from the autumn of 1962 until spring 
of 1963. Up until April 1963, Holler repeatedly tried to persuade the 
MFA to change its opinion. 
Because of the Kings Bay accident on 5 November 1962, the is-
sue of participation rights stood still for a while. Not until 10 January 
1963 did the MI pick up the thread. In a letter to Lange, Holler wrote 
that the matter of the State’s participation rights had been forwarded 
245 Ibid; RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15212, Note on participation rights 
by H. Lindstrøm, 9 August 1962 (author’s translation).
246 Interview with Willum Steen, 28 August 2007.
247 ibid (author’s translation).
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to the Ministry of Justice’s legislation department, where General 
Director Stabel had concluded that the State’s legal position was weak. 
After the meeting with Evensen, Holler assumed that the MFA’s mo-
tive for demanding participation was to gain better control over oil ac-
tivity on Svalbard. But personally Holler could not see how participat-
ing in operations would lead to any new control measures, especially if 
the State settled for a part of Caltex’s profit. He thus asserted that the 
only reason to insist on participation was financial. But the sums in-
volved were hardly astronomic and there was thus little reason to risk 
having a trial whose outcome would be uncertain. Holler also doubted 
that Caltex would be interested in negotiating economic compensa-
tion based on State participation rights which the company denied 
existed. In conclusion, Holler echoed Lindstrøm’s suggested solution: 
the State should assert its participation right in principle, but choose 
not to invoke in the case of Caltex. Like Lindstrøm, Holler thought 
this a matter of urgency.248
As he did not receive a reply, Holler sent a new letter to Lange 
on 12 March 1963, and reminded him of the matter. Still no answer 
came, so Holler sent a third letter to Lange on 23 March the same year. 
He wrote that Caltex had come with a new enquiry about the matter, 
and noted that it was taking rather too long to get a final answer.249 
Neither Lange nor the civil servants at the MFA bowed to Holler’s 
pressure. Evensen, who was tired of Lindstrøm’s and Holler’s references 
to the legislation department’s acceptance of the MI’s position, wrote 
an opinion on a cluster of Svalbard issues, with the State’s participa-
tion right as the central theme. He concluded that the State’s position 
was not as weak as Stabel had asserted. There were other interpreta-
tive options of the legal material in question, and defending Norway’s 
participation right could be based on Norway’s sovereignty over the 
archipelago. However, the strongest argument in Norway’s favour 
was not of purely legal nature. As mentioned, Evensen was pragmatic 
and his approach to the participation issue was coloured by this atti-
tude. Court proceedings would in the first instance have to take place 
in Norway. And Norwegian courts had to “… base their rulings on 
Norwegian law”, Evensen noted. He was referring to the relationship 
between Norwegian and international law. Norwegian sources of law, 
especially Norwegian statutes, must be the basis for Norwegian court 
248 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
249 Ibid.
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rulings – even in cases of a discrepancy between Norwegian and inter-
national law.250 This was important because the mining ordinance is a 
Royal Decree from 1925. By comparison, the English text on which 
Andenæs based his legal opinion is a translation of a draft of a mining 
ordinance from 1921. It was in other words not a part of Norwegian 
law. Combined with the expression “right of ownership” in section 
22 of the Svalbard Act, this resulted in the participation right issue 
standing “… legally much stronger before a Norwegian court than 
potentially before an international court”.251
If the matter were brought before the International Court of Justice 
in The Hague, Norwegian law would no longer take precedence. In 
such a case, prior to a trial in The Hague, the United States would 
have to claim that Norway had violated the Svalbard Treaty. However, 
the MFA was not particularly concerned about American reactions. As 
mentioned, the treaty’s principle of non-discrimination would mean 
that concessions granted to Caltex would also have to be awarded to 
Arktikugol. In light of the Cold War and the United States’ “denial 
approach” to Svalbard, this was a question of whether the American 
government would endorse a policy which would reduce Norway’s ex-
ercise of sovereignty over Soviet activities. Evensen for one claimed 
that it was “… unlikely that the company’s country of origin will call 
Norway to account before an international court”. So it was not the 
validity of Andenæs’ reasoning that attracted Evensen’s main focus, 
but its applicability as a source of law. This was discussed with Stabel’s 
executive at the Ministry of Justice, Secretary General Rolv Ryssdal. 
Both Ryssdal and his superior, Minister of Justice Jens Haugland, were 
of the opinion that the MFA had to stand fast to its position. And 
so it was settled. A final decision therefore had to be taken by the 
Cabinet.252
Lindstrøm was enraged by the turn of events. That the Ministry 
of Justice had sided with Evensen was a defeat. And he regarded the 
MFA’s critical approach to the MI’s mining policy as a personal insult. 
He reacted vociferously on 16 April 1963, writing:
250 As a rule, Norwegian courts apply the principle of dualism, meaning that municipal 
and international law are two separate legal entities and that neither has the power to 
create or change the rules of the other. 
251 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, Memo on Svalbard by J. Evensen, 
21 March 1963 (author’s translation), the term “Norwegian” emphasized in original 
document. 
252 Ibid; UD, 36.6/39, bind II (author’s translation).
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For nine years now I have paid close attention to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs’ work with Svalbard. It has been a strange 
show of ignorance and dilettantism. It has been depressing to 
see the endless ignorance with which the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs conducts Svalbard matters. My flesh creeps whenever I 
am reminded that this is the same ministry that manages our 
foreign relations.
In fairly essential areas their competence is almost absent. Would 
it not be to our country’s advantage if Lange + Evensen + several 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s executives took up studying 
Norwegian foreign relations and let Congo Negroes, flatfooted 
Bush Negroes, and cowed Maharajas solve their own problems. 
Reading about our foreign policy leadership’s well intentioned 
advice to “the recently emancipated people” of the world has a 
fool’s touch to it.
It is now high time to write an unpleasant letter to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. It’s the only thing they’d understand.253
But to Holler the situation was different now. By the spring of 1963 
he was weighed down by other matters, especially the investigation of 
the Kings Bay accident. As a result of meetings between representa-
tives from the MFA’s legal affairs department and the MI’s leadership, 
it became clear that the MFA would not budge. In the end Holler 
accepted the MFA’s position on the need for a stricter policy for award-
ing claims, and that the participation right issue had to be settled at a 
government conference.254 
This was also decisive for Lindstrøm’s position. Though he dis-
approved, during April–May 1963 he accepted that little could be 
done about the MFA’s decision. On 18 May 1963 he wrote that the 
MFA “… still seems to labour under the illusion that Norway can 
win a trial over participation rights … [It is] certain that we will lose 
…”. Lindstrøm was tired of the issue. “I am pretty indifferent to the 
outcome of this case. The only sad part is that the defendant in a pos-
253 H. Lindstrøm, Svalbard ..., p. 97; SA, Recommendation for the Ministry of Industry’s 
administration, 15 November 1963, p. 138–39 (author’s translation).
254 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15212, Note on participation rights by H. 
Lindstrøm, 17 May 1963.
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sible trial will be the Ministry of Industry. It ought to have been the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”255
Arktikugol demands claim rights
Before Holler’s decision to accept the MFA’s stance, a development 
occurred highlighting the legal affairs department’s desire to tighten 
the criteria for conferring claims. In January 1963 the mining com-
missioner received discovery notices for seventy-one claims from 
Arktikugol. The possibility of the Soviets discovering oil on Svalbard 
dismayed the Norwegian authorities: a stronger Soviet presence was 
highly undesirable. Even if this did not influence the MI’s stance on 
the issue of participation rights, it is clear that it did lead to a reas-
sessment of the criteria for awarding claims. Even Lindstrøm gradually 
came to accept a stricter regulation policy.256
All of Arktikugol’s claim applications were based on geological in-
dications. Again the commissioner contacted the MI for instructions. 
It is noteworthy that Lindstrøm adopted on this occasion a very dif-
ferent approach to his executive work with Caltex: at the beginning 
of May 1963 he contacted the Norwegian Polar Institute for a profes-
sional assessment of Arktikugol’s geological material.257
The Polar Institute, unfamiliar with the divergence from the min-
ing ordinance at the time of Caltex’s claim survey, was of the opinion 
that discovery point notifications which properly documented the ex-
istence of conditions for entrapped hydrocarbons could be accepted. 
However, Arktikugol’s geological data documented no such condi-
tions. On the contrary, the Institute asserted that it was unlikely that 
indications of such conditions existed at several of the discovery points. 
The conclusion was clear: Arktikugol had not documented geological 
prerequisites indicating the existence of petroleum.258
Lindstrøm then sent a copy of the Polar Institute’s assessment to 
the commissioner. He wrote that the MI was of the opinion that claims 
could not be awarded. There were two reasons for this: Arktikugol’s 
claim applications overlapped with existing claims; but Lindstrøm’s 
primary objection was that since the authorities had gone far in ac-
cepting applications based on geological indications, such indications 
255 Ibid (author’s translation).
256 SA, Recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 15 August 1964; Interview with Leif 
Terje Løddesøl, 11 April 2007 
257 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
258 Ibid.
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had to be sufficiently documented. As was evident from the Polar 
Institute’s letter, this was not the case in this instance. 
Furthermore, Lindstrøm asked the commissioner to examine close-
ly the Polar Institute’s assessment, telling him that it should form 
the basis for evaluating claim applications in the future. In conclu-
sion, Lindstrøm told the commissioner not to inform Arktikugol of 
the matter before the MFA had assessed the issue. At the end of May 
1962, Lindstrøm wrote to the MFA, informing the ministry that the 
MI advised against conferring Arktikugol’s claims. He wanted the 
MFA’s opinion. Enclosed were both Lindstrøm’s letter to the mining 
commissioner and the Polar Institute’s assessment.259
Lindstrøm’s new approach was welcomed by the MFA. The legal 
affairs department pointed out that the ministry had previously under-
lined the need for the strict enforcement of the mining ordinance. The 
Polar Institute’s opinion was a step in that direction – beyond that the 
ministry had no comments.260
Soviet protests
This Norwegian rejection did not go down well. At the end of September 
1963, the Soviet trade representative on Svalbard approached the min-
ing commissioner, asserting that Arktikugol was entitled to claim 
rights because Norway could not treat Caltex and Soviet companies 
differently. The Russians concluded by asking the mining commis-
sioner to raise the matter with the MI.261
On 10 October 1963, as a result of the Soviet objection, a meeting 
was held between representatives from the MI, the Norwegian Polar 
Institute and the mining commissioner. The Polar Institute reiterated 
that Arktikugol’s geological indications were far from sufficient, while 
noting that the material which formed the basis for Caltex’s claims was 
no better. The MI suggested that the problem could be solved by let-
ting Norwegian geologists inform Soviet colleagues why Arktikugol’s 
documentation was insufficient. However, this proposal was put aside, 
as the MFA feared it would insult the Russians. But clarifying the mat-
ter was also important. At the beginning of November 1963, the Soviet 
Union’s ambassador raised the issue with Lange, claiming the matter 
259 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
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had been delayed by Norway – if Arktikugol’s claim applications were 
not recognised, this would constitute a violation of the treaty.262
The Norwegian authorities were in a tight spot. There was con-
sensus that tightening claim criteria was necessary. But how could 
Arktikugol be encouraged to accept a Norwegian rejection without 
Moscow crying discrimination? The answer to this would be impor-
tant for Evensen’s policy of tightening general regulatory practice on 
Svalbard. The MFA concluded that the only viable option was to per-
suade Caltex to surrender some of the claims the company already had 
been awarded, making the legal affairs department’s task even more 
formidable: not only was Caltex to be persuaded to accept the State’s 
participation rights; the company was also to be talked into giving up 
several awarded claims.263 
Negotiations with Caltex
Three weeks after the MFA had agreed to reject Arktikugol’s appli-
cation, the dispute concerning the State’s participation rights took a 
new turn. On 24 June 1963, the matter was raised at government 
conference. Both the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Justice and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had doubts about the State’s right to 
participate, but since the foreign-affairs leadership was of the opinion 
that extensive interests were connected to the demand, it should not 
be surrendered.264
However, the MFA did not want any commotion over the issue, so 
it was decided that the MI should approach Caltex and suggest a roy-
alty scheme as a practical utilization of the participation right. Holler 
suggested a cautious approach. The State should propose a royalty of 
five percent. But Lange disagreed, asserting that the authorities should 
under no circumstances start off with a modest percentage: five per 
cent was far too little. The MFA’s objection was accepted.265
262 Ibid; SA, Recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 15 August 1964.
263 Interview with Leif Terje Løddesøl, 11 April 2007.
264 RA, Government Conference, 24 June 1963.
265 Ibid.
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On 11 July the same year, Trygve Lie, who had become minister of 
industry,266 approached Caltex to notify the company that the govern-
ment wanted negotiations on the payment of royalties based on the 
State being recognized as the land owner with participation rights. 
In return, the State would not invoke its right. In a letter from 23 
October 1963, the company accepted the State’s point of departure. 
Caltex wanted negotiations to start as quickly as possible.267
But why did the company – which, it was acknowledged, had 
a good legal case – accept negotiations about royalties to the State? 
According to Lindstrøm, the explanation was simple: Caltex “… have 
had such excellent cooperation with the Ministry of Industry that they 
thought Norway should also benefit from a possible positive oil dis-
covery on Svalbard”.268 Professor Andenæs asserted many years later 
that the company chose to cooperate with the Norwegian authorities 
because it did not want “… to be at odds with the State, whose good-
will the company in many ways depended on …”269 The reality, how-
ever, was more complex. 
First, the company arrived critically at the decision. Caltex was in-
formed in July that the State wanted to negotiate a royalty agreement, 
but did not respond until the end of October, as it needed persuading, 
which was Evensen’s task. He and some of his staff from the legal af-
fairs department had several meetings with the company between July 
and October 1963. But persuading the company was no easy task: 
Caltex did not want any expenditure because of a right it disputed 
even existed for the State; Evensen for his part aimed to tighten claim 
criteria and reduce the company’s rights.270
Even though Evensen was of the opinion that Andenæs’ conclu-
sion was not the only possible one, he did not want any debate on 
the legal aspects. He chose to approach Caltex with a political argu-
ment: stronger Norwegian regulation would in the long term be in the 
company’s interests. Any development towards an unregulated terra 
communis could lead to stronger Soviet engagement. And as the US 
266 In the aftermath of the King’s Bay accident, Kjell Holler resigned as minister of in-
dustry on 4 July 1963. Trygve Lie occupied the post until 28 August, when he left 
the executive together with the rest of Gerhardsen’s Labour Party Government. Lie 
returned to the MI post on 19 September the same year, when Labour returned to 
executive office. 
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was not demonstrating any particular interest in Svalbard at the time, 
this would leave Caltex unprotected. Thus regulation policy had to be 
tightened, and the importance of participation rights for Norway was 
also stressed, which could in fact be to Caltex’s advantage. The prospect 
of a joint petroleum venture with Norway could dampen Arktikugol’s 
desire to start operations. Caltex would lose a competitor, and Norway 
would have its sovereignty underlined. This argument was gradually 
accepted by the oil company.271
However, other circumstance may also have been considered. Caltex 
had lost some of its most eager supporters. Kjell Holler was replaced 
by Trygve Lie in July 1963: this was an important development as Lie 
and Evensen knew each other well. They had first worked together in 
1946, and “Trygve Lie had faith in Evensen’s abilities …”272
Few people had had equally unnerving experiences with the Soviet 
Union and Svalbard as Trygve Lie.273 And he agreed with Evensen 
that it was wise to test the extent of Norway’s sovereignty by way 
of an American rather than a Soviet company. However, the relation-
ship between Lie and Lindstrøm was tense. Lindstrøm had, accord-
ing to Secretary General Skjerdal, become “… a fly in Minister Lie’s 
ointment”,274 while Lindstrøm “… wanted Trygve Lie to go to blazes”. 
On 30 September 1963, Lindstrøm went on sick leave and resigned 
on 17 October. By 21 October, he had been arrested on suspicion of 
embezzlement.275 The sweet harmony between Lie and Evensen – com-
bined with Holler’s and Lindstrøm’s departures – resulted in Caltex no 
longer finding support within Norway’s executive and administrative 
machinery. The coalition between the interests of the oil sector and the 
MI had been broken, and Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard increas-
ingly became guided by Norwegian sovereignty interests.
At the same time, it also became clear that the US would not 
support Caltex. The Norwegian authorities had not raised the matter 
of participation rights with their American counterparts. This was a 
matter of principle: Svalbard was a part of Norway, not international 
common land. So Caltex was the natural partner for dialogue with 
the Norwegian authorities, not the US government. Nor was there 
271 UD, 36.6/39, bind II; Interview with Leif Terje Løddesøl, 11 April 2007.
272 B. R. Retzer, Makten ..., p. 85 (author’s translation).
273 As mentioned in chapter 2, Trygve Lie was Norway’s minister of foreign affairs during 
the first stage of the Svalbard Crisis.
274 K. Skjerdal, I demokratiets ..., p. 224 (author’s translation).
275 H. Markussen, Prosessen mot ..., pp. 14–15, 91 (author’s translation).
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any American pressure on Norwegian Svalbard policy at the time. 
However, during the summer of 1963 the US’s position did become 
topical as the American vice president, Lyndon Baines Johnson, was to 
visit Norway soon after. Because Johnson, like one half of Caltex, was 
from Texas, it was possible that the issue interested him. At the begin-
ning of July 1963 the MFA thus initiated some careful preparations 
for discussing the problems connected with Caltex’s involvement on 
Svalbard with Johnson.276
As with Caltex, the legal affairs department decided that it was not 
expedient to discuss the specific legal topics with Johnson. If the vice 
president chose to raise the issue, then the political motives should 
be emphasized. Recognizing participation rights would strengthen 
Norway’s position to invoke the same rights vis-à-vis Arktikugol. If 
the right of participation was not recognized, then Norway would lose 
one of its few possibilities to control the burgeoning Soviet activity 
on the archipelago. Norwegian participation in potential Soviet oil 
operations on Svalbard could reduce Russian incentives for starting up 
oil exploration on the archipelago. From Norway’s point of view, this 
would undoubtedly be favourable – and probably the US would be of 
the same opinion.277
However, the US showed no signs of intervening for Caltex. But 
it is also reasonable to assume that the company did not want any as-
sistance. A dispute in The Hague could take years. It would be diffi-
cult for the company to start operations without a clear judicial scope. 
During the autumn of 1963, Caltex’s options were limited. The com-
pany must in all likelihood have concluded that without any American 
support or Norwegian regulatory authority, it would be vulnerable to 
Soviet interests on Svalbard. Hence the risks would be larger. Therefore 
276 UD, 36.6/39, bind II; Interview with Leif Terje Løddesøl, 11 April 2007.
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the company chose to enter into negotiations with the Norwegian 
authorities.278
The royalty agreement
Negotiating with Caltex was Evensen’s task and he needed some 
time to prepare: first, he had to familiarize himself with the petro-
leum legislation in other countries; second, he wanted to wait and see 
whether the criminal investigation of Lindstrøm revealed any criminal 
dealings.279
Negotiations started in April 1964 and the parties quickly reached 
agreement. The State was to be awarded a royalty of ten per cent based 
on the gross value of the oil and gas at port in Svalbard. In September 
a draft contract was completed, which read as follows: 
(1) In consideration of the waiver and renunciation stated in 
Paragraph 2 herein below, the State shall be entitled to receive 
from the undersigned a royalty equal to 10 % of its gross proceeds 
(less transportation and other costs from field storage) derived 
from the sale at deep water port of loading in Spitsbergen of 
liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons produced by the undersigned 
from the area in Spitsbergen covered by the 201 mining claims 
published in the Norsk Lysingsblad No. 165 dated July 20, 1962 
and any mining claims granted to the Mining Ordinance for 
Spitsbergen of August 7, 1925 on land owned by the Norwegian 
State under article 22, Paragraph 1, of the Svalbard Act of 17th 
July, 1925, No. 11.
(2) The State waives and renounces any and all rights or partici-
pation which it may have pursuant to Article 19 of the Mining 
278 The US State Department’s archives were rather one dimensional regarding this mat-
ter. The American authorities do not seem to have taken much interest in Svalbard 
until the 1970s, and then predominantly related to the archipelago’s continental shelf. 
In addition, two circumstances – though of a hypothetical nature – deserve mention-
ing: first, it is not certain that the US, or any other country, would have argued that 
the English translation of the mining ordinance constituted an agreement under in-
ternational law. To elevate something intended to be an unofficial presentation into a 
binding agreement could have had unpredictable consequences for the US in a reverse 
situation; second, the US recognised the international court’s limited jurisdiction. If 
Norway could prove that the reservations would have encompassed participation right 
issues in a reverse situation, it would considerably strengthen Norway’s case. As shown 
in the Norwegian-French Gold Clause Case from1958, there was no basis for arguing 
that laws which one did not consider binding to oneself could bind other parties. 
279 Beyond Lindstrøm’s obsession with making conditions favourable for Caltex, the in-
vestigation did not reveal any illegalities between the former principal officer and the 
oil company.  
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Ordinance for Spitsbergen of August 7, 1925 in the operations 
of the undersigned in respect of the area covered by any of the 
claims mentioned in Paragraph 1, whether heretofore or hereaf-
ter granted.280
According to the Norwegian Constitution, the Storting’s consent was 
unnecessary.281 Of late, however, the Storting’s members had shown 
such a keen interest in Svalbard that Evensen thought it wise to air 
the issue with the Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and the 
Standing Committee of Industry.282
Evensen’s advice was followed. On 7 April 1965, during a joint 
meeting between the committees, the draft was put forward. The 
committee members objected to one condition. By accepting the pro-
posal, the State would thereby renounce the right to participation if 
minerals were discovered on Caltex’s claims.283 Evensen, who thought 
the proposal needed no amending, viewed the objection as theoreti-
cal. The company was not interested in anything but oil. But the 
MPs stood firm, and the Government agreed. There had been a lot of 
noise over the MI and Svalbard and the Government had no desire to 
provide the opposition parties with ammunition. The draft could not 
be accepted.284 
Evensen had to approach Caltex again. He apologized for the 
Storting’s attitude, but it was beyond his power to do anything about 
it. The company, who wanted to start test drilling in the summer of 
1965, was accommodating. The draft agreement’s second paragraph 
was thus changed as follows: 
(2) The State waives and renounces any and all rights of partici-
pation in the exploitation of liquid and gaseous hydro-carbons which 
it may have pursuant to Article 19 of the Mining Ordinance for 
Spitsbergen of August 7, 1925 in the operations of the under-
signed in respect of the area covered by any of the claims men-
tioned in Paragraph 1, whether heretofore or hereafter granted. 
As regards participation in the exploitation of other minerals which may 
280 UD, 36.6/39, bind III.
281 This is not certain. It was Evensen’s opinion. 
282 UD, 36.6/39, bind III.
283 RA, John Lyng’s private archive, Storting papers 1964–65.
284 UD, 36.6/39, bind III.
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be discovered in the future, such participation shall be subject to special 
agreement between the parties.285
Hence the contract only pertained to oil and gas. If Caltex discov-
ered other minerals that the company wanted to mine, the matter of 
participation would have to be raised anew. Evensen was pleased the 
problem had been solved so smoothly, telling the Minister of Industry 
Karl Trasti and Foreign Minister Lange that the agreement was very 
favourable for the State286. First, Evensen claimed that Caltex had now 
acknowledged the State’s right to participation. Second, Evensen un-
derlined that a royalty, as opposed to invoking participation rights, 
would ensure the State avoided any economic risk. Petroleum opera-
tions could involve substantial investment by Norwegian standards. 
How much ten percent of the gross value was, compared to twenty-five 
percent of the net value, could not be established with certainty. This 
would depend on the size of a discovery, production costs, petroleum 
prices, and so on. But to Evensen, one thing was certain: ten percent 
of the gross value was significantly more than twenty-five percent of 
the net profit.287 
Was Evensen’s positive assessment of the contract correct? In a 
strict legal sense, it is clear from the text of the contract that Caltex 
did not recognize the State’s right to participate per se. At the same 
time, the contract implied recognition of the State’s sovereignty over 
Svalbard’s unclaimed land. In other words, it can be said that the con-
tract signalled a de facto recognition of the State’s ownership and right 
of participation. The precedent created was equally important. The 
underlying problem was that the treaty was not explicit about own-
ership rights. In international law it was usual to build upon estab-
lished practice. And a favourable practice had now been established for 
Norway. Caltex accepted that beyond the treaty’s explicit stipulations, 
it was the principle of full and absolute Norwegian sovereignty that 
applied.288 
As Evensen pointed out, the State was freed from any economic 
commitments. This was definitely a blessing. Though the State may 
285 UD, 36.6/39, bind III. 
286 During the winter of 1963/64, Lie fell ill. Karl Trasti became minister of industry on 
20 January 1964.
287 UD, 36.6/39, bind III.
288 Interview with Leif Terje Løddesøl, 11 April 2007; interview with Prof. C. A. Fleischer, 
19 April 2007.
DSS-1_2009_revidert.indd   93 24.04.2009   09:38:10
 94 Defence and Security Studies 1-2009
have to finance one quarter of Caltex’s expenditure for petroleum ex-
ploration because of the MI’s liberal claims practice, the royalty would 
mean the State “… avoided gambling, but would still get a slice of 
the winnings”.289 
Nevertheless, the Norwegian authorities would have had more op-
tions for monitoring Caltex if it had joined as co-owner of the claims. 
But this was unacceptable to the company. In light of ten percent of 
the gross value probably being greater than twenty-five percent of the 
net profits, it is reasonable to assume that this was due to operational 
considerations and a liberal corporate ideology. The State was seen as 
neither a desirable nor natural business partner. In this regard it is 
noteworthy that the contract between Store Norske and Caltex also 
involved the former replacing its participation and mining rights on 
its private land and claims with a royalty fee.
It is also clear that participation per se was not the most precarious 
issue for the Norwegian authorities. The essential objective in assert-
ing participation rights was to underline that Norwegian sovereignty 
included the right of ownership to Svalbard’s unclaimed land. In this 
respect the royalty contract equalled active participation. In the way 
the Norwegian authorities analyzed it, the royalty contract strength-
ened “… the arguments for a stricter Norwegian regulatory prac-
tice”. The royalty contract underlined Norwegian sovereignty. And 
Norwegian sovereignty underlined Norwegian regulatory authority. 
Thus the State was in a stronger position than before to tighten its 
regulatory grip, which Evensen had identified as important at the out-
set of the issue of participation rights.290
By the Storting, the contract was relatively well received. The 
government and the opposition agreed that Norwegian oil policy on 
Svalbard had got off to a very rocky start but that the royalty contract 
was a step in the right direction. The situation at the MI, however, 
called for attention. Jon Leirfall (Norwegian Centre Party) for one ex-
pressed that he found it strange that Kjell Holler had for several years 
been given memos of the type Lindstrøm wrote without “… speculat-
ing on whether the mental health of the person concerned is such that 
it is safe to entrust him with large and serious tasks”.291 However, this 
did not develop into a serious political issue, as the case was raised 
289 Interview with Willum Steen, 28 August 2007 (author’s translation).
290 Interview with Leif Terje Løddesøl, 11 April 2007 (author’s translation).
291 SA, Closed sitting in the Storting, 18 June 1965, p. 15 (author’s translation).
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in the Storting in 1965. By then Holler had already resigned and 
Lindstrøm was under arrest. In addition, there was the sensitive nature 
of the issue of participation rights and it was also uncertain whether 
Arktikugol would accept a royalty arrangement. The Storting’s con-
siderations were thus kept secret.292
Arktikugol’s claims
While the terms between the Norwegian authorities and Caltex had 
been settled, Arktikugol’s claims were still unresolved. After meetings 
between the legal affairs department and Caltex, it became clear that 
the company was not willing to surrender any of its claims. By agree-
ing to pay a royalty, the company thought it had gone far to accom-
modate the State. So whether the State could turn down Arktikugol’s 
claims remained an open question.293
Legally it was not obvious that the Norwegian authorities had to 
accommodate the Soviet company. It could forcefully be asserted that 
claims based on geological indications were illegal. Even though the 
MI had acted unlawfully, this did not provide a basis for continued 
illegal practice. However, the Norwegian authorities were of the opin-
ion that Moscow would never accept such a position. Power political 
terms thus dictated a different strategy: a fear of triggering Soviet re-
actions – the primary threat – resulted in it being decided in the spring 
of 1965 that the quality specifications for geological indications could 
not be tightened until after Arktikugol had been awarded claims on 
the same basis as Caltex.294
However, at about the same time Arktikugol signalled that it 
would accept the same terms as Caltex. On 17 June 1965 the Soviet 
company entered into a royalty contract with the State. Seen in a larger 
perspective, this was of invaluable importance. As mentioned, inter-
national law does not operate in a power political vacuum. Though 
the Norwegian authorities did not fear the US coming out in Caltex’s 
favour, it was, based on past experience, likely that Moscow would 
intervene on behalf of Arktikugol. That this did not occur was signifi-
cant. It signalled Soviet recognition of Norway’s right of ownership 
to and regulation of Svalbard. Norway’s hold on its sovereignty was 
292 SA, Closed sitting in the Storting, 25 January 1965, 14 May 1965, 18 June 1965.
293 UD, 36.6/39, bind II.
294 SA, Recommendation for claims on Svalbard, 15 August 1964.
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thus strengthened without creating political problems with its eastern 
neighbour. This was a victory for the MFA.295
Why did Arktikugol accept paying a royalty? There is no clear 
answer, but in terms of negotiation tactics the company may have 
painted itself into a corner. The Russians’ main objection had been that 
Arktikugol could not be treated differently from Caltex, regardless of 
the validity of the basis of the claims. Thus it would be hard to de-
mand preferential treatment in the next round. At the same time, the 
Russians were far behind their counterparts. Even NPN had secured 
claim rights. And according to Evensen, strengthening Norway’s regu-
latory authority, and thus control over American enterprises, may also 
have been in the Soviet Union’s interest. After all, Norway was quite at-
tentive to Soviet objections. If royalty payments and stricter Norwegian 
regulation could limit Caltex’s further operations on Svalbard, this 
would probably be seen as positive from a Soviet point of view.296
Norsk Polar Navigasjon
In light of the result of the issue of participation rights vis-à-vis Caltex 
and Arktikugol, it is rather strange that the relationship between the 
Norwegian authorities and NPN did not arrive at a satisfactory result 
to begin with. On 25 September 1963, the MI demanded participa-
tion in twenty-seven of the company’s claim. The main reason for this 
was that the authorities were facing final negotiations with Caltex. 
The Ministry therefore also clarified that royalty payments could re-
place participation rights.297
But a royalty was no option for NPN. Unlike Caltex, the com-
pany wanted the State to invoke its participation rights, which would 
strengthen the Norwegian dimension of its operations and make the 
State contribute to its exploratory expenses.298 Against this back-
ground NPN sent a draft contract to the State in February 1964. The 
Norwegian authorities, who did not consider themselves obliged to 
finance the company’s search operations, asserted that the draft was 
unacceptable. When disagreement between a land owner and claim 
holder arises, it is, according to the mining ordinance, the mining 
295 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, Note on petroleum searches on 
Svalbard, 21 May 1976.
296 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15211, Memo on Svalbard by J. Evensen, 
21 March 1963.
297 RA, John Lyng’s private archive, Storting papers 1964–65.
298 R. Tamnes, Svalbard og den politiske …, p. 52.
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commissioner’s duty to set the terms for participation. In March 1964 
the MI therefore demanded that the mining commissioner draw up a 
contract.299
The mining commissioner presented his contract proposal 
on 24 November 1964. It was essentially similar to NPN’s draft. 
Consequently the company had no qualms about accepting it. Although 
the Norwegian authorities were not satisfied, beyond renouncing par-
ticipation, little could be done: the mining ordinance establishes that 
when one of the parties cannot accept the mining commissioner’s pro-
posal, then that party must withdraw. The State waived its right of 
participation in NPN’s first claims.300 
However, not reaching agreement with NPN gave rise to a prob-
lem: as the State’s ownership right was regarded as uncertain in terms 
of international law, it was important to establish a practice in favour 
of Norway. And the contracts with Caltex and Arktikugol did not im-
ply explicit recognition of participation rights. MP Bernt Ingvaldsen 
(Norwegian Conservative Party) thus expressed that “… it would be 
natural to consider whether the State should utilize the participation 
right … towards NPN, for thereby one would also in real terms estab-
lish the principle of the State’s right of participation”.301 There was in 
other words a solid argument for cooperating with NPN. And since 
the company occupied only a limited number of claims, insuperable 
expense would not be involved. In light of the principle importance 
of the participation right, why would the Norwegian authorities not 
accept cooperation with NPN? 
First of all, the attitude of the foreign affairs leadership towards 
NPN was “… characterized by scepticism”.302 The company had not 
hidden its hope that the interests of the petroleum sector on Svalbard 
would create a demand for air transportation services to and from the 
archipelago. The Norwegian authorities noticed with some irritation 
that NPN seemed to be right. For example, in July 1965 Caltex ex-
pressed that its work on Svalbard was in trouble due to the lack of op-
tions for air transportation.303 In addition, the Norwegian authorities 
299 SA, Report to the Storting, no. 37 (1964–1965), p. 3–4.
300 RA, John Lyng’s private archive, Storting papers 1964–1965.
301 SA, Closed sitting in the Storting, 14 May 1965 (author’s translation).
302 Interview with Leif Terje Løddesøl, 11 April 2007 (author’s translation).
303 UD, 36.6/39, bind III. Due to poor air transportation, Caltex approached the Norwe-
gian authorities, asking for assistance from the Norwegian air force. The MFA claimed 
this could result in Soviet suspicions of collaboration between NATO and Caltex. The 
request was thus declined. 
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viewed NPN as too lacking in capital and technology to discover any 
oil. At the MFA, employees mocked the level of competence, telling 
jokes about the company using manual drills for test drilling.304 NPN 
appeared amateurish compared to Caltex.305
At the same time, the mining commissioner’s proposal was wholly 
lacking in terms of the State’s end goals. The MI asserted that the pro-
posal had gone beyond the letter of the law in several ways. Also, it was 
not specified whether the State had to cover one quarter of exploration 
expenses. The State would have buy in and pay NPN up to five million 
Norwegian kroner. But the State would not acquire any right of co-
determination to the assets for which it would have to pay.306
The majority of the Storting’s Standing Committee on Industry 
seconded the negative assessment of the proposal. The Committee’s 
chair, Olaf Watnebryn (Labour), summarized the State’s assessment as 
follows: 
We are only going to pay and have no influence over the condi-
tions, guidelines or programme for exploration. Based on the 
information we have, I believe one can safely say that due to the 
equipment, the tools this company has, and its lack of experi-
ence, it is not easy to take it seriously. So in light of the state of 
affairs today I do not believe it would be advisable for the State 
to agree to a proposal such as the one arrived at by the mining 
commissioner.307 
A joint venture with NPN would in other words not give the State 
effective control over the company. Beyond the symbolic value associ-
ated with Norwegian sovereignty – which the Norwegian authorities 
reckoned was in any case secured by the royalty contracts – control was 
the main aim of invoking participation rights. And combined with 
NPN’s unstoppable airport ambitions, it could be politically risky for 
the government to associate itself with the company. Also, at this point 
of time Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard was influenced by develop-
ments in the North Sea, where a fundamental feature was that “… one 
wanted to deal with large companies … financially solid if any damage 
304 Interview with Willum Steen, 28 August 2007.
305 Interview with Leif Terje Løddesøl, 11 April 2007. 
306 SA, Report to the Storting no. 37 (1964–1965), pp. 4–5.
307 SA, Closed sitting in the Storting, 14 May 1965 (author’s translation).
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was caused … and technologically competent”. The Pedersen brothers 
had nothing “to contribute”.308
NPN’s claims revisited
It was “… rather usual to think in Norway that NPN would soon fall 
out of the race with the US and the Soviet Union”.309 The Norwegian 
authorities were also of that belief. But the Pedersen brothers, show-
ing great endurance and determination, clearly showed the company 
would not quit its Svalbard ventures. 
In August 1965, only a few months after the mining commission-
er’s proposal had been rejected by the Storting, NPN wanted a further 
thirty-nine claims. By 1966 the company had reported fifty-one new 
discovery points. The company’s geological documentation was in all 
its essential aspects strengthened. In addition, in 1965 a new govern-
ment was formed.310 The change was for the better for the company. 
The new minister of industry, Sverre Walter Rostoft (Conservative), 
was more positive to the Pedersen brothers. NPN was conferred all the 
claims it applied for.311
In the long term it would be unacceptable to let NPN continue 
without demanding participation, which could result in accusations 
of preferential treatment. It was clear that the Norwegian authorities 
had to invoke the right of participation again. Initially, the dividing 
line between the company and the State was the same as before. The 
State did not want to pay for exploration while NPN needed capital. 
Once again the mining commissioner had to draft a contract proposal. 
For the claims applied for in 1965 a proposal was complete by May 
1967. For the claims applied for in 1966 a proposal was complete by 
October 1968.312
Previously it had been the Norwegian authorities which had been 
dissatisfied with the contract proposal. This time it was much more 
pleasing, possibly because it had been written by a new mining com-
308 Interview with Prof C. A. Fleischer, 19 April 2007 (author’s translation).
309 E. S. Pedersen, “Polarbasillen …”, p. 230 (author’s translation).
310 On 12 October 1965 a centre-right coalition comprising the Liberal Party, the Con-
servative Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the Centre Party won the execu-
tive. The Government was led by Per Borten.
311 Note from conversation between G. S. Pedersen, E. S. Pedersen and R. Tamnes, 30 
March 1987.
312 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15212, Note on petroleum exploration on 
Svalbard, 21 May 1976.
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missioner, Tormod Johnsen.313 In the new proposal the State still had 
to cover one quarter of operational costs, but not until after oil had 
been discovered and its commercial utilization had been agreed upon. 
This last part was essential. The State would not have to finance a 
company which it did not believe would discover any oil. And should 
NPN, contrary to expectations, make a profitable discovery, the money 
generated would cover the State’s expenses.314 
The Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
the Ministry of Justice gave its consent to the proposal, as did the 
Storting. But NPN was dissatisfied: according to the company’s at-
torney, an arrangement in which the State would only participate in 
commercial operations was “… unacceptable, unreasonable, and in 
dispute with the Mining Ordinance …” But now the company had 
the same problem which the State had had in 1965. The mining com-
missioner’s proposal could not be re-examined. If NPN did not ac-
cept the commissioner’s terms, the company would have to surrender 
its new claims. In practice, this would spell an end to its petroleum 
activity on Svalbard. Faced with such consequences, the choice was 
simple. NPN accepted the commissioner’s proposal.315
313 The MI could not instruct the mining commissioner since the ministry represented 
one of the contractual parties. The mining commissioner was free in moulding the 
proposal. That the contents in the two proposals were different can be explained by 
the fact that the first proposal had been written by Mining Commissioner Gunnar 
Mikalsen. However, Mikalsen quickly resigned on 1 November 1964. Preparing the 
contract plus the rest of the mining commissioner’s workload was consequently borne 
by Mikalsen’s assistant, Jan Hatle. A second explanation is that Mikalsen and Hatle 
sympathized with NPN and tried to take advantage of the situation. Mikalsen was 
later investigated by the police because of allegedly illegal dealings with the company 
BERABO, dating from 5 October 1964. Mikalsen was purported to have given confi-
dential documents to the company. After Mikalsen resigned as mining commissioner, 
he started to work for BERABO. Hatle followed suit shortly after. The investigation, 
which did not commence until 1972, was dropped due to the breach of a five-year lim-
itation period. Even though Mikalsen and Hatle did not necessarily sympathize with 
NPN while drafting the first proposal, it may be asserted that they did not feel any 
great loyalty to the Ministry of Industry during the autumn of 1964. And if Mikalsen 
and Hatle’s proposal had been accepted, then BERABO could have demanded the 
same terms in the next round. Tormod Johnsen, who was mining commissioner when 
the State again invoked its participation rights vis-à-vis NPN in 1967 and 1968, had 
no such links, either to BERABO or NPN. He was equally free in drafting a proposal, 
but he arrived at a different result. 
314 RA, Records of the Ministry of Industry, 1A15212. Letter to the Svalbard Panel by K. 
Dæhlin, 23 June 1967. 
315 SA, Proposition to the Storting, no. 16 (1967–1968), p. 6–9 (author’s translation).
DSS-1_2009_revidert.indd   100 24.04.2009   09:38:10
 Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard 101
1961–1967: The State’s right of ownership 
reformed
The most far-ranging consequence of the dispute over participation 
rights essentially concerned the true meaning of Norway’s sovereignty 
over Svalbard. The Ministry of Industry – unhindered by considera-
tions for Norwegian sovereignty and foreign policy - had basically 
made Svalbard an international industrial park. In addition, the pow-
erlessness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union had already considerably strained 
Norway’s sovereignty exercise, and made the situation very piquant. If 
Caltex were given unlimited freedom of action, this might not embit-
ter only Norwegian-Soviet relations, but also open up for an uncon-
trollable expansion of Russian industrial activity on the archipelago. 
The State’s right to participation thus pertained to more than just 
financial issues. It was “… to a large extent a matter of principle and 
had to be seen in a broader perspective”.316
For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the conclusion was crystal 
clear: Norwegian oil policy had to change drastically. However, this 
turnaround was obstructed for as long as possible by the MI. In addi-
tion, Caltex appeared to have a solid case, but because of the matter’s 
importance Evensen would not give in. He approached the problem 
in a way that was typical of his direction of the legal affairs depart-
ment: jurisprudential perspectives should not dictate Norwegian for-
eign policy. Guided by pragmatic rather than legal analysis, Evensen 
asserted that as long as the dispute over participation rights was be-
ing processed by the Norwegian courts, a great deal of the potency of 
Andenæs’ legal opinion would be lost. There was little probability of 
American involvement. 
That Evensen’s approach was supported by Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Lange, Minister of Justice Haugland, and Secretary General 
Ryssdal was important. It was also significant that the undertow of 
the Kings Bay-accident had sucked under Minister of Industry Holler, 
Principal Officer Lindstrøm, and Secretary General Skjerdal. With 
Lie’s entry to the MI, the Norwegian authorities stood united behind 
the demand for participation rights. The coalition between Caltex and 
the MI, which had earlier dominated the decision-making process, 
had been broken. With sovereignty considerations as its chief con-
cern, Norwegian oil policy became more coordinated. But Caltex’s 
316 Interview with Willum Steen, 28 August 2007 (author’s translation).
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position became more vulnerable. And by referring to consequences 
that Caltex’s dispositions could create, Evensen visualized the need for 
strengthening Norwegian regulatory authority if economic ventures 
were to operate under stable terms. But to strengthen regulatory au-
thority, the country’s sovereign position had to be underlined. Thus 
the company had to accept paying royalty: Caltex accepted the State’s 
demands in the end. 
When Arktikugol applied for oil exploration, the Norwegian pol-
icy of stricter regulation hit an obstacle: objections from Moscow. The 
Norwegian authorities, recognizing that power political relations still 
carried decisive weight on Svalbard, had to let the Soviet company 
in before introducing stricter claim terms. However, that Arktikugol 
accepted the same royalty contract as Caltex was a boon. With that, 
both American and Soviet interests had de facto recognized Norway 
as proprietor of Svalbard’s unclaimed land, and consequently was en-
titled to a certain “… co-ownership of the enterprises’ operations”.317 
Norway’s position was further strengthened when NPN entered into 
a participation rights contract in 1967. Within a judicially uncertain 
area, a practice had been established which underlined Norwegian sov-
ereignty. In sum, a relatively comprehensive development in Norway’s 
position on the archipelago can be identified. In 1961 the Norwegian 
regime was about to slide back to an unregulated terra communis. In 
1967 the situation was different. The recognition of Norway’s primacy 
on Svalbard’s unclaimed land, which was offered de facto by the roy-
alty and participation contracts, the archipelago was to a larger extent 
than before a terra norvegica. 
So the outcome of the dispute over participation rights led to a 
clearer sovereignty position for Norway, but what did this mean for 
Norway’s regulatory authority? As mentioned, Evensen pointed out 
that the real content of national sovereignty depended on the degree 
to which rights were asserted. Accordingly, highlighting Norway’s 
sovereignty would not be of much value “non-policy” since the end of 
World War II continued. 
Participation rights were the first acid test of Evensen’s active 
Svalbard policy. His approach quickly won through at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice. And thanks to replacing 
the leadership at the Ministry of Industry, the bureaucracy at the 
three ministries became attuned to the importance of underlining 
317 Interview with Prof. C. A. Fleischer, 19 April 2007 (author’s translation).
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Norwegian rights on the archipelago. The Government’s decision to 
seek a royalty arrangement, and the Storting’s passing of the contract, 
show that Evensen’s policy also had political approval. It can be as-
serted that the problems associated with Caltex’s activities, combined 
with factors such as the Kings Bay accident, the ESRO Case, and the 
question of the airport, created a consciousness, both within the ex-
ecutive’s administrative machinery and in the Storting, that Norway’s 
disengagement from Svalbard had to stop. The royalty and participa-
tion contracts were especially important in this regard because they 
“… underlined that Norway had regulatory authority as a consequence 
of its sovereignty”.318 Thus the Caltex case was important, not just for 
placing Svalbard on the political and bureaucratic agenda, but also be-
cause it constituted a platform for strengthening Norway’s sovereignty 
exercise. 
318 Interview with Leif Terje Løddesøl, 11 April 2007 (author’s translation).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The “non-policy”
Between 1960 and 1967, Norwegian oil policy on Svalbard developed 
extensively. Initially, it was very much a “non-policy”: the Norwegian 
authorities did not undertake independent initiatives on the archi-
pelago, and only reacted to overseas developments which might af-
fect Svalbard. Since the 1930s, Norwegian politicians had been little 
interested in Svalbard. After World War II, insofar as Norway had a 
Svalbard policy, the goals thereof were to secure Norwegian sovereign-
ty by preserving low regional tension. Realizing this was regarded as 
dependent on the great powers – especially the Soviet Union – not de-
veloping a greater interest in the archipelago. To counter any stronger 
foreign engagement, Norwegian Svalbard policy was, to a larger extent 
than was usual in Norwegian security policy, characterized by reas-
suring the Soviet Union of the country’s peaceful intentions and by 
screening Western powers. The Norwegian government was focused 
sharply on the stipulations of the treaty. The Norwegian authorities 
chose to place “… strong limitations on their sovereignty exercise on 
the archipelago”. This “non-policy” continued unchallenged until the 
1960s.319
Caltex and the Ministry of Industry
How did Caltex manage to achieve such favourable terms on Svalbard? 
First, it is clear that the Ministry of Industry sympathized with 
Caltex concerning the difficulties involved in acquiring deposit sam-
ples. Further, the ministry was impressed by the company raising the 
matter instead of trying to obtain claims based on mineral sample 
319 K. E. Eriksen and H. Pharo, Norsk utenrikspolitikks ..., pp. 65, 371; R. Tamnes, Sval-
bard og stormaktene …, p. 68 (author’s translation).
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deposits. Caltex’s ability to influence the ministry grew as the latter 
was strongly protective of mining policy on the archipelago. It was 
this combination of Caltex and the Ministry of Industry that settled 
the matter: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government or the 
Storting had no opportunity to voice their opinions, and foreign policy 
played no part in the analysis. This was decisive for Caltex obtaining 
such good terms on Svalbard.   
At the same time, it is fair to say that unique circumstances at 
the Ministry of Industry permitted the situation illustrated above. 
Principal Officer Harry Lindstrøm’s part was particularly essential in 
this regard. He practically had a monopoly on the ministry’s Svalbard 
cases and distrusted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That this was ac-
cepted by Minister Kjell Holler and Secretary General Karl Skjærdal 
sealed the Ministry of Industry’s solo run in the deposit sample issue 
and helped seal Caltex’s profitable terms.
Why was this a challenge for Norwegian sovereignty? Independent 
of the Ministry of Industry’s treatment of Caltex, the possibility of dis-
covering oil was a challenge in itself. The right to search for oil and 
minerals was by and large everyman’s on Svalbard. If oil – a strategic 
resource – was discovered, the Norwegian authorities risked Svalbard 
becoming the locus in quo of American and Soviet oil companies. 
Heightened interest from the great powers could lead to the disin-
tegration of the low regional tension. And if conflicts arose between 
American and Soviet interests on the archipelago, Norway’s sovereign-
ty exercise could prove challenging. So it was problematic that Caltex 
had been let in so easily. It did not take long for Arktikugol to report 
its own geological indications. That oil exploration implied disturb-
ing elements for Norwegian foreign policy in a Cold War perspective 
is clear.   
Moreover, by virtue of the Ministry of Industry’s treatment of 
Caltex, the impression that Norwegian sovereignty was no more than 
a caretaker mission widened to include economic interests. It was 
Norway’s duty to prepare conditions for economic activity, the Ministry 
of Industry asserted. Out of consideration for Caltex, the right to regu-
late the criteria for oil claims was surrendered. In other words, a prac-
tice evolved leading to considerations for Norwegian sovereignty being 
subject to considerations for economic activity. As Norwegian sover-
eignty was already very inactive, the situation was piquant. This de-
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velopment became even more serious when Caltex disputed the State’s 
right to participation in claims on unclaimed land. 
Caltex’s contention was built upon a legal opinion written by 
Professor Johs. Andenæs. Based on an assumption that the State’s 
right of ownership to Svalbard’s un-claimed land did not provide the 
same rights as those held by private landowners, Andenæs concluded 
that participation rights could not be invoked by the State. If this 
opinion had been accepted, it would largely confirm that the State’s 
sovereignty over Svalbard was qualitatively different from that over 
the rest of Norway. If this development had not been reversed, the 
Norwegian “non-policy” would have been confirmed both politically 
and legally. Svalbard would in reality be a terra communis.
The ministerial tug of war
By December 1961, in connection with the participation rights is-
sue, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs became aware of the circumstances 
surrounding oil claims on Svalbard. Thus Norwegian oil policy on 
the archipelago became entangled in foreign political threat patterns. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ point of departure was twofold, and 
represents a clear break from the cautious “non-policy” of the 1940s 
and 1950s: the real content of sovereignty over Svalbard depended on 
the extent to which Norway’s rights were enforced, and Norway was 
not obliged to accept any limitations on its exercise of sovereignty 
beyond the explicit stipulations of the Svalbard Treaty. Therefore, it 
became the ministry’s policy that Norway’s regulatory authority had 
to be vigorously practised. But if Norway did not have rights of own-
ership to Svalbard’s unclaimed land as under ordinary constitutional 
law, the authority to regulate the area would be weak. The issue of the 
State’s right to participation in claims on the archipelago’s unclaimed 
land thus concerned both how regulatory authority could be practised 
and the real content of the sovereignty. This was an important matter 
of principle which greatly concerned Norway’s national interests on 
Svalbard.  
As shown in chapter four, the relationship between the Ministry 
of Industry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs soured after the is-
sue of participation rights surfaced. This was particularly evident be-
tween the summer of 1962 until the spring of 1963. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs asserted that the Norwegian authorities had to control 
oil exploration, and thus Norway’s regulatory authority had to be in-
voked actively. Practice concerning claims was far too lenient and the 
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State should demand participation rights regardless of what Professor 
Andenæs thought of the matter.  
At the Ministry of Industry, Lindstrøm was particularly indig-
nant at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ opposition to the Ministry of 
Industry’s treatment of Caltex. Lindstrøm’s antipathy to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and his lack of ability to see that mining policy 
could have foreign political consequences precluded any chance of 
agreement. That the administration was not united hindered any broad 
analysis of the matter. Thus the final decision was taken at a govern-
ment conference. Supported by the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ policy of the active implementation of the sovereign’s 
sole rights won through.  
With a change of minister and new civil servants at the Ministry 
of Industry, policy moved towards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
direction by the autumn of 1963. Thus Norwegian Svalbard policy 
broke with “non-policy”. It was established that Norway had to con-
duct an engaged and regulating policy to strengthen its sovereignty 
on Svalbard. And the new focus on sovereign’s rights yielded positive 
results: royalty contracts with Caltex and Arktikugol, and a participa-
tion rights contract with Norsk Polar Navigasjon, implied that the 
real content of Norway’s sovereignty over Svalbard was recognized by 
international and national actors to include the right of ownership to 
the archipelago’s unclaimed land. Consequently, the State’s right to 
regulate extensively the terms for companies operating on that un-
claimed land was established.  
Between 1960 and 1967, the course of developments is clear. At 
the outset, oil interests posed a challenge for Norwegian sovereignty 
– especially because of the Ministry of Industry’s lenient treatment of 
Caltex and the company disputing the State’s right to participation. 
Norwegian countermeasures reversed this development. Through its 
sovereignty over Svalbard, the State had ownership rights to the un-
claimed land and the authority to regulate economic activity on the 
archipelago.
The 1970s: an active Svalbard policy
The outcome of the Caltex case led to a highlighted sovereignty po-
sition, but what did this mean for the future of Norway’s Svalbard 
policy? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that the real content 
of sovereignty was dependent on the degree to which rights were en-
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forced. Accordingly, highlighting Norway’s sovereignty would not be 
of much value if the “non-policy” remained unchanged.
Significantly, the focus on Svalbard in the 1960s and the recogni-
tion of a need for a more active approach became permanent policy 
features. This was first seen in a reform to strengthen Norway’s gov-
ernance of Svalbard. To avoid a repetition of events, there was a need 
for regularly exchanging information between Svalbard institutions. 
As a consequence, an inter-ministerial coordinating body, the Svalbard 
Committee, was established in 1965. It became an arena where the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs could monitor the foreign political aspects 
of Svalbard issues.
Furthermore, during the latter part of the 1960s, but especially 
during the next decade, Norway started in earnest to make its mark on 
Svalbard. The archipelago was drawn into a process of modernization 
taking place in the rest of Norway. In 1971, the government decided 
to construct an airport on Svalbard, and regulation increased strongly. 
New regulations pertaining to traffic, economic activity, safe oil drill-
ing, air transport, radio transmitters and a rise in claim fees demon-
strated that the State was making increased use of its regulatory author-
ity, even vis-à-vis the relatively autonomous Soviet settlements.320
The Norwegian authorities’ efforts were largely successful. But 
Norwegian regulatory policy was a step in the wrong direction from 
the point of view of the Soviet Union, desirous of a privileged position 
on Svalbard. In practice, however, Soviet companies complied with the 
regulatory measures, a victory for Norwegian Svalbard policy.321  
The Caltex case and Cold War history
In chapter one, three perspectives to analyze Norwegian foreign-
political decision-making process during the Cold War were intro-
duced. The question was whether any of these could shed light on 
the circumstances behind oil exploration on Svalbard. As presumed, 
the one-party politics perspective – i.e. that Norway’s foreign-political 
decision-making processes were the exclusive domain of the Labour 
Party – was not accurate, as Norwegian oil policy was first moulded 
by the Ministry of Industry alone. There was no political involvement 
320 R. Tamnes, Norsk utenrikspolitikks ..., pp. 257, 264, 269–270; UD, 36.6/60, bind 
II, JN.026931. Note from Ambassador Vennemoe to Foreign Minister Vårvik, 
5 July 1973
321 R. Tamnes: Norsk utenrikspolitikks ..., pp. 257–258; UD, 36.6/60, bind II, JN.026931. 
Note from Ambassador Vennemoe to Foreign Minister Vårvik, 5 July 1973
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in the decision to confer Caltex claims. Nor was tightening regu-
latory practice initiated by politicians, but by civil servants at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The idea that the Storting had been re-
duced to rubberstamping decisions already taken is also not valid. 
In the 1960s, the members of the Storting became increasingly con-
cerned with Svalbard issues. That the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ first 
draft contract with Caltex was rejected by the Storting demonstrates 
the participation and influence of parliament. 
The institutional interest perspective’s emphasis on cooperation be-
tween special interest groups and the bureaucracy provides a more ac-
curate account of oil policy on Svalbard. From the end of the 1940s, 
the Ministry of Industry experienced institutional growth and acquired 
responsibility for more and more Svalbard matters. When Caltex an-
nounced its interest in Svalbard, the ministry sympathized with the 
company. Petroleum activities were seen as a purely industrial mat-
ter of no concern to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of 
Industry’s identification with Caltex is further illustrated by its strong 
efforts to hinder participation rights being invoked.  
However, when the Ministry of Industry’s leadership was replaced 
in 1963, the validity of the institutional interest perspective ends. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a leading role and the Government and 
the Storting became involved. The Norwegian authorities’ approach to 
oil interests became more coordinated and its analysis focused mainly 
on national interests. Accordingly, the institutional interest perspective 
only captures essential parts of the opening phase of Norwegian oil 
policy on Svalbard. 
The international framework perspective is the most precise angle 
of approach for oil policy on the archipelago. The Cold War turned 
the High North into a strategically sensitive region, and the Svalbard 
Treaty permitted Soviet activity on Svalbard. With the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ active involvement in the Caltex Case, considera-
tions for sovereignty became decisive for the Norwegian authorities’ 
dispositions. 
The relevance of the international framework perspective is further 
underlined by Norway’s inability to influence external factors. Norway 
and the Soviet Union remained “… the inner circle of the Svalbard 
System …”322 Oil exploration did not rally the Western allies togeth-
322 R. Tamnes: Svalbard og stormaktene …, p. 9 (author’s translation).
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er in support of Norway. So even though Norwegian Svalbard policy 
became more active, Norway’s room for manoeuvre remained limited.
The importance of the external framework is also reflected by the 
threat pattern. The Norwegian authorities viewed the Soviet Union as 
the primary threat, while foreign and Norwegian actors constituted sec-
ondary threats. The Caltex case largely confirms this pattern. If extend-
ed activity by Western and Norwegian companies were permitted, the 
Soviets would demand the same. Indeed, not long after Caltex and 
Norsk Polar Navigasjon had been conferred claims, Arktikugol en-
tered the fray. Likewise, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assumed that 
participation rights could not be invoked vis-à-vis Arktikugol without 
Caltex first having accepted them. 
Moreover, the significance of the threat pattern was evident even 
after Norway’s Svalbard policy became more active. Norwegian exer-
cise of sovereignty had to follow a narrow path. On the one hand, a 
more forceful policy could lead to reactions from Moscow, potentially 
adversely affecting future sovereignty exercise. On the other hand, if 
the Norwegian authorities were compliant, this could also undermine 
sovereignty. To some extent this gave Norwegian Svalbard policy an 
aspect of “… catch 22. Whichever action chosen could go awry”.323
Although the Cold War certainly influenced the external frame-
work of Norwegian Svalbard policies, there are, as noted in the first 
chapter, unresolved legal issues between Norway and some of the par-
ties to the Svalbard Treaty. As with the issue of participation rights, 
from a Norwegian standpoint the heart of the matter is the real con-
tent of Norwegian sovereignty. Accepting the opposing legal argu-
ments would have consequences graver than just financial losses. In 
this regard the Caltex case is not a unique Cold War episode: the le-
gal disputes still exist, but the Cold War emphasized the security po-
litical element in having foreign nationals operating extensively on 
Norwegian soil. 
323 Interview with Prof. C. A. Fleischer, 19 April 2007 (author’s translation).
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